Man, I've got to admit, I am going to miss watching Mike Mussina pitch. The guy's all arms and legs coming at you, working on refining that game and reinventing himself after the fastball is gone, throwing every single pitch ever invented and working that arm angle to get those batters off balance. You've got to love a guy who throws a few curves, a bunch of fastballs, a slider, and thirty-five change ups and still adds that split-fingered fastball to his arsenal. Works to get that 85 MPH fastball past batters. Works to get that nasty sink on the 2-seamer (seriously, watch the clips ESPN is showing of that junkballer extraordinaire -- those pitches that are starting approximately 5-6 inches off the plate and coming back are fastballs!).

So, of course the Hall of Fame debate is up, and I happen to think that after Roger Clemens comes up before him, the Moose should be an intriguing candidate. For some time, he'll benefit from the fact that he beat Pedro Martinez and Randy Johnson to retirement, and maybe Greg Maddux, too. Mussina's main competition for the Hall will be those extraordinary aces who began their careers in the 1980s and 1990s and managed to make it through the steroids era as well -- I don't even think a push from Kevin Brown could unseat Mussina.

What will be interesting is how Mussina fares against the Hall of Fame voters' biggest recent debate, that of Jack Morris and Bert Blyleven, with sidebar evidence entered from Stat Geeks vs. Shooters-from-the-hip (or, people who watch baseball vs. people who watch baseball....you figure it out!)

I happen to think that Mussina will beat both Blyleven and Morris to the Hall. Here's why:

(1) His loss total is much better, and he has a respectable win total (that stuff matters to the people with the ballots)

(2) Mussina is an opportunistic retiree. His career did not drop off to the extent that the respective careers of Morris and Blyleven did. From age 34, Mussina pitched 6 seasons, with 3 of them below average (the worst was an 87 ERA+ over 152 IP in 2007). Morris pitched 6 seasons from age 34, with 4 of them below average (the worst was a 70 ERA+ over 152.7 IP in 1993), and Blyleven pitched 7 from age 34, with 3 of them below average (the worst was a 73 ERA+ over 133 IP in 1990).

And of course, from age 34, Mussina has 3 seasons at or above 120 ERA+ (with one above 130); Blyleven has 2 (both are above 130, and one is above 140, though); Morris has 1 above 120 ERA+ from age 34 forward.

I can only see the fact that Mussina finished with his best win total yet, and retired before he put up too many clunkers.

(3) Mussina was so damn consistent. 15 of 18 seasons at or above 100 ERA+. 12 of 18 seasons at or above 120 ERA+. 4 of 18 seasons at or above 140 ERA+.

Morris also had 18 seasons. 11 of 18 at or above 100 ERA+. 6 of 18 seasons at or above 120 ERA+. 0 above 140 ERA+.

Blyleven had 22 seasons. 17 of 22 seasons at or above 100 ERA+. 11 of 22 seasons at or above 120 ERA+. 5 of 22 seasons at or above 140 ERA+.

***

If the battle is Mussina versus Blyleven and Morris, I see Mussina being the bigtime candidate. Of course, he probably has some "experiential" counter-arguments that need to be defended. Unlike Morris, he doesn't have a "defining" game, or a defining moment of clutch greatness. His playoff record is 7-9, which looks bad despite a solid 3.42 ERA (and the playoff W-L is probably due more to luck; more advanced win probability calculations, such as Win Probability Added have Mussina basically even). Unlike Blyleven, he doesn't have the back-up argument behind his statistics that he played for relatively poor teams in poor markets, obscuring his perception as a national pitcher. Some might see it as a strike against Mussina that he spent almost a decade in New York, and the good 1990s years in Baltimore, and still failed to win a World Series.

I still don't think that obscures or distorts Mussina's clear production. He's not the best pitcher of the steroids era. But he's pretty damn close. Comparing his career wins probability and statistics to the obvious leaders and other notable names and contract signees of the era:

(Using Win Probability Added, a career running aggregate of the positive and negative shifts in game winning probability based on inning, baserunning, and score situation; Batted Runs Against Average, a career running aggregate of the positive and negative shifts in expected runs based on baserunners and outs situations; and Runs Expected Wins, a conversion of BRAA that expresses the runs-expected aggregate in terms of wins; i.e., like wins above average based on runs allowed and runs prevented against expectations. See FanGraphs for more expanations of these awesome stats. They're rather intuitive stats for expressing a running progression of a player's situational successes and failures)

 (To make reading these stats easier, think of this: a player who accumulated a 0 WPA over the course of his career has a perfectly even contribution to aggregate win and loss probability throughout his career. So, some of these pitchers are incredibly above average):

Roger Clemens:

WPA: 76.15; BRAA: 757.10 (74.06 REW)

