What do we expect from Parra in 2010?

I was looking through his record, and something that really jumped out at me is that in both 2008 and 2009, Parra's fielding independent ERA was much better than his actual runs-performance. For instance in 2008, he posted a FIP of 4.16 (against an ERA of 4.39 and a VORP of 15.0), and in 2009 he posted a FIP of 4.88 (against an ERA of 6.36 and VORP of -23.5).

Now, those are shockingly bad numbers in 2009, but what jumps out at me is that although his runs performance is well over 30 runs worse in 2009, and his ERA is almost exactly 2-earned-runs-worse-per-9 IP in 2009, his fielding independent ERA -- based off of walks, home runs, and strike outs -- only increased by 0.72 FIP-runs-worse-per-9 IP. This increase is likely due to his noticeable BB increase, K decrease, and slight HR increase.

 Compared to the decrease of his runs production, though, something doesn't add up.

But, what do we make of Parra's defensive support? Here's what really blows my mind: even though Parra allowed more fly balls in 2009 than 2008, he managed to increase his infield pop-ups by 4% to 10.8%, and although his fly ball percentage increased by 7%, his groundball percentage only decreased by 3%. His line drive percentage, btw, actually dropped by 3%, as well. 

So, in this regard, I am pleased to see that Parra induced more infield pop ups and allowed fewer line drives, and in between, it seems that part of his decrease in defensive efficiency is due to giving more batted balls to an outfield that, on the whole, featured two below average outfielders (Braun and Hart) and one above average outfielder (Cam).

I will be curious to see how Parra's performance shifts if he (a) makes a slight adjustment to his BB%, (b) continues to steadily induce infield pop-ups, and (c) returns some balance to his groundball/flyball percentage...

 While AL MVP voters will likely debate between the importance of Joe Mauer's phenomenal campaign as a catcher or Derek Jeter's resurgence as a premier shortstop, another candidate lurks in the shadows of obscurity. His team failed to reach the playoffs after reaching the World Series as a Cinderella story in 2008, and his market was small enough to completely hide the amazing feat he accomplished:

Ben Zobrist hit .297/.405/.543, with 27 HR, 28 2B, and 17/23 SB, walking 91 times to 104 K. Impressive numbers, good enough to finish 4th among qualified AL hitters in OBP and 7th in SLG. Only four qualified AL hitters managed to finish in the AL Top 10 for OBP and SLG: Joe Mauer, Kevin Youkilis, Miguel Cabrera, and, Ben Zobrist.

And, Zobrist hit .297/.405/.543 while playing 91 games at 2B, 59 at RF, 13 at SS, 9 at LF, 7 at CF, 3 at 1B, and 1 at 3B. Now, Zobrist wasn't close to the only player to play a handful of games at different positions -- a glance through the 2009 AL fielding log reveals other players that have played a few games here or there, and even some prominent players such as Kevin Youkilis or Nick Swisher spending time at various positions.

However, very few players managed to receive playing time at seven different fielding positions, let alone six, or reach basically a handful of games at five different positions.

Zobrist appears to combine two fine attributes -- extreme utility fielding and a strong, well-rounded bat -- into one bizarre season.

So, I did some digging and used a helpful compilation from the folks at Hardball Times to answer a simple question:

Has any superutility player hit .300/.400/.500?

I heavily relief upon THT's "Superdupersubs" series from 2008, which can be found in Parts I, II, III and IV. I could not have completed this survey had I not known about this series, and if you're at all interested in obscure baseball history, this series should be right up your alley.

The fielding requirements according to THT, to be a superdupersub:

The definition we'll use for such a player is this:

- He must appear in at least 100 games in a given season, and come to the plate at least 300 times;
and
- He must appear in at least 20 games at three or more defensive positions (and if it's just three positions, they can't all be in the outfield);
and/or
- He must appear in at least 10 games at four or more defensive positions;
and/or
- He must appear in at least five games at five or more defensive positions;
and/or
- He must appear in at least one game at six or more defensive positions.

