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July 2008 - Posts
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Around baseball -- on broadcats, in columns, in message boards -- there exists the general sentiment that pitchers simply are not prepared to pitch complete games any longer. Jim Powell is one baseball analyst that muses on this topic from time to time during his segments of Brewers broadcasts; just today he was talking about the "Complete game mentality." While I think that Jim is probably right about the fact that there is a certain type of mentality that goes along with CGs -- enough baseball people, Ned Yost and Ben Sheets included, talk about "CG mentality" enough that I agree that it must exist to some extent (and after all, Ben Sheets has pitched a lot more CG than I have -- the last game I might have finished was probably in Boy Scouts recreational ball when I was about as big as Russell Branyan's bat).
But, even though baseball people talk about the mentality -- and fans yearn for the time when "men were men," and mourn the fact that yet another American institution suffers an inevitable defeat at the hands of politically correct jibberish that turns our young warriors into hippie mush, I am never convinced that mentality covers the whole story.
Baseball is a business, as well as a sport, and like most businesses involving humans, most motivating factors for most policies, activities, practices can be explained in economic terms. Economic risk and reward explains how contracts are negotiated (we often hear that when a player such as Ryan Braun signs away free agency years for long term economic security, he is using that economic security against the risk of future injury, and while the ballclub gains one or two significant years of production at a reduced price, they also eat a hefty sum should the production level head south), and also how penants are won (often times, a team will take on the contract of a bigtime performer to make a penant run, even if that contract stretches the economic resources of that team to some extent -- the C.C. Sabathia / LaPorta deal is a good example of this type of move, although I am certain that Attanasio weighed the economic gains of having more Levis occupying seats at Miller Park against the cost of obtaining C.C.).
Why shouldn't economics also dictate how players are utilized?
Moreover, why shouldn't longer contracts and larger sums of guaranteed money help to explain the shift in pitching strategies since free agency became the widespread business practice for players?
Obviously, a host of factors can help to explain the continuous drop in complete games in the MLB -- expansion, developments in baseball manufacturing, stadium designs, mound reconfirguations, the advent of the specialized bullpen, the development of the five man rotation, advances in sports medicine treatments, advances in preventative sports medicine ideologies, multi-year guaranteed contracts, and of course, they just don't make men like they used to (just ask Gore Vidal and Lou Reed).
Which brings us to one of the greatest years of the twentieth century -- 1976. America celebrated its bicentenniel, the Sex Pistols accelerated their brief reign of terror over pop music and fashion, Martin Heidegger died, Tommy John returned from an innovative surgery, and Andy Messersmith received a 3-year contract with the Atlanta Braves after playing through 1975 without a contract and winning an arbitration hearing (along with aging ace Dave McNally).
I believe that if we are looking for catalysts to explain the contemporary position of the complete game, our main sources for analysis can be found in 1976. For, in 1976 we find the victory of sports medicine over a certain type of elbow injury, which eventually helped to prolong the careers of more league average players than anyone could imagine, and we also find the victory of MLB players over their owners.
Both of these events, the successful return of Tommy John and the contract signed by Messersmith after the arbitration victory in 1975, proved to be widespread victories for all baseball players. Even if ulnar collateral ligament reconstruction was initially a longshot, and initially connected to a pitching injury, it eventually was developed and perfected to the level of an 85%-90% success rate (for full, healthy recovery). Even if the Messersmith-McNally victory, coupled with Catfish Hunter's voided-contract free agency of 1975, was initially received as a superstar's practice, netting large contracts for the best players and alienating some average players, free agency eventually exploded into the prosperous business venture we currently see in baseball, where Gil Meche, Jeff Suppan, Kyle Farnsworth, and Jason Marquis can break the bank, just like Barry Zito, Roger Clemens, and A.J. Burnett.
Free agency continually places more and more years on an individual pitcher's future forecast, so much so that the arm must be paced -- no longer does the risk of one great season, full of deep-game performances and high innings-pitched workloads outweigh the reward of pacing a pitcher. This is in the interest of the pitcher as much as it is in the organization; the pitcher needs his arm to work effectively for more years, and the organization needs his arm to work effectively for more years.
Coupled with the added bonus of advanced sports medicine practices, and pitchers no longer must fight for their roster spots, even through injuries. The days of the one-year, disposible contract (at the hands of the ownership-oriented reserve clause) are over -- no longer does an arm injury simply means packing it up and calling it a career.