WPA+385.06, -WPA 308.91

Randy Johnson:

WPA: 54.16; BRAA: 548.91 (51.81 REW)

+WPA 319.83, -WA 265.67

Greg Maddux:

WPA: 53.69; BRAA: 495.86 (51.45 REW)

+WPA 373.77, -WPA 320.08

Pedro Martinez:

WPA: 50.91; BRAA: 513.48 (49.66 REW)

WPA+ 212.60, -WPA 161.69

Mike Mussina:

WPA: 39.76; BRAA: 404.43 (39.08 REW)

+WPA 265.00, -WPA 225.23

Curt Schilling:

WPA: 36.54; BRAA: 412.18 (40.21 REW)

+WPA 244.71, -WPA 208.17

Kevin Brown:

WPA: 30.55; BRAA: 305.98 (30.87 REW)

+WPA 250.64, -WPA 220.09

Tom Glavine:

WPA: 30.17; BRAA 307.59 (31.48 REW)

+WPA 333.38, -WPA 303.21

Kevin Appier:

WPA: 22.54; BRAA: 213.39 (20.68 REW)

+WPA 201.60, -WPA 179.05

David Wells:

WPA: 20.55; BRAA: 187.36 (17.07 REW)

+WPA 263.95, -WPA 243.39

Jamie Moyer:

WPA: 12.22; BRAA: 135.29 (12.64 REW)

+WPA 279.13, -WPA 266.91

Kevin Millwood:

WPA: 5.79; BRAA: 66.67 (6.27 REW)

+WPA 160.50, -WPA: 154.71

Mike Hampton:

WPA: 4.72; BRAA: 53.67 (4.94 REW)

+WPA 166.44, -WPA: 161.72

Now, it's rather obvious that he's no Clemens, Maddux, Johnson, or Pedro. But he is definitely comparable or better than other notable aces of the era, such as Curt Schilling, Tom Glavine, and Kevin Brown. Given the way in which Mussina finished his career, he probably has a stronger case for the Hall than 300-game winner Tom Glavine, and everyone's favorite clutch ace, Schilling. And it cannot hurt that Mussina pitched throughout his bigtime contract with the Yankees with more success than other notable big-contract signees, Brown and Hampton.

(Perhaps in the era of high pitching contracts in the 1990s and beyond, a player has a better case for the Hall based on how they pitched through a huge contract versus their career win total, ERA, and IP. Could the fact that Mussina is one of the easiest pitchers to name as a relative success throughout a long-term deal help his case for the Hall?)

But, really, we'll miss that stuff. Seriously, how many other truly crafty pitchers outlasted Mussina in this era? Maddux? Okay, he's easily better. Moyer? His longevity is insane, but he's not an ace like Mussina could be considered. Pedro? Yeah, nothing beats Pedro's work as a sinker/change up guy, but his career finish is not looking as strong as Mussina's.

I've got some serious junkball blues for Mussina. That big 'ol curveball, that neat l'il sinkerball, and everything in between; those flying elbows and legs, and the illusion that that baseball hat is not even going to stay on his head.

A pure junkballer, baby. And I've got those blues, Mussina.

I'd imagine that if we polled the average Brewers fan leaving Miller Park, the resounding opinion on Rickie Weeks would be that he is a bust -- a plain and simple high-draft pick bust who never lived up to the hype, his minor league numbers, or the promise of his college career.

But, part of me has always wondered if Weeks has been more of a victim of incredibly high standards and ridiculous hype coming from the Brewers' organization -- the expectation is always that he breaks out at some point, not that he continue to work as an average MLB second baseman. Early hype had Weeks as the type of huge power threat fit for the #3 role, and his power/speed combination brought whispers of a 20/20, 30/30 threat at a historically weak offensive position. It seems that no matter the development, no matter the reality to his production, Brewers fans and the Brewers organization have helped themselves to as many servings of Rickie Weeks hype as their bellies can handle. 

After all, it was never about producing a functional core of young major leaguers, right? The desire was to produce a core of young major league stars, which of course ignores that fact that the vast majority of baseball players drafted indeed become average players, or worse. 

What leads me to believe that Rickie Weeks is the victim of unrealistic and unfocused hype is simple: the history of the second pick in the MLB Rule IV draft, or the June amateur draft. One might think, intuitively, that there is little difference between the first and second draft pick since the inception of the draft. But upon a closer look, that's not really the case.

There were 30 position players drafted with the first pick before 2008; 28 of those picks made it to the majors, with 22 accumulating 1000 or more career AB, and 20 accumulating 2000 or more career AB. 13 of those players posted a career OPS at or above .800, and 4 posted a career OPS at or above .900. Lofty company, indeed; hell, there are 11 first picks who posted at least 5000 career AB (or more).