So, long story short, three players in the twentieth century that qualified as superdupersubs, or super-utility players, hit .300/.400/.500:

 

	NAME	POS			AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS+
Stan Musial 1952		1B, RF, CF, LF			0.336	0.432	0.538	167
Stan Musial 1955		1B, RF, CF, LF			0.319	0.408	0.566	156
Jim Hickman 1970		RF, CF, 1B			0.315	0.419	0.582	155
Albert Pujols 2001		1B, 3B, LF, RF			0.329	0.403	0.61	157

 

It should not be surprising that these top hitters are primarily corner players, for the most part, interchanging positions on the lower spectrum of fielding difficulity (although Hickman and Musial played in CF, Musial prominently so in 1952 (106 games), Hickman to a lesser extent (53 games).

Hickman is easily my favorite player on this list for the simple reason that his 1970 campaign came in his mid-30s, was his best career season, and came after bouncing around as a parttime player with three different teams from 1966-1969 (Cubs, Mets, and Dodgers). He was a relatively average player earlier in his career, from ages 25-28 or so, spending his time primarily as an outfielder, but also as a 3B early on. In 1965, his last season that was anything close to fulltime before his 1970 breakout, Hickman showed great versatility at CF, LG, 1B, 3B, and RF with a slightly below average bat (.236/.291/.407).

Given that this season came at age 28, and the fact that Hickman went .224/.305/.393 (94 OPS+) in 890 PA from 1966-1969, makes Hickman's 1970 breakout in 613 PA all the more impressive. 

Of course, he wouldn't ever come close to matching it again, and basically wound down his career as a slightly above average OF/1B for the Cubs and Cards, working 1186 PA from 1971-1974, at a .260/.356/.422 (111 OPS+).

Pujols and Musial are delightful examples of bona fide offensive studs playing wherever their team needed them. Pujols' adventures early in his career had something to do with an injured elbow (as documented by Buzz Bissinger in Three Nights in August), and after spending most of his time in the OF in 2003 (with some innings at 1B), Pujols settled in at 1B (I can say that I had the privilege of watching Pujols play his only fielding innings off of 1B since 2003 on April 22, 2008, when Pujols spent approximately 3 innings at 2B to cover for an injury during extra innings at Miller Park).

Much like Pujols, Musial pretty much settled into a corner OF/1B role after his 1952 campaign (his last season with extensive time at CF).

***

Now, there are also 17 players that I qualified as "close" to hitting .300/.400/.500 while serving as a superutility player. Close players pretty much reached two of the criteria, or were slight percentages off in other cases. 

I also included some deadball players who are not numerically close in SLG categories, but given their time, posted very strong OPS+.

 

CLOSE	NAME	POS			AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS+
H. Wagner 1901		1B, SS, LF, CF, RF, 3B			0.353	0.417	0.494	160
H. Wagner 1902		1B, SS, LF, CF, RF, 3B			0.33	0.394	0.463	159
S. Strang 1906		2B, CF, RF			0.319	0.423	0.435	165
B. Hirchman 1916		1B, LF, RF			0.315	0.378	0.427	146
S. Magee 1914		1B, LF, CF, SS			0.314	0.38	0.509	157
S. Gordon 1951		3B, CF, RF			0.287	0.383	0.5	143
J. Cunningham 1958		1B, LF, RF			0.312	0.449	0.496	147
J. Cunningham 1959		1B, LF, RF			0.345	0.453	0.478	143
D. Demeter 1962		3B, CF, LF, RF, 1B			0.307	0.359	0.52	137
F. Alou 1966		CF, LF, 1B			0.327	0.361	0.533	142
B. Robinson 1976		LF, CF. RF, 3B			0.303	0.329	0.534	143
P. Guerrero 1982		3B, CF, RF			0.304	0.378	0.536	156
B. Bonilla 1995		3B, LF, RF			0.329	0.388	0.576	151
D. Martinez 1996		1B, RF, CF			0.318	0.393	0.468	122
F. Catalanotto '01		1B, 3B, 2B, RF, LF			0.33	0.381	0.49	128
A. Pujols 2002		1B, 3B, LF, RF			0.314	0.394	0.561	151
K. Millar 2001		3B, 1B, LF, RF			0.314	0.374	0.557	140
M. DeRosa 2008		3B, LF, RF, 2B			0.285	0.376	0.481	118
B. Zobrist 2009		2B, RF, SS, LF, CF, 1B, 3B			0.297	0.405	0.543	144

