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If the Brewers want to win the division in 2010, chances are, they're going to need to (a) post a winning record, (b) win at least 85 games, and (c) win more than 90 games. Even in a historically weak division such as the NL Central -- their requisite 3 World Series of the last nine years being the '04 Cards, '05 Astros, and the flukey '06 Cards -- where teams have won the division with as few as 83 games, the average number of victories for the division winners from 2001-present was over 93 wins/season. It's time to have some fun with runs scored / runs allowed. Assume -- yes, I know, this is tough -- that the offense remains constant at 785 RS, which would be quite a feat in consecutive seasons should the league runs environment remain consistently low; the Brewers had one of the best offenses in NL 2009, but their offseason moves thus far really do show that Melvin was (unfortunately) not kidding when he said the Brewers would sacrifice offense for pitching (seriously, what boss would allow their personnel manager to openly say that they're not looking to improve an aspect of their business during a roster-building stage?). But, nevertheless, the Brewers pull through and score 785 runs, again. To win 85 games: 740 RA To win 90 games: 690 RA To win 93 games: 665 RA So, the Brewers' pitchers have their work cut out for them. Unless they are going to work like the 2007 Diamondbacks, and propel themselves to 90 wins despite allowing more runs than scored -- on the strength of magical situational hitting and a dominant bullpen -- the Brewers need to allow 78 fewer, 128 fewer, or 153 fewer runs than their 2009 staff. And that's if the offense remains constant. Here's where the roster stands (using average per 162 games for starters): Zaun: 528 PA, 456 AB, 115 H, 66 BB+HBP, 3/6 SB, 177 TB; .251/.344/.388; 63 RC Fielder: 673 PA, 571 AB, 162 H, 94 BB+HBP, 3/5 SB, 314 TB; .284/.381/.550; 123 RC Weeks: 695 PA, 592 AB, 146 H, 87 BB+HBP, 27/32 SB, 246 TB; .247/.351/.415; 95 RC McGehee: 543 PA, 491 AB, 111 H, 45 BB+HBP, 0/3 SB, 236 TB; .293/.348/.480; 79 RC Escobar: 476 PA, 445 AB, 138 H, 21 BB+HBP, 14/21 SB, 165 TB; .310/.338/.372; 59 RC Braun: 715 PA, 651 AB, 201 H, 59 BB+HBP, 19/25 SB, 374 TB; .308/.363/.574; 136 RC Gomez: 513 PA, 473 AB, 116 H, 33 BB+HBP, 27/37 SB, 164 TB; .246/.292/.346; 50 RC Hart: 627 PA, 569 AB, 155 H, 47 BB+HBP, 20/29 SB, 267 TB; .273/.326/.470; 86 RC These group 162 game averages equal 4770 plate appearances, or a full 76% of the 2009 Brewers' team plate appearances, which would indeed be a remarkable occurrence for the team -- all 8 starters playing full seasons would obviously help the team. And of course, if they played perfectly to their career averages, that puts the core at 691 RC, which puts the bench in excellent position to help the team reach 785 RC; the remaining 94 RC needed from the bench (constituting 11% of the runs scored) would need to be tallied in 24% of the total plate appearances, meaning that the runs scoring output from the bench would not need to be terribly strong if the starters each play full seasons. Of course, it's highly unlikely that Zaun reaches 528 PA on the season, there are question marks about how many PA Weeks can accumulate, Gomez and Escobar are both offensive question marks (for completely different reasons; one is a question mark due to lack of previous production at the MLB level, the other is a question mark due to a simple lack of MLB experience. Escobar obviously is in a much better place than Gomez at the moment, and has his work cut out for him to answer his 2009 improvements made in AAA). Furthermore, it's difficult to see McGehee repeating his 2009 success -- which included a power surge out of nowhere -- over the course of a full season, and although he was more patient in 2009, Corey Hart as a ways to go to recover a .470 SLG. Substituting their 2009 production levels here, the group was actually worth 3234 PA / 520 RC, which puts them at a lower total of PA per 1296 G (2.50 PA/G versus 3.68 PA/G above), but luckily places them on a higher run production pace (.161 RC/PA versus .145 RC/PA above). If the group produced their career average RC/PA over 3234 2009 PA, they would be worth 469 runs; if the group produced at their 2009 RC/PA over the 4770 PA listed above, they would be worth 768 runs. I am juxtaposing 2009 performance against career performance to amplify the career question marks we can raise about some 2009 performances by this group, and also to note the rather severe playing time trends. In one scenario, the group forces the bench to work 3062 PA / 265 RC (.087 RC/PA), whereas in another the group forces the bench to work 1526 / 94 PA (0.61 RC/PA), which obviously leaves the bench in an ideal situation in one case and severely tests organizational depth in the other scenario. *** The reason I am scrutinizing these offensive issues is that they deeply affect the pitching. Imagine the pitching staff actually improves by 128 runs versus 2009, fully putting this team on a course to improve their W-L record. If the offense scores even 20 fewer runs, leaving a 765 RS / 690 RA split, which puts the team between 88 and 89 wins instead of 90 and 91 wins. This is why I do not buy into the idea that the team can "sacrifice" offense for pitching, which seems to be a prevalent view in Brewers fandom, as well as a stated point by the Brewers' front office. If the Brewers' offense cannot improve upon their 2009 success, or even maintain it, the pitching woes are amplified that much further. With 765 RS:
To win 85 games: 720 RA To win 90 games: 675 RA To win 93 games: 645 RA In one case, a marked improvement of 100 fewer RA than 2009 results in just over 85 wins; in the other, the team moves even closer to 90 wins. Which is why the offense cannot be sacrificed.
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Here's my favorite argument in favor of Blyleven: Blyleven:
692 G, 4970 IP, 118 ERA;Longest above average stretches: (1) 1970-9,
353 G, 2624.7 IP, 130 ERA+; (2) 1983-7, 167 G, 1233.7 IP, 121 ERA+.
Best consecutive 10 seasons: 1970-9, 353 G, 2624.7 IP, 130 ERA+
Spahn:
750 G, 5243.7 IP, 118 ERA+; Longest above average stretch: (1) 1946-59,
527 G, 3797.3 IP, 126 ERA+; (2) 1961-3, 105 G, 791.7 IP, 124 ERA+. Best
consecutive 10 seasons: 1947-56, 386 G, 2818.7 IP, 128 ERA+. Ryan:
807 G, 5386 IP, 111 ERA+. Longest above average stretches: (1) 1972-5,
150 G, 1140.7 IP, 118 ERA+; (2) 1981-4, 115 G, 779.3 IP, 118 ERA+; (3)
1989-92, 116 G, 773.7 IP, 120 ERA+. Best consecutive 10 seasons:
1972-81, 347 G, 2564 IP, 116 ERA+. Perry: 777 G, 5350.3 IP, 117
ERA+. Longest above average stretches: (1) 1966-80, 557 G, 4275.7 IP,
125 ERA+. Best consecutive 10 seasons: 1966-75, 388 G, 3088.3 IP, 130
ERA+. Sutton: 774 G, 5282.3 IP, 108 ERA+. Longest above average
stretches: (1) 1971-7, 247 G, 1832.7 IP, 124 ERA+; (2) 1980-2, 89 G,
620.7 IP, 129 ERA+; 1984-6, 101 G, 645.7 IP, 104 ERA+. Best consecutive
10 seasons: 1971-80, 346 G, 2509.3 IP, 120 ERA+. P. Niekro: 864
G, 5404.3 IP, 115 ERA+; Longest above average stretches: (1) 1967-82,
626 g, 4278 IP, 122 ERA+. Best consecutive 10 seasons: 1967-76, 397 G,
2622.7 IP, 126 ERA+. Bunning: 591 G, 3760.3 IP, 114 ERA+.
Longest above average stretches: (1) 1956-62, 250 G, 1568 IP, 122 ERA+;
(2) 1964-7, 163 G, 1191.7 IP, 140 ERA+. Best consecutive 10 seasons:
1958-67, 392 G, 2687.3 IP, 124 ERA+.
Any player that
plays consistently will indeed accumulate stats, but Blyleven is better
than simply accumulating stats. Besides, even if he was only
good at accumulating stats over a long period of time, what makes
Spahn, Ryan, Perry, Sutton, Niekro, and Bunning any different? Now, a real issue would be how Blyleven shapes up against the best HOF'ers of his time... Palmer:
558 G, 3948 IP, 126 ERA+. Longest above average stretches: (1) 1967-80,
424 G, 3199 IP, 133 ERA+. Best consecutive 10 seasons: 1969-78, 358 G,
2770.3 IP, 139 ERA+. Gibson: 528 G, 3884.3 IP, 127 ERA+.
Longest above average stretches: (1) 1961-73, 433 G, 337 IP, 137 ERA+.