By comparison, the second pick saw 22 position players drafted before 2007, with 19 of those picks making it to the majors. 17 of those players accumulated 1000 or more AB during their career, and 12 players accumulated 2000 or more AB. The kicker? Only 5 second picks posted a career OPS at or above .800, and none reached that exceptional .900 OPS plateau. Even further, only 4 second picks ever made it to (or beyond) 5000 career AB.

Here's the breakdown:

Position Players drafted: 30 (1st), 22 (2nd)

To majors: 28 (1st; 93%), 19 (2nd; 86%)

1000 AB: 22 (1st;  73%), 17 (2nd; 77%)

2000 AB: 20 (1st; 67%), 12 (2nd;  55%)

5000 AB: 11 (1st; 37%), 4 (2nd; 18%)

+.800 OPS: 13 (1st; 43%), 5 (2nd; 23%)

+.900 OPS: 4 (1st; 13%), 0 (2nd; 0%)

Right off the bat, we can question the type of hype a second pick should receive. It is rather clear, by direct comparison, that the second pick has not historically matched the first pick, and even though the second pick has produced players with fine careers such as Reggie Jackson and Will Clark, the second pick cannot match Alex Rodriguez, Chipper Jones, Ken Griffey, Jr., or even Josh Hamilton.

A more in-depth search of second picks will show the historical level of production from the second pick. Those 22 position players drafted with the second pick accumulated 77,792 plate appearances, 18,178 hits, and 30,073 total bases; the average 2nd pick career spans 3536 PA, includes 826 H, and 1367 TB, with a line of .265/.340/.438.

That's right. Our beloved second base power/speed superstar-to-be, from draft day forward, was expected to become a superstar against the historical marker of .265/.340/.438, and an average career span of 3536 PA. This, without even considering that Weeks was the first second pick ever drafted at 2B, and only the 8th middle infielder drafted with the second pick.

Here are those eight middle infielders drafted with the second pick:

 

Middle Infielders:		PA	AB	H	BB	HBP	TB
Terry Hughes		97	86	18	7	2	24
Rick Manning		5832	5248	1349	471	9	1792
Garry Harris		0	0	0	0	0	0
Augie Schmidt		0	0	0	0	0	0
Kurt Stillwell		3478	3125	779	274	18	1092
Mark Lewis		3051	2795	736	196	16	1061
B.J. Upton		1554	1339	371	190	8	570
Rickie Weeks		1907	1615	395	215	59	656
Totals		15919	14208	3648	1353	112	5195
AVG:	0.257		AVG PA:	1990
OBP:	0.321		AVG H:	456
SLG:	0.366		AVG TB:	649
OPS:	0.687

 

Amazing, isn't it? 

My whole point isn't that we shouldn't criticize and analyze Weeks' shortcomings; that we shouldn't expect him to play well with his tools. He is a very toolsy player, has a lot of talent, and should be able to continue to produce as an average 2B.

But against which history do we compare him? In the context of the second pick, in the history of the Rule IV draft, Rickie Weeks is one of the best middle infielders drafted with that historical pick. In a historical draft pick that has not produced superstar second baseman, that has not produced lengthy careers in the middle infield, Weeks' career is already a success.

Now, this says nothing of his minor league stats, nor his college career. There are markers in his past that suggest the type of player Weeks has been or could become. This might depend upon his development, his injury history, and whether or not he's miscast by the Brewers in the lead-off role.

There are a whole host of points by which we can analyze Weeks. But the one point that I think is undeniably false is any point that suggests that Rickie Weeks is a bust.

I do not think we can look at the historical evidence, nor Weeks' rather average career to this point (he is a career .245/.352/.406 second baseman). In the next year, Weeks' career will surpass the average length of a second pick middle infield career; he will likely surpass average PA, average H, and he has already surpassed the average TB accumulated by a second pick middle infielder.

I have long thought that the Brewers’ young core underachieved in 2008, and this stroke in fortune cost the Brewers dearly in overall runs totals throughout the season. What an odd occurrence, if you think about it – how likely is it that of the 6 regulars aged 28 or younger, 5 of them regress during the same season?

I’ve assembled a series of questions based around each player’s individual regressions, or in Hardy’s case, evaluating why he didn’t regress and assessing his chances at regression in 2009.

Most of the stats I’ve used should be intuitive, and I’ve linked the main Baseball-Reference pages so you can read along with me, year by year. I went within the basic AVG/OBP/SLG trio to provide a more precise picture of their production. Here are two stats that might not seem intuitive:

-BABIP (Batting Average on Balls in Play). This is simply the rate at which every batted ball that was not a home run drops in for a hit. It makes a bit more sense as a defensive metric, i.e., how opposing defenses convert a batter’s balls in play into outs (which would be easily approximated by: ((1) – BABIP)). I took BABIP figures from B-R.