Joe Cunningham boasted the best OBP as a super-corner player in 1958-9, Honus Wagner the best AVG all over the diamond!, and Bobby Bonnilla slugged the best of anyone on this list, in his 1995 corner-player campaign.

Note that of these 17 players, only five players were strongly featured at middle infield positions: Wagner, Strang, Magee, Catalanotto, and of course, Zobrist.

The fact that Zobrist worked 104 games at 2B and SS, hitting .297/.405/.543, compared with 107 for Wagner over 2 years (2B, SS), 61 for Strang (2B, SS), 39 for Magee (SS), and 13 for Catalanotto (2B),  makes his superutility campaign all the more impressive.

What an odd year for Zobrist: not only did he play at least one game at every fielding position except P and C, and not only did he nearly hit .300/.400/.500 while doing so, he also is a member of a small class of players to ever get close to that accomplishment, and an even smaller class of players who have done so while playing significant time as a middle infielder.

***

References.

Treder, Steve. "Superdupersubs." The Hardball Times. Four parts, April 15, May 6, June 3, July 1, 2008. Viewed October and November, 2009.

 As the World Series MVP, Hideki Matsui received bigtime praise for his role in the Yankees' first World Series victory in nearly a decade. The World Series MVP is a welcome award for Matsui in another regard, which is to bring him attention as the top Japanese player in the MLB -- at the moment for sure, and maybe even for the decade.

 Most baseball fans would probably list Ichiro Suzuki as the top Japanese baseball player, and Ichiro certainly has the hits under his belt to warrant the attention. However, Matsui has almost always followed Ichiro step-for-step, producing fewer hits but doing more besides that -- hitting home runs, extra base hits, and walking more. The biggest aspect separating Matsui and Ichiro is playing time; whereas Matsui has missed large chunks of plate appearances due to injuries in his career, Ichiro remained healthy to accumulate nearly 3000 more PA than his countryman.

At age 27, Ichiro tore into AL pitching, working them for 242 hits, good for a .350/.381/.487 line, along with 56/70 stolen bases. This performance set the stage for Ichiro's career, and he really hasn't surpassed it; the hit total remains his second best hit total in his career, and he has yet to surpass that phenomenal basestealing performance.

Matsui came to the AL in 2003 at age 29, putting together a decent 179 hit, 16 home run performance, producing .287/.353/.435 overall. He still managed to finish second in the Rookie of the year voting, but did not steal the spotlight or set the stage for his career as Ichiro did...

...until his second season. Matsui slammed 31 home runs, 34 doubles, 174 hits, and walked 88 times, putting together a strong .298/.390/.522 line. This would be the best season put together by either Matsui or Ichiro; neither would surpass a .390 OBP / .500 SLG season after Matsui did so in 2004 (Ichiro's .390 OBP campaign in 2007 was accompanied by a .431 SLG). 

In their 30s, the easiest comparison to make between the two (from 2004-2009), Ichiro accumulated more plate appearances, but Matsui is the stronger player during that time:

Matsui (3121 PA): 798 H, 154 2B, 10 3B, 124 HR, 399 K/353 BB. 454 R, 491 RBI. .293/.374/.493 (127 OPS+). 516 RC, 6.8 RC/G.

