In perhaps one of the most organization-defining offseasons Doug Melvin has ever faced, the team attempted to solidify the back-end of the bullpen by resigning Trevor Hoffman to a one-year, $8MM deal.
The contract also has a mutual option for 2011.
Hoffman was previously unwilling to include an option on his previous contract with Milwaukee, as he was unsure how he would like the team and the surrounding city. That changed after he became the undisputed leader of an infectious clubhouse, running mock courts and leading ceremonies for various players throughout the year. He also was a large part of the Milwaukee community as a whole.
That all lead to the All-Time Saves Leader being back in a Brewers uniform in 2010, if not longer.
Unfortunately, as with all top-flight closers, the Milwaukee Brewers had to overpay for the shiny "closer" tag to keep Hoffman in their bullpen.
In the SportsBubbler forum, brewguru listed the contracts for closers who had 6+ years of service time:
Mariano Riviera: $15 million (3 year/45 mil deal)
Francisco Cordero: $12 million (4 year/46 mil deal)
Francisco Rodriquez: $11.5 million (3 year/37 mil deal)
Brad Lidge: $11.5 million (3 year/37 mil deal)
Joe Nathan: $11.25 million (4 year/47 mil deal)
Kerry Wood: $10.5 million (2 year/20.5 mil deal)
Brian Fuentes: $9 million (2 year/17.5 mil deal)
Jose Valvarde: $8 million (in 2009, will be a FA)
Ryan Franklin: Signed 2 year/$6.5 million deal on September 1, 2009.
By comparing Hoffman's contract to other veteran closers, it is clear that Milwaukee made out pretty well. Hoffman did not demand too much money. The Crew is paying far less for even better production than many teams in the league.
My issue, however, is more of a philosophical disagreement about paying closers top-dollar.
Milwaukee will pay $8MM to a pitcher who only tossed 54 innings last season. That correlates to approximately $148K per inning pitched. It also is $8MM to a pitcher that did not go more than one inning in a single contest during the 2009 season.
Sure, there is something psychologically comforting about having an "ace in the hole" during the ninth inning to close out a win, but their impact on a game is not $6-7MM more important than the reliever who pitches during the eighth inning. It is contract inflation due to the "save" statistic.
To be a bit more concrete about Hoffman's value, we can look at FanGraphs' WAR totals and how it correlates into a specific dollar amount.
Trevor Hoffman was worth +1.5 wins over replacement, which would fetch $6.9MM on the open market.
Before you yell about how Hoffman's contract was approximately $6.5MM after all the incentives and how he actually outperformed his contract, take a look at his career numbers.
At 41-years old, Hoffman put up his best ERA (1.83) and WHIP (0.907) since 1998. He did this despite a walk rate that increased from 1.79 BB/9 to 2.33 BB/9 from last season. His strikeout rate decreased over a batter per nine innings, while his BABIP (batting average on balls in play) was an extremely low .240 -- suggesting Trevor got a bit lucky this season.
That luck becomes more apparent when noticing that his HR/FB rate was only 3.1%. That is significantly lower than his previous marks, and those were in a pitchers park in PETCO. Moving to Miller Park, Trevor should have recorded a bit of an uptick in his HR/FB rate. Instead, it depreciated significantly.
What all these numbers that I just threw out at you suggest is that Trevor Hoffman will likely not be able to sustain his 2009 production. That is, unless he benefits from the same amount of luck that he enjoyed this past season.
This is not out of the question. Hoffman routinely posts a BABIP below .300. His rising fastball induces many infield flies and his changeup is normally down in the zone. He also began throwing his slider much more often to right-handers this season, which gives batters yet another pitch to worry about while constantly having the change in the back of their minds.
I do not wish to portray Hoffman as a below-average closer.
The right-hander still has a strikeout rate that approaches 9.00 K/9, while walking under 2.50 BB/9. Aside from the oblique injury to begin the season, Hoffman has proven extremely durable and healthy throughout his career. He also provides a stabilizing force in the back-end of the bullpen. A solidified closer allows the remainder of the relievers to fall into a set role without having to worry about a closer by committee.
When comparing Hoffman's contract to those of other veteran closers in baseball, Milwaukee did just fine. The team needed a closer with Hoffman hitting free agency, and Doug Melvin moved quickly to address that need. Melvin also did it well within the economic trends of baseball. He should be commended for that.
Once again, I am not against this signing.
I simply am against the practice of overpaying for a reliever that only pitches one inning per game, perhaps only 50-60 games per year. $8MM for such a player is a bit ridiculous, especially when that same closer is coming off a tremendous season that will likely lead to a significant regression in 2010.
Hoffman will likely draw some criticism next season for not performing up to his contract, but it will be from the same folks that praised the deal at the time. Exorbitant contracts to closers only appear worth it when they are "lights out" throughout an entire season -- which Hoffman was in 2009.
The price of the Hoffman signing frustrates me. I do, however, understand the move. It makes sense, especially when considering the baseball economic practices.
Just do not come complaining when you think Hoffman was overpaid in 2010. I can almost guarantee you that he will be.