Best consecutive 10 seasons: 1961-70, 343 G, 2654.3 IP, 139 ERA+. And, for fun, here's a real head-scratcher: Hunter:
500 G, 3449.3 IP, 104 ERA+.Longest above average stretches: (1)
1971-75, 191 G, 1471.7 IP, 127 ERA+. Best consecutive 10 seasons:
1967-76, 376 G, 2773.3 IP, 111 ERA+. If Catfish Hunter is in the
HOF, after putting together a career that is nearly 200 starts shorter
than Blyleven's, and not even close to being as good for as
long, why exactly is Blyleven getting the shaft? Especially after
Spahn, Ryan, Perry, Sutton, Niekro, Sutton, and Bunning made the HOF? Now,
I will agree with you here: nothing really sticks out for Blyleven. He
was hardly ever on good teams, so he doesn't have that "slightly above
average pitcher works well during Championship run" charm, and his
curveball didn't have a popular big-market nickname ("The Yellow
Hammer"), and he didn't have an overwhelming personality trait that
built up hype, clashed with his owner, or worked itself into a
box-office nickname....but yet, he's just as good, if not better, that
most of that list of 7 pitchers above, and he's certainly better than Hunter...
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As the Brewers'
offensive core of Ryan Braun and Prince Fielder continue to develop
their respective plate approaches, the Brewers have a solid offensive
duo that can easily be plugged into the top or middle of a batting
order. The question of the Brewers' offensive production does not rest
on their shoulders; while it would certainly be devastating if one was
injured, their production is not at issue.
With the
remainder of the batting order, the concern is much more with
production than showing up; whereas Braun and Fielder simply need to be
present for the Brewers' offense, the other corner fielders and new SS
and CF do not have the same luxury. Of this group of players outside of
Braun and Fielder, Gregg Zaun is pretty much a steady, patient veteran
with a specific track record and skill set, Rickie Weeks raises a host
of injury issues, and Corey Hart looks to capitalize on the increased
patience in his batting approach in 2010, to prove that 2009 really was
a watershed season in his case. The remaining regulars from
2009, or new faces, are Casey McGehee, Carlos Gomez, and Alcides
Escobar, and although one might find little that is similar in their
disparate backgrounds and acquisition to the Brewers, these three
batters introduce an important new dynamic to the Brewers' batting
order, but not without a host of questions and concerns. These
three batters will prove crucial to the 2010 Brewers' offensive output.
As a group, they all have the same issue: inexperience at the Major
League level, and minor league careers with little or no distinctive
traits. In the case of McGehee, he broke onto the scene for the Brewers
in 2009 as a waiver acquisition, and apart from his startling MLB
performance last year, his professional record is very nearly faceless:
McGehee does not offer much in terms of power, patience, or contact,
but rather depends upon the concert of those three aspects to build his
approach. Gomez is well-known as an impatient speedster that grates
against managerial wisdom, but sympathetic supporters might observe
that his professional career thus far is as rushed as his approach to
the game. Alcides Escobar is the prize of the bunch, a bona fide
prospect that gets his trial-by-fire after J.J. Hardy was traded to the
Minnesota Twins. Surprisingly, after a breakthrough minor league
campaign in which Escobar developed his extra base hit output and
posted a strong OBP without relying solely on AVG, Escobar regressed
back to his previous self upon appearing in the majors in limited time
during the 2009 season. What the Brewers' office and Brewers fans
can expect from this group of players is a departure from the Brewers'
previous mold of high strike out, high walk, high power success. (1)
Apart from McGehee's unexpected power explosion in 2009 at the major
league level, not one of these players boasts even league average power
(think .025 HR/PA, or approx. 2.5 HR per 100 plate appearances,
approximately 16 HR per 650 PA). In fact, in both his major and minor
league plate appearances, Carlos Gomez posts consistent power numbers
around 1.1% and 1.5% HR/PA (approximately 10 HR per 650 PA at best),
McGehee finds himself consistently between 1.6% and 2.2% (approximately
14 HR per 650 PA at best), and Escobar sits firmly below the 1% mark, hovering between .5% and .8% HR/PA (approximately 5 HR per 650 PA at best). (2)
None of these three players boast particularly notable plate
discipline, and until his 2009 breakthrough, one could say that both
Gomez and Escobar have particularly bad plate approaches in that
department. Escobar's minor league career features a slow and steady
increase from approximately 3%-4% BB/PA to 6%-7% BB/PA, which at the
very least approaches the 2009 NL average of approximately 9%
BB/PA. Outside of a brief period of discipline in roughly 170 minor
league PA in 2007, Gomez rests firmly between the 4% and 6% BB/PA.