Ichiro (4416 PA): 1368 H, 138 2B,  44 3B, 55 HR, 413 K/278 BB. 624 R, 333 RBI. .335/.380/.431 (117 OPS+). 706 RC, 6.7 RC/G.

For their careers: 

Matsui (3816 PA): 977 H, 196 2B, 11 3B, 140 HR, 485 K/416 BB. 536 R, 597 RBI. .292/.370/.482 (124 OPS+). 607 RC, 6.5 RC/G.

Ichiro (6607 PA): 2030 H, 228 2B, 68 3B, 84 HR, 597 K/412 BB. 973 R, 515 RBI. .333/.378/.434 (118 OPS+). 1051 RC, 6.6 RC/G.

Ichiro has the personal milestones to command more attention about his individual accomplishments, but all along, Matsui has produced in various ways to match Ichiro's pure hitting prowess. 

He does not always receive the individual praise, so enjoy Matsui's trip to the spotlight this week, and his World Series MVP. He probably deserves more attention than he usually receives.

Lately I've been thinking about Doug Melvin's middle-man, crowd-pleasing position: that the Brewers will be willing to sacrifice some offense for some pitching.

I've wrapped my mind into a pretzel over how to determine the value of a run prevented against a run scored (in 2009 NL, the league teams allowed 9 more runs than they scored, which at a basic level means that a run prevented was very slightly more valuable than a run scored (to the tune of 1.01 RA: 1.00 RS).

On the surface, in a consistently depressed offensive environment, it seems like an intuitive way to approach the offseason; anyhow, the Brewers had one of the best offenses in the NL, scoring 67 more runs than the average offense (that's nearly 10% of the runs scored by an average offense), so it looks like the Brewers have a margin to dig into (if they give up, say, even 5% of their 2009 RS, that means around 746 RS for 2010, which could very well be an average to above average offense once again, if recent runs environment trends remain the same in the NL.

However, my thinking on this issue shifts once I think of two things:

(1) The Brewers' available resources

(2) The available free agent pitchers

(3) The likely talent required to obtain proven, average (and above) pitching via trade

(4) The level at which the Brewers' pitching staff needs to improve in order to become an average staff

Here's the deal; the average 2009 NL team allowed 727 runs, and the Brewers' 818 runs allowed requires the team to prevent 81 runs somewhere. The Brewers' bullpen isn't really a place to look for that task, given that the pen allowed 250 runs despite pitching over 540 IP (the average 2009 NL bullpen pitched 501.78 IP and allowed 242.6 runs, compared to 544 IP/250 RA for the Brewers' 2009 bullpen -- a rather exceptional performance when you consider the added requirement of 40 extra innings for the Crew's relievers).

So, the burden really falls with the rotation, which allowed approximately 74 more runs than the average NL rotation, which pitched 942.84 IP over 162 G, allowing 484 R. The Brewers starters' 891 IP and 568 R performance leaves a whole lot to be desired.

Which leads me to ask, how do you make up for that type of performance?

In order to figure this out, I needed to create two potential models for building an average rotation. The first model is simple: how does a true 1-2-3-4-5 rotation perform? The second is a bit more convoluted: how does a rotation of five #3 starters perform? Both models are unrealistic to some extent, because (a) no rotation actually goes 1-2-3-4-5 according to runs performance, and (b) no rotation actually goes 3-3-3-3-3 according to runs performance (and to show you the difference between rotation spots, the Brewers went 1-4-4-4-5 according to runs performance, which should demonstrate (a) the difficulty of using a #1 starter to offset multiple low rotation performances, and (b) the difference between #3 and #4 starters.)

Of course, the other issue is that relatively few rotations even reach 5 regular spots; there really wasn't even a such thing as a true #5 starter in the NL. The two true #5 candidates according to my survey has Manny Parra and Todd Wellemeyer sharing the dubious distinction of being the only two #5 starters according to runs performance (which is really, really awful), and Jeff Karstens lumped in as a swingman (only due to % of GS and IP, really; he was actually about as valuable as a mean #4).