Guaranteed money and advanced medicine mean that pitchers do not need to fight as much for their spots, because their spots are no longer in jeopardy. Granted, there is a point where any performance level outweighs the risk of a contract, but the threshold for that type of performance is now fairly high (anyone remember Barry Zito's bullpen stint this year?)
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Development of Complete Games:
1901-1910 NL: 12,042 G, 9,234 CG; 76.68%
1911-1920 NL: 12,070 G, 6,747 CG; 55.89%
1921-1930 NL: 12,318 G, 5,976 CG; 48.51%
1931-1940 NL: 12,318 G, 5,433 CG; 44.11%
1941-1950 NL: 12,394 G, 5,057 CG; 40.80%
1951-1961 NL: 13,616 G, 4,225 CG; 31.03%
1962-1974 NL: 22,938 G, 6,011 CG; 26.21%
1975-1984 NL: 18,782 G, 3,230 CG; 17.20%
1985-1994 NL: 19,410 G, 1,959 CG; 10.09%
1995-2008 NL: 33,960 G, 1,427 CG; 4.20%
1901-1910 AL: 11,898 G, 9,289 CG; 78.07%
1911-1920 AL: 12,062 G, 6,782 CG; 56.23%
1921-1930 AL: 12,328 G, 5,956 CG; 48.31%
1931-1940 AL: 12,308 G, 5,548 CG; 45.08%
1941-1950 AL: 12,362 G, 5,401 CG; 43.69%
1951-1960 AL: 12,366 G, 4,061 CG; 32.84%
1961-1974 AL: 24,532 G, 6,142 CG; 25.04%
1975-1984 AL: 21,212 G, 5,192 CG; 24.48%
1985-1997 AL: 28,542 G, 3,190 CG; 11.18%
1998-2008 AL: 26,234 G, 1,153 CG; 4.40%
When we look at the actual development of the complete game in the history of baseball, we find that there have always been reasons for the decline of the complete game. After the Carl Mays / Ray Chapman incident forced MLB to address the rough-and-tumble state of affairs that was baseball's spitball era, complete games declined in both the American and National Leagues, as new baseballs were to be utilized as soon as any dirt was noticed on the ball. This could have been one of baseball's single most radical developments, as it almost immediately shifted the balance in favor of the offense, at least for some time.
The percentage of complete games steadily declined in both leagues, with one notable exception: the immediate effect of the designated hitter on the American League helped to maintain a higher percentage of complete games in the American League than the National League, which makes perfect sense from a strategical standpoint (if American League managers are no longer forced by the mere progression of the game to make a pitching decision, the immediate effect will probably be a situation of hands-off managing). Of course,a steady diet of expansion and the advent of the LaRussa bullpen eventually caught up with the American League, as did free agency.
Notice that the progression of the complete game is quite similar between the two leagues, except for the decade immediately following the introduction of the designated hitter. This is probably quite easily attributed to the fact that most baseball managers manage the game according to the same broad ideology, with only a few mavericks here and there challenging the norms (no one wants to be named the maverick that attempts a new baseball strategy that fails miserably).
With each passing milestone -- Tommy John's successful return in 1976, and the steady improvement in sports medicine treatments, free agency, new spitball policies, new expansion teams, etc., we can find changes in the percentage of complete games.
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Perhaps only a handful of baseballs were used during the whole game, and pitchers were encouraged to scuff up the ball, dirty it up, and ready it for play; perhaps only eight teams played in each league; perhaps each team utilized some form of a four-man rotation; perhaps pitchers were subject to a stronger reserve clause; perhaps pitchers had to sign a contract each year based upon their previous performance; perhaps an arm injury meant the end of a career; perhaps a lack of preventative medical knowledge allowed pitchers to perform at a lower level of conditioning and specific training; peraps contractual money was not guaranteed...
....baseball would have more complete games.