McGehee is the patient one of the bunch, consistently sitting between
7% and 9% BB/PA, most recently resting around 8.5% BB/PA. The
result, of course, will be that for the first time in years, the
Brewers will have several position players who rely heavily on putting
the ball in play, which is not necessarily a good sign for offensive
production -- there is no correlation between high BIP% without noted BB% or HR% performances, with only a few exceptions in the last couple of years (most notably the St. Louis Cardinals). (3)
Of course, one of the corresponding traits is low K%, right? Well, not
as low as one might expect. Given their low BB%, these players should
strike out less than 15% consistently, and certainly should lower their K% down towards that 10% mark, which is the trait of an extreme contact hitter (think Vlad Guerrero in his prime, or Albert Pujols). Unfortunately, Gomez is a complete disappointment in this aspect of his game, regularly
striking out more than 3 times his walk rate. If you thought watching
strike outs was obnoxious with Mike Cameron patrolling centerfield,
keep his above average BB% and HR% in mind when you're watching Gomez
strike out almost as frequently without any of the other true outcome benefits. Escobar
is probably the best member of this trio in this aspect of the game,
settling into a 13% K/PA range that at least renders a 5%-6% BB ratio somewhat
acceptable. McGehee is a wild card, and his strike out rate will very
likely depend upon how frequently he hits home runs (2009 was a fluke
in that regard for McGehee; it was the first season in his professional
career in which he boasted a high HR% and an acceptable K%.
There is absolutely no precedent for him maintaining that power
production, especially given that Miller Park is playing as a slight
pitchers' park in the last few years). On the whole, the Brewers' offense in 2010 will depend upon three players finding their identity.
If Gomez and McGehee are both starting at CF and 3B to begin the year,
they will have to answer serious questions about the way they approach
their game, especially given McGehee's explosive combination of walking
and power in 2009 that is unmatched by any season in his professional
career; I cannot stress enough just how much his 2009 production came
out of nowhere. Gomez will need to let the game slow down,
become more selective, and develop a cohesive identity and approach at
the plate. If he's a contact hitter without power, he will need to
become much more selective and cut the strike outs; if he's going to
develop power, he will need to express that selectivity in a different
regard. Escobar is the gem of the bunch, and to him I pose one
question: when will the 2009 advancements and improvements manifest at
the major league level? Overall, there remains one crucial
question: with some other question marks on the diamond in Weeks' wrist
and Hart's plate-approach-gut-check (will he blink in continuing his
marked patience improvements in 2009?), and moderate pitching
improvements likely, how far will this offense regress? Or,
perhaps stated in a more positive tone, what will these three players
need to accomplish to maintain a run scored out put of 785?