-BIP% (Balls in Play Percentage): This should be intuitive: it’s simply the rate at which a batter puts the ball in play. I calculate this as ( (AB – HR – K) / (PA) ), simply to correspond with the BABIP stats. I understand that we could use a more thorough calculation for this figure, but that requires more in-depth debate than I’d prefer for this analysis, and that might also compromise the compatibility of BABIP and my BIP%.

These six players are the bread and butter of the Brewers in 2009, regardless of other acquisitions, and these are some ways to approach their expected production.

1. How can Braun improve his OBP?

Ryan Braun is a bizarre player. He slugs the ball like nobody else, and manages to maintain a high batting average while striking out frequently, and doesn’t walk (although to his credit, he improved his walk rate slightly in 2008).

The issue for Braun in 2008 was simple: he put the ball in play more frequently, and defenses corrected themselves from the unrealistic AVG on balls in play from Braun’s Rookie of the Year campaign.

For Braun to build his OBP, he will need to do one of two things: (1) Find more ways to get those balls in play to drop for hits, which may or may not force him to abandon some of his powerful approach, or (2) Walk more, which may or may not force him to abandon the approach that allows him to hit for such power.

As it stands, Braun relies so thoroughly on pure hitting that his ability to make fewer outs has hit a wall, depending upon how defenses play him, and how pitchers pitch him. If he cannot add more dimensions to his offensive game, his OBP will continue to follow his basic ability to get the hits to drop, which can fluctuate very much from year to year (witness the transition from 2007 to 2008, which fluctuated by 6%).

2. How likely is it for Prince to improve his production?

Before Prince’s monstrous September, the major complaint about the slugger was that his power numbers declined – specifically his home runs. Throughout his power outage, however, Prince’s doubles total was consistently more alarming. It should have been clear that Prince’s HR surge in 2007 might not have been likely to be repeated in 2008, but along with that HR return to reality, the doubles total declined.

Analyzing Prince’s production and the possibility for improvement depends upon the definition of improvement. If improving his rate of getting on base is the issue, it seems clear that there are some ways in which Prince can find his way on base on a more frequent basis. Behind his power issues in 2008, Fielder drew slightly fewer walks and hit at a lower rate. These rates fell in a very moderate way, and might be easier to correct than his power numbers.

If improvement for Prince means more power, then the issue might seem more problematic. Although Prince’s HR totals, even in 2008, are at a strong level, his doubles rate has dropped in both 2007 and 2008, and the question remains: how does Prince hit more doubles?

Overall improvement for Fielder might actually mean more of a dip in HR, a corresponding raise in 2B, and slightly higher hitting and walking totals – that is, more OBP, and a SLG driven more by doubles and less by the long ball.

3. Will Hardy regress?

Hardy was the only youngster that did not regress in 2008. But, many fans questioned his ability to sustain his 2007 production, which was not as much of a fluke as some expected. That said, are there areas in which we can expect regression for 2009?

The main issue with Hardy in 2009 will be to maintain the walk level that he produced in 2008. He improved by a strong 2% from 2007 to 2008, while maintaining strong hitting totals. This will be crucial to his 2009 success, given the consistency with which he has hit for power in recent years.

The second issue to look for is a defensive correction. Hardy’s AVG on balls in play jumped by almost 3% in 2008, and he put the ball in play almost 6% less frequently than he did in 2007. That correction allowed Hardy’s hitting rate between 2007 and 2008 to remain consistent, although for completely different reasons.

If Hardy does not put the ball in play more frequently and defenses correct their approach, Hardy will be in for a noticeable regression in 2009.

4. Why did Hart regress?

Hart’s fall from grace is extreme and baffling: he literally became one of the least valuable right fielders in the 2008 NL after producing as one of the best in 2007. Given the fact that his struggles were compacted in just a couple months’ time, the perception of his struggles were amplified. What gives?

Here’s the simple issue: Hart suffered almost the exact opposite fate of Hardy. He put the ball in play almost 6% more frequently than in 2007, but his AVG on balls in play dropped significantly (3%), which explains his overall drop in hitting.

Hart consistently walked less, struck out less, and homered less in 2008, which spelled disaster when coupled with worse luck. It might be a stretch simply to suggest that luck will correct itself in 2009, but one thing is for certain: Hart needs to walk more so that his production does not depend so exclusively on his hitting fortunes, and at the very least that will afford him more consistent production potential.

5. Which Hall is the real Hall?

Hall’s fall from 2006 seemed shocking in 2007, and 2008 was simply odd: how is it that he managed to regress once again, from a regression?