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One of my favorite measures for analyzing hitters is XBH%, which adds up 2B, 3B, and HR and then divides that number against total H (2B+3B+HR)/(H). The reason I use this percentage is that along with slugging percentage, it helps to suggest the ability a certain player has for driving the ball. I know that not all XBH are created equally (a Prince Fielder double to the gap is a lot different than a Craig Counsell cue shot double down the line), but I would argue that an approach that yields more extra bases is generally a positive indicator of the batter's ability to drive the ball (and if not drive the ball, indicate an ability to pull the ball for cue-shot doubles, or slice the ball down the opposite line -- ex., Prince Fielder hitting a LF double against the shift).
So, here are the Brewers' XBH% numbers (I eyeballed the cut off at 100 AB):
Kendall: 74 H, 15 2B, 2 3B, 1 HR; 24.32%
Fielder: 90 H, 17 2B, 2 3B, 17 HR; 40.00%
Weeks: 64 H, 15 2B, 3 3B, 8 HR; 40.63%
Hall: 61 H, 16 2B, 12 HR; 45.90%
Hardy: 87 H, 20 2B, 13 HR; 37.93%
Braun: 105 H, 23 2B, 3 3B, 22 HR; 46.67%
Cameron: 48 H, 12 2B, 14 HR; 54.17%
Hart: 102 H, 25 2B, 3 3B, 15 HR; 42.16%
Kapler: 45 H, 10 2B, 2 3B, 5 HR; 37.78%
Counsell: 31 H, 7 2B, 1 3B, 1 HR; 29.03%
Branyan: 26 H, 5 2B, 11 HR; 61.54%
Here are the National League average XBH% from 2003-2007, and 2008 thus far:
2008: 13018 H, 2694 2B, 249 3B, 1494 HR; 34.0.8%
2007: 23796 H, 4898 2B, 505 3B, 2705 HR; 34.07%
2006: 23501 H, 4834 2B, 561 3B, 2840 HR; 35.04%
2005: 23058 H, 4754 2B, 468 3B, 2580 HR; 33.84%
2004: 23271 H, 4686 2B, 494 3B, 2846 HR; 34.49%
2003: 23126 H, 4657 2B, 491 3B, 2708 HR; 33.97%
Along with league SLG, we can use this tool as a general marker for a player's production; my guess is that for a player's production to be worthwhile at a given position, that player ought to hit an extra base hit at least 1 in every 3 hits. Further investigation could find different ratios for different positions (i.e., fewer XBH at C, 2B, SS, and CF, more XBH at 1B, 3B, LF, and RF, as a basic outline).
But, outside of more advanced analysis from position to position, it seems as though an average approach should yield approximately 1/3 XBH.
As you can see, the Brewers excel at hitting extra base hits -- Counsell and Kendall are the outliers, yielding little power production at catcher and utility infield / pinch hit positions. Kapler and Cameron have provided good power at CF, as have Weeks and Hardy in the middle infield.
I would even venture to say that although each of them play at positions that demand more power, XBH% numbers at or above 40% for Fielder, Hart, and Braun are a pretty good level. Where Fielder has fallen in some XBH% has been recovered with Cameron, Kapler, Weeks, Hardy, Branyan, and even Hall.
One of the big keys for a playoff run in the second half will be for Fielder to produce extra base hits at a higher level (even up to 43%-45%), with Cameron, Kapler, Weeks, and Hardy holding steady in the XBH department.
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After the Brewers made their bigtime move for Sabathia, the Cubs came kicking and screaming, "we can do it, too."
Their pitcher of choice? Athletics' splitter expert, Rich Harden, and reliever Chad Gaudin. The Cubs sent Matt Murton, Sean Gallagher, Eric Patterson, and a minor leaguer packing.
The centerpiece of the deal must be Gallagher, the Cubs' young pitching prospect that has shown as much ability striking out batters in the minors as Harden has in the majors. A quick glance at Gallagher's BB/IP shows that his control has improved over time, and he could develop into a strong power/control middle-rotation pitcher.
I cannot help but think that the Cubs got the better deal if only because they can control Harden's contract for another year, and have a league average reliever in Chad Gaudin under control for another two years. The piece that keeps me from gushing over the Cubs' deal is Gallagher -- depending upon how strong an opinion one can have on a pitcher that isn't even 23, has shown developments in control, and can be controlled for years to come.
In Baseball America's terms, the Cubs traded their 5th prospect (vs. the Brewers trading their top prospect). I am beginning to think that the only difference between LaPorta and Gallagher in this case is the shiny sticker on the front window. If the Brewers traded the equivalent of flashy and attractive new car sitting on center display, the Cubs traded one that might be displayed in the middle lot, but with better fuel efficiency.