That's my logic, to outline the problem. 

1-2-3-4-5 MODEL: 824.56 IP, 421.57 R

3-3-3-3-3 MODEL: 827.95 IP, 429.61 R

A couple of things should really jump out:

(a) A rotation of full-time, average #3 starters is almost exactly comparable to a 1-2-3-4-5 rotation. As a theoretical point, this should be powerful. I know actual available resources, scarcity of talent, difficulty of developing pitchers, etc., makes it extremely unlikely for a team to acquire five #3 starters, but it should re-open the debate about Doug Melvin's 2008-2009 offseason plan to acquire Braden Looper (a top #3 in 2008 NL) to work with Dave Bush (the top #3 in 2008 NL) and Manny Parra (another #3 in 2008 NL). With the gambles of Yovani Gallardo and the decreasing production of Jeff Suppan fully weighed, that rotation basically looked like ?-3-3-3-4, which isn't all that far off from a 3-3-3-3-3 model if all the starters remain healthy, make all their starts, and don't regress.

And there's your issue. After all, this is only a model, but really, think it through, thoroughly, and allow it to frame your logic of pitching acquisitions for a week. Then revisit it.

(b) Neither a 1-2-3-4-5 or 3-3-3-3-3 rotation completes the league average IP for NL 2009 starters, or fills 162 games. I will repeat it again for effect: Neither a 1-2-3-4-5 or 3-3-3-3-3 rotation completes the league average IP for NL 2009 starters, or fills 162 games.

I am fond of saying that a lot of baseball is just killing time, or biding time, and this seems to reflect that point: a team should expect to use 6 starters in this day and age, and probably have a swingman or two ready on top of that.

Either way, in a 1-2-3-4-5 model, or a 3-3-3-3-3 model, someone has to step up beyond what an average spot produces in a rotation, to the tune of 114-118 IP and a runs average of approximately 4.26 to 4.75.

This is significant for the 2010 Brewers because even theoretically, a 1-4-4-4-5 rotation is so much further from a passable starting pitching performance provided by a 3-3-3-3-3 / 1-2-3-4-5 model before those extra innings filled by a sixth starter are even considered.

1-4-4-4-5 MODEL: 761.09 IP, 432.34 R

This rotation needs 180 IP at a 2.65 runs average just to break even.

Think about that. That's better than a #1. That's like Tim Lincecum good. And that's even giving Gallardo the benefit of the doubt at a #1 (he was, in reality, the best #2 starter in the 2009 NL, but I basically felt like giving this team a benefit of the doubt somewhere, so I'm praising Gallardo). 

THINK ABOUT THAT. Seriously think about it. Imagine that Dave Bush's scar tissue is serious, his elbow issue is more serious than thought, and it affects his ability to bounce back in 2010. Imagine that the Brewers either bring back Looper or need to fill his spot. Suppan is here. Gallardo is here. Parra is somewhere, or else the Brewers need to acquire yet another arm to improve this rotation.

And the Brewers are going to somehow accomplish this through (a) best case scenario projections again, and (b) acquiring two pitchers?

***

Which leads me to point out that

(a) The cost of acquiring the type of pitching that will be needed to improve the club --  not stay the course from 2009 -- will require either (1) giving up more than 5% of their 2009 runs scored equation, or (2) spending more money than is currently available to the Brewers.

(b) The Brewers are arguably in a better position to acquire multiple, reasonable depth options without the goal of reaching an average starting rotation production level, and instead spend the available resources on ADDING offense to the 2010 Brewers.

(c) The logic behind "giving up some offense for pitching" is paradoxical, and therefore false, for the 2010 Brewers. It requires either spending more resources than are available, or depleting the offense beyond an acceptable level. 

My hypothesis is simple:

IF THE BREWERS SURRENDER OFFENSE FOR PITCHING THIS OFFSEASON -- GIVEN THE AVAILABLE RESOURCES -- THEY WILL END UP WITH AN AVERAGE TO BELOW AVERAGE OFFENSE WITHOUT AN ABOVE AVERAGE PITCHING STAFF.