| Gomez |
PA |
BB% |
HR% |
K% |
BIP% |
BABIP |
| 2004 |
239 |
0.029 |
0.004 |
0.16 |
0.774 |
0.335 |
| 2005 |
539 |
0.059 |
0.015 |
0.163 |
0.746 |
0.322 |
| 2006 |
486 |
0.056 |
0.014 |
0.2 |
0.689 |
0.35 |
| 2007 |
172 |
0.093 |
0.012 |
0.157 |
0.721 |
0.323 |
| Gomez |
PA |
BB% |
HR% |
K% |
BIP% |
BABIP |
| 2007 |
139 |
0.058 |
0.014 |
0.194 |
0.712 |
0.273 |
| 2008 |
614 |
0.041 |
0.011 |
0.231 |
0.705 |
0.33 |
| 2009 |
349 |
0.063 |
0.009 |
0.206 |
0.711 |
0.286 |
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| McGehee |
PA |
BB% |
HR% |
K% |
BIP% |
BABIP |
| 2003 |
258 |
0.039 |
0.012 |
0.178 |
0.764 |
0.32 |
| 2004 |
491 |
0.067 |
0.02 |
0.141 |
0.77 |
0.284 |
| 2005 |
505 |
0.085 |
0.016 |
0.127 |
0.77 |
0.326 |
| 2006 |
546 |
0.075 |
0.02 |
0.128 |
0.77 |
0.305 |
| 2007 |
486 |
0.088 |
0.021 |
0.171 |
0.718 |
0.297 |
| 2008 |
550 |
0.073 |
0.022 |
0.162 |
0.738 |
0.333 |
| McGehee |
PA |
BB% |
HR% |
K% |
BIP% |
BABIP |
| 2008 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
0.32 |
0.68 |
0.235 |
| 2009 |
394 |
0.863 |
0.041 |
0.17 |
0.7 |
0.33 |
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| Escobar |
PA |
BB% |
HR% |
K% |
BIP% |
BABIP |
| 2004 |
262 |
0.076 |
0.008 |
0.168 |
0.733 |
0.328 |
| 2005 |
562 |
0.036 |
0.004 |
0.16 |
0.788 |
0.314 |
| 2006 |
386 |
0.049 |
0.005 |
0.145 |
0.793 |
0.288 |
| 2007 |
528 |
0.034 |
0.002 |
0.134 |
0.824 |
0.345 |
| 2008 |
597 |
0.052 |
0.013 |
0.137 |
0.792 |
0.362 |
| 2009 |
487 |
0.066 |
0.008 |
0.133 |
0.782 |
0.325 |
| Escobar |
PA |
BB% |
HR% |
K% |
BIP% |
BABIP |
| 2008 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0.25 |
0.75 |
0.667 |
| 2009 |
134 |
0.03 |
0.007 |
0.134 |
0.813 |
0.339 |
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One of the reasons I am skeptical of the Randy Wolf signing is that throughout his career, Wolf has proven unable to pitch two consecutive above average seasons; the last time he worked a season of 200 IP, 120 ERA+ before 2009 was 2002, when he worked 210.7 IP for the Phillies, posting a 3.20 ERA (121 ERA+) and 1.116 WHIP. He followed that campaign in 2003 with a 4.23 ERA (94 ERA+) in 200 IP with a 1.27 WHIP. Notably, his FIP (Fielding Independent Pitching) between 2002 and 2003 were much closer than his actual ERA, as his walk, home run, and strike out ratios yielded FIP of 3.75 in 2002 and 4.28 in 2003; he almost seemed destined to regress after 2002. We can find similar issues with Wolf's 2009 campaign, in which he followed a 190.3 IP, 92 ERA+, 1.377 WHIP season with a 214.3 IP, 122 ERA+, 1.101 WHIP season. Not surprisingly, his FIP were much closer; in 2008, Wolf posted a 4.17 FIP, whereas he worked at a 3.97 level without his defense in 2009. This strong ERA / FIP discrepency -- almost 0.70 ER/9 IP -- can be traced to Wolf's excellent BABIP of .256, which is well above normal defensive efficiency ratio (almost 4% better than league average defensive efficiency). My concern is that Wolf's stable BB and K rates will lead to a decline in Milwaukee, playing in front of a less efficient defense. Perhaps this was part of the problem with the 2009 Brewers' rotation: 2009 Brewers pitching staff: .299 BABIP Yovani Gallardo: .288 BABIP Braden Looper: .294 BABIP
Jeff Suppan: .318 BABIP
David Bush: .324 BABIP
Manny Parra: .365 BABIP Notice that of the Brewers' main starters of 2009, the only above average defensive efficiency / BABIP numbers belong to Gallardo and Looper, and they are both within 1% of league average (so, it's not really notable that they're above average per se). What concerns me about Wolf, specifically, is that although his ground ball and fly ball ratios are rather consistent and rather close throughout his career, he still relies on fly outs more than ground outs. Placed in front of below average outfielders such as Ryan Braun and Corey Hart concerns me, even with a fine defensive centerfielder such as Carlos Gomez.
Pitching in front of an average defense in most cases, and shifting to a slightly more favorable park for hitters (compared to Dodgers Stadium, although Miller Park and Dodgers Stadium are closer than you might guess), it seems that Wolf will be unlikely to sustain the low WHIP necessary for him to produce an above average performance. With that, I am unsure what the Brewers actually purchased with their $10 million.