In terms of value, the Athletics controlling a league average power/control pitcher for approx. six more years beats the Indians controlling a league average corner outfielder / first baseman / designated hitter for up to seven more years. The rub is whether or not Gallagher or LaPorta can produce at exceptional levels.
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If the Brewers traded the flashier prospect, they received the more steadfast rotation option. If the Cubs traded the less-flashy prospect, they received a flashier pitcher in return.
The Cubs win in terms of the risk/reward game. The Brewers win in terms of replicable production. Harden has produced some ERA and K/BB numbers that Sabathia has not matched, but Sabathia has produced many, many IP and GS numbers that Harden has not come close to reaching.
For their careers, Harden's IP/G numbers are hurt by the fact that he has pitched out of the bullpen. Sabathia has been an IP eater from the start, and has never pitched out of the pen. Although Sabathia is not even two years older than Harden, his career line dwarfs the right-hander who makes Ben Sheets look like the Lou Gehrig of power-pitching aces.
Here are their career lines, with OD 2008 / OD 2009 ages:
Harden (career, 26/27): 97 G, 89 GS, 541.7 IP, 442 H, 220 R, 523 K/232 BB; 3.66 runs average, 5.58 IP/G
Sabathia (career, 27/28): 238 GS, 1534.7 IP, 1440 H, 703 R, 1270 K/503 BB; 4.12 runs average, 6.45 IP/GS
Sabathia's career runs average is not as eye-popping as Harden's, but he is much more of a strong presence in the Indians' rotations over the years -- not even two years older, Sabathia's career IP total nearly triples Harden's.
Here are their basic ERA, WHIP, and ERA+ lines for their careers...
Harden (career): 3.42 ERA, 1.244 WHIP, 127 ERA+
Sabathia (career): 3.82 ERA, 1.266 WHIP, 115 ERA+
...and their top seasons (judged by ERA+):
Harden (2005): 22 G, 19 GS, 128 IP, 2.53 ERA, 1.063 WHIP, 172 ERA+
Harden (2007): 7 G, 4 GS, 25.7 IP, 2.45 ERA, 1.130 WHIP, 171 ERA+
Harden (2008): 13 GS, 77 IP, 2.34 ERA, 1.143 WHIP, 162 ERA+
Sabathia (2007): 34 GS, 241 IP, 3.21 ERA, 1.141 WHIP, 143 ERA+
Sabathia (2006): 28 GS, 192.7 IP, 3.22 ERA, 1.173 WHIP, 140 ERA+
Sabathia (2003): 30 GS, 197.7 IP, 3.60 ERA, 1.295 WHIP, 122 ERA+
Almost systematically, Harden's best performances in terms of ERA and WHIP best Sabathia's efforts, but where Harden teases with excellent ace performances, Sabathia delievers with the IP totals -- from 2001-2007, Sabathia only pitched fewer than 190 IP twice (and in those seasons, he notched better than 180 IP both times). Harden, by contrast, has only pitched better than 180 IP once, and he notched better than 100 IP in only two of his seasons from 2003-2007.
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What gets me about these deals is the pitchers that both the Cubs and Brewers can control after 2008. Say what you will about Harden's promise (and his teasing), the Cubs have the pitcher under control for 2009 for less than $10 million. Their top three pitchers controlled for '09 are Zambrano, Lilly, and Harden, a formidible top rotation. While the Brewers possess the top two free agent pitchers for 2009, they control neither of them. The Crew's top three pitchers controlled for '09 are Gallardo, Parra, and Suppan, unless you consider Villanueva a rotation option once again.
It is clear to me that the Brewers have a rotation that is strong in ace quality for the stretch run, which is very pleasing as a fan. I cannot help but be bothered by the fact that we likely lose both Sabathia and Sheets, and I am very bothered by our front office's ho-hum attitude to the press about that very fact.
While the Brewers have the stronger ace for the stretch run, the Cubs control another year of promise/teasing from Harden. Given Harden's results, even in a limited amount of IP, and his price for '09, that's no small feat for the Cubs.
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While the Brewers cannot match the Cubs' 2009 improvements along with a stretch run improvement, what intrigues me is that the Cubs might have given up the better talent.