My recommended plan of action is simple:

WORK TO IMPROVE THE ONE NOTABLY ABOVE AVERAGE ASPECT OF THE CLUB (OFFENSE), MAINTAIN THE OTHER ABOVE AVERAGE ASPECT (BULLPEN), WITH THE GOAL OF SACRIFICING THE BELOW AVERAGE ASPECT OF THE CLUB IN ORDER TO ATTEMPT TO HAVE ONE EXCEPTIONAL ASPECT OF THE CLUB.

Most of our debates around here dance around one point, but rarely seem to tackle it directly: run scoring does not depend upon putting the ball in play, so much as it is framed by how the ball is put in play. Subsequently, an approach at the plate is framed or outlined by balls not put in play -- home runs, walks, hit by pitch, and strike outs -- which in turn help to shape the value of a batter's balls in play. In a search for the evasive plate discipline, or patience, we can in turn study the ratios between K, BB, and HR.

For instance, it is not simply a bad thing to K. It is a bad thing to K and not hit HR in a complementary ratio; it is a bad thing to K and not BB; but all three outcomes must be taken in order. Similarly, it is not always a good thing to be a contact hitter and put the ball in play frequently; if that is shaped by excessive K, no BB, and no HR, contact approaches become less valuable.

In understanding the circumstances by which a player puts the ball in play, we are understanding their luck. Luck is not here meant to be something insulting to a hitter, as most people who believe in moral desert in baseball believe luck to be. Luck is pervasive; every aspect of a hitter's approach encounters luck in one way or another, simply by the manner of circumstances in which the hitter finds himself.

This basic balance between the percentage of balls in play ((PA-HR-BB-K-HBP)/PA) and BABIP will reveal more foundational aspects of a hitter's approach than his AVG/OBP/SLG splits, and looking at batting luck over a period of years will be more instructive about hitting trends than the AVG/OBP/SLG taken together. The point is not to explain that a hitter hit a certain way, but to attempt to comprehend why. 

This is a simple survey of Brewers' 2009 batting luck, and those players' 2007-2009 progressions. I have also included HR/PA, BB/PA, and K/PA to help frame the type of balls not put in play by a batter. As I said, it is not simply a good or bad thing to strike out, and not simply a good or bad thing to be a contact hitter; there are degrees of patience, discipline, power, etc., that also frame those aspects of hitting, which keep us from making sweeping general claims. 

 

NL Averages	`	BIP%	BABIP		BB%	K%	HR%
2007		0.706	0.301		0.085	0.173	0.027
2008		0.697	0.298		0.088	0.181	0.027
2009		0.0693	0.299		0.09	0.184	0.025

 

 

Jason kendall		BIP%	BABIP		BB%	K%	HR%
2007		0.834	0.259		0.06	0.082	0.006
2008		0.813	0.265		0.085	0.077	0.003
2009		0.766	0.27		0.087	0.11	0.004

 

Ick. Exhibit A against contact hitting. Kendall is exactly the type of contact hitter that baseball doesn't need. Increasing K in 2009, negligable home run total, and rather steady batting average on balls in play.

Ick.

 

Prince Fielder		BIP%	BABIP		BB%	K%	HR%
2007		0.596	0.283		0.132	0.178	0.073
2008		0.62	0.298		0.121	0.193	0.049
2009		0.597	0.315		0.153	0.192	0.064

 

This is a thing of beauty. Prince hit more home runs than 2008, while striking out more frequently than his last huge HR total season (2007), and of course, those walks picked up big time.

Prince's BABIP might be likely to drop a little bit in 2010, but the main trend that we should keep in our minds here is Prince's phenomenal K/BB ratio. 