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After stumbling around Chicago drunk last night with a group of
skinny-legged noise rockers, I wandered home from a mysterious dance
club in which I climbed atop a light fixture and carved the name of my
nemesis in my chest with shards of Two-Hearted Ale bottles. CARLOS GOMEZ really burns, baby. I
awoke in a fit of madness and distress, wondering why my hatred guided
me to new depths. Really, I came to, and determined to end my hatred
for the ballplayer that can't hit a ball farther than I can throw a
bohemian. After all, the object of my visions of hatred was behind the
wheel of the #50 that took me home at 7:30 this morning, so the least I
can do is return the favor...
***
So, a
retrospective of Gomez's minor league career is in order. I wonder,
openly, what Gomez accomplished as a minor leaguer that could offer
insights to possible improvements in 2010. I seem all too willing to
say that the kid won't do anything in 2010, but I figured that I should
at least give him a fighting chance by glancing over his rushed minor
league career. Specifically, I am interested in how he put the
ball in play, and what trends are sustainable, which trends can
improve, and, of course, which are not going to ever translate at the
major league level.
| Gomez |
PA |
BB% |
HR% |
K% |
BIP% |
BABIP |
| 2004 |
239 |
0.029 |
0.004 |
0.16 |
0.774 |
0.335 |
| 2005 |
539 |
0.059 |
0.015 |
0.163 |
0.746 |
0.322 |
| 2006 |
486 |
0.056 |
0.014 |
0.2 |
0.689 |
0.35 |
| 2007 |
172 |
0.093 |
0.012 |
0.157 |
0.721 |
0.323 |
Anybody here surprised to see that Gomez was a high contact, low power, low K%, low BB% player in the minors? A player who almost completely relied on putting the ball in play and having it drop between fielders? A
few things come to mind: although he strikes out like crazy in the
bigs, his minor league numbers indicate that he has the capability to
strike out at a pretty strong rate (around 16%), but of course, he
doesn't come close to posting a valuable K/BB ratio even with lower K
rates. Part of me wonders just how much Gomez exploited poor minor
league defense, resulting in BABIP rates that are
perfectly-consistent-yet-completely-unsustainable -- for instance, his
best minor league season (2006) features his best BABIP (.350), and
this occurred in a league that featured defenses that converted BIP
into outs at a rate that was easily 5% lower than what one might reasonably expect from major leaguers. Coupled
with better selectivity in the minors, and that occurrence of more BIP
means a much better exploitation of his speed and a more extreme
offensive profile.
This helps to explain his major league performance, which indicates only one notable shift: the kid strikes out a lot
more at the big league level, subsequently squashing his BIP%, which
looks even more disastrous when you place him in the context of
defenses that can actually field the ball.
| Gomez |
PA |
BB% |
HR% |
K% |
BIP% |
BABIP |
| 2007 |
139 |
0.058 |
0.014 |
0.194 |
0.712 |
0.273 |
| 2008 |
614 |
0.041 |
0.011 |
0.231 |
0.705 |
0.33 |
| 2009 |
349 |
0.063 |
0.009 |
0.206 |
0.711 |
0.286 |
Notice that
neither Gomez's BB% nor HR% shift much from his minor league career,
while his K% explodes, meaning fewer BIP%. Of course, not surprisingly,
his BABIP fluctuates wildly, too, which is indicative of playing
against better defenses against pitchers who know how to exploit his
lack of selectivity. So, where do we go from here? My most
optimistic appraisal of Gomez is that a slight return to his K% of the
minor leagues will result in better production simply by yielding more
balls in play, which is crucial for a player who doesn't walk and
doesn't HR. Of course, one could argue that increased selectivity at
the major leagues could exploit power potential that is currently
hidden within the K%, and perhaps raise his BB% to a league average
level (between 8% and 9%). This is a lot for Gomez to accomplish, and he has his work cut out for him. He needs to become a more extreme contact player, at first, for him to be successful in 2010 -- that is, if
the selectivity isn't there. If the selectivity shows up, we might be
able to become optimistic about him notching that HR% up a bit to
league average level, along with that BB%.... ....but, I'm wondering just how long we should hold our breath. Thankfully the Crew can hang onto Gomez for four years!
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