Gallagher will be able to pitch in a pressure-free environment in Oakland, where he can develop without the demands of a penant race. Some Chicago sportswriters act as though Beane got spanked by Hendry, but they overlook the fact that Beane's genius is his pre-emptive rebuilding. The maverick GM might have shaved a year off of the length of the Athletics' rebuilding process by dealing key pieces prior to the season, as well as during the season.
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So, while most will be watching Sabathia vs. Harden, I contend that LaPorta vs. Gallagher is much more interesting -- both in terms of future production and in terms of baseball value. I would take a league average middle rotation pitcher with some power and control ability everyday of the week, over a league average corner outfielder.
Which makes me wonder, just how exceptional will LaPorta be?
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First off, it's been too long since an update, but I have been in the middle of a move. As Ryan from Between the Green Pillars put it best, I am now "blogging from behind enemy lines" from Wrigleyville/Lakeview in Chicago, where I am working on finding a job. I love the neighborhood, but will probably have to attend Sox games for now -- tickets are very hard to come by on the north side.
Secondly, C.C. Sabthia.
-Welcome, C.C.! I couldn't be happier to see another power/control pitcher to complement Sheets in the rotation. His 3.61 K/BB this season is exceptional, and his career K/BB of 2.54 indicates good control over all, as does his 2.93 BB/9 IP.
-I love C.C. in our rotation because he is the type of pitcher that will not depend upon our defense to make outs as much as some others in our rotation, and he will put fewer men on base via the walk.
-The price: I don't love this. In fact, when the deal initially was reported, the cost spoiled the whole thing for me. Upon waking up with C.C. in the rotation, I feel more at peace to watch the end of the season unfold. But, some thoughts....
-I think that dealing LaPorta indicates a poorly managed win-now strategy by the Brewers that requires that the Brewers abandon parts of their draft-first strategy, which has resulted in a well-stocked farm system. What bothers me in particular is that the Brewers did not simply part ways with some question marks as prospects, but have included their top prospect, and a Top 25 prospect in the ballgame. We're not simply talking about some player whose future is undetermined, or whose place on the club in the future is questionable. LaPorta is an offensive talent that would have helped solidify one of the best offenses in the game for years.
-Six-to-seven years of renewal/arbitration control vs. approximately 12 weeks of contract control. This is what I do not understand -- for a team such as the Brewers, it is crucial to utilize young talent under arbitration rights and the club renewal phases of contracts. Under the current arbitration levels and the Brewers club renewal system, it is likely to project that LaPorta could have been controlled for up to 7 years and up to $40 million (but probably no more). This is the price I will keep in my head when (a) the Brewers need to acquire different talent for their outfield, or, (b) acquire different talent for first base.
-Taylor Green. If Taylor Green is indeed the PTBNL, the Brewers will have parted with another of their Top 20 farmhands. For those keeping track, that's the Top Prospect, and another Top 20 prospect.
-Contract negotiations: the only way this deal makes any sense to me is if the Brewers re-sign Sabathia. The price is simply way too high for a rental; my intuition is that the price is so high because the Brewers intend to use the two and a half months of Sabathia contract control as an exclusive negotiation window for the ace. I expect a deal around 6 years and $20 million to be the neighborhood of an extension for Sabathia -- a bit less than the Santana extension, but more than the Zito free agency contract, and definitely more than Buehrle, Zambrano, and Peavy.
-If the Brewers do not re-sign Sabathia, the deal is bad. The price is simply too high. Just about the only thing that will make the price tolerable is a playoff appearance by the Brewers. We'll deal with the Brewers making the playoffs and analyzing Sabathia's contribution if it happens; we'll also deal with the Brewers failing to make the playoffs if it happens -- at which time the only way the deal could be justified is an extension for Sabathia.
-Good news: until we need to worry about the price more, the Brewers have two top ace pitchers in their rotation, and can easily make a case for the best rotation in the division, and maybe even in the NL, when the peripheral talent is considered. The only combination of aces that really comes close is Webb/Haren in Arizona.
So, I will hide my sour feelings about what the Brewers surrendered for Sabathia and enjoy this pennant race (with arms folded).
At any rate, welcome to Milwaukee, C.C. You will be loved greatly by the fans if you deliver, and criticized roundly if you don't. No pressure!
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