 

Rickie Weeks		BIP%	BABIP		BB%	K%	HR%
2007		0.557	0.287		0.154	0.229	0.032
2008		0.627	0.277		0.118	0.205	0.025
2009		0.611	0.313		0.074	0.241	0.056

 

Joe Average Fan cheered mightily at the sight of Weeks' apparent hitting breakout this year, but I am more skeptical of Weeks' 2009 than his steady 2007-2008 trends. 

What do we make of Weeks' complete lack of discipline in 2009? Sure, he hit more home runs, and sure enough, his BABIP came around in a big way. But look at his actual trends: his strike outs increased by 4%, walks dropped 4%, and while this is made worthwhile by a 3% increase in HR frequency, what happens should Weeks maintain his ridiculous K/BB (worse than 3/1) rate and the home runs don't come again in 2010?

I am not confident about what we'll see from Weeks in 2010.

 

Casey McGehee		BIP%	BABIP		BB%	K%	HR%
2007		DNP	DNP		DNP	DNP	DNP
2008		0.68	0.235		0	0.32	0
2009		0.7	0.33		0.086	0.17	0.041

 

The good news is that McGehee burst onto the MLB scene in 2010. The bad news is that his BB% increased over his minor league norms, and so did his BABIP and HR%.

Not good for 2010. Trade now.

 

J.J. Hardy		BIP%	BABIP		BB%	K%	HR%
2007		0.781	0.279		0.063	0.114	0.041
2008		0.722	0.305		0.083	0.156	0.038
2009		0.697	0.26		0.092	0.183	0.024
Alcides Escobar		BIP%	BABIP		BB%	K%	HR%
2007		DNP	DNP		DNP	DNP	DNP
2008		0.75	0.667		0	0.25	0
2009		0.813	0.304		0.03	0.134	0.007

 

Escobar made major strides in the minors during 2009, improving his discipline and power numbers. He didn't take that to the majors, which means he has his work cut out for him in 2010. He won't go anywhere as a player with a K/BB that is worse than 4/1, and a BB% lower than 5%.

Hardy's luck was due to drop, and it fell in a bad way, which looked even worse given that his steady 2007-2008 HR rate dropped, and he struck out a lot more.

I don't know what to say other than not only did Hardy look completely lost in person, but also on paper. Is it just Murphy's Law, and moreover, is trading Hardy such a good idea with Escobar leaving a few question marks as well?

Mark me down as generally perplexed about our SS situation.

 

Ryan Braun		BIP%	BABIP		BB%	K%	HR%
2007		0.63	0.361		0.056	0.228	0.069
2008		0.677	0.305		0.063	0.195	0.056
2009		0.685	0.353		0.081	0.171	0.045

 

Ryan Braun is nothing more than a pure hitter, and I would not be surprised to see his contact continue to rise, putting more balls in play, hopefully accompanied by maintaining his 2009 BB% improvements, progressively lower K%, and progressively lower HR%.

Braun seems to show more of a desire simply to hit, and he said so at the end of the year. I see him morphing into a Moises Alou style hitter, very high average, pretty decent HR, and swinging away, for the most part.

 

Mike Cameron		BIP%	BABIP		BB%	K%	HR%
2007		0.607	0.298		0.103	0.246	0.032
2008		0.553	0.296		0.106	0.28	0.049
2009		0.588	0.304		0.119	0.248	0.038

 

Cameron is pretty damn consistent, isn't he?

 

Corey Hart		BIP%	BABIP		BB%	K%	HR%
2007		0.696	0.321		0.064	0.175	0.042
2008		0.755	0.293		0.041	0.166	0.03
2009		0.676	0.305		0.091	0.195	0.025

 

Everything went right for Hart in 2007, and that's excellent, but now he's morphing into a useful hitter after dropping off in 2008. His marked BB% increase in 2009 is really promising, and if he can work the strike outs down a little bit more (if he's not going to be hitting home runs as frequently as 2007), I think we can see Hart morph into a very useful hitter for the 2010 Brewers.