Around baseball -- on broadcats, in columns, in message boards -- there exists the general sentiment that pitchers simply are not prepared to pitch complete games any longer. Jim Powell is one baseball analyst that muses on this topic from time to time during his segments of Brewers broadcasts; just today he was talking about the "Complete game mentality." While I think that Jim is probably right about the fact that there is a certain type of mentality that goes along with CGs -- enough baseball people, Ned Yost and Ben Sheets included, talk about "CG mentality" enough that I agree that it must exist to some extent (and after all, Ben Sheets has pitched a lot more CG than I have -- the last game I might have finished was probably in Boy Scouts recreational ball when I was about as big as Russell Branyan's bat).

But, even though baseball people talk about the mentality -- and fans yearn for the time when "men were men," and mourn the fact that yet another American institution suffers an inevitable defeat at the hands of politically correct jibberish that turns our young warriors into hippie mush, I am never convinced that mentality covers the whole story.

Baseball is a business, as well as a sport, and like most businesses involving humans, most motivating factors for most policies, activities, practices can be explained in economic terms. Economic risk and reward explains how contracts are negotiated (we often hear that when a player such as Ryan Braun signs away free agency years for long term economic security, he is using that economic security against the risk of future injury, and while the ballclub gains one or two significant years of production at a reduced price, they also eat a hefty sum should the production level head south), and also how penants are won (often times, a team will take on the contract of a bigtime performer to make a penant run, even if that contract stretches the economic resources of that team to some extent -- the C.C. Sabathia / LaPorta deal is a good example of this type of move, although I am certain that Attanasio weighed the economic gains of having more Levis occupying seats at Miller Park against the cost of obtaining C.C.).

Why shouldn't economics also dictate how players are utilized?

Moreover, why shouldn't longer contracts and larger sums of guaranteed money help to explain the shift in pitching strategies since free agency became the widespread business practice for players?

Obviously, a host of factors can help to explain the continuous drop in complete games in the MLB -- expansion, developments in baseball manufacturing, stadium designs, mound reconfirguations, the advent of the specialized bullpen, the development of the five man rotation, advances in sports medicine treatments, advances in preventative sports medicine ideologies, multi-year guaranteed contracts, and of course, they just don't make men like they used to (just ask Gore Vidal and Lou Reed).

Which brings us to one of the greatest years of the twentieth century -- 1976. America celebrated its bicentenniel, the Sex Pistols accelerated their brief reign of terror over pop music and fashion, Martin Heidegger died, Tommy John returned from an innovative surgery, and Andy Messersmith received a 3-year contract with the Atlanta Braves after playing through 1975 without a contract and winning an arbitration hearing (along with aging ace Dave McNally).

I believe that if we are looking for catalysts to explain the contemporary position of the complete game, our main sources for analysis can be found in 1976. For, in 1976 we find the victory of sports medicine over a certain type of elbow injury, which eventually helped to prolong the careers of more league average players than anyone could imagine, and we also find the victory of MLB players over their owners.

Both of these events, the successful return of Tommy John and the contract signed by Messersmith after the arbitration victory in 1975, proved to be widespread victories for all baseball players. Even if ulnar collateral ligament reconstruction was initially a longshot, and initially connected to a pitching injury, it eventually was developed and perfected to the level of an 85%-90% success rate (for full, healthy recovery). Even if the Messersmith-McNally victory, coupled with Catfish Hunter's voided-contract free agency of 1975, was initially received as a superstar's practice, netting large contracts for the best players and alienating some average players, free agency eventually exploded into the prosperous business venture we currently see in baseball, where Gil Meche, Jeff Suppan, Kyle Farnsworth, and Jason Marquis can break the bank, just like Barry Zito, Roger Clemens, and A.J. Burnett.

Free agency continually places more and more years on an individual pitcher's future forecast, so much so that the arm must be paced -- no longer does the risk of one great season, full of deep-game performances and high innings-pitched workloads outweigh the reward of pacing a pitcher. This is in the interest of the pitcher as much as it is in the organization; the pitcher needs his arm to work effectively for more years, and the organization needs his arm to work effectively for more years.

Coupled with the added bonus of advanced sports medicine practices, and pitchers no longer must fight for their roster spots, even through injuries. The days of the one-year, disposible contract (at the hands of the ownership-oriented reserve clause) are over -- no longer does an arm injury simply means packing it up and calling it a career.

Guaranteed money and advanced medicine mean that pitchers do not need to fight as much for their spots, because their spots are no longer in jeopardy. Granted, there is a point where any performance level outweighs the risk of a contract, but the threshold for that type of performance is now fairly high (anyone remember Barry Zito's bullpen stint this year?)

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 Development of Complete Games:

1901-1910 NL: 12,042 G, 9,234 CG; 76.68%

1911-1920 NL: 12,070 G, 6,747 CG; 55.89%

1921-1930 NL: 12,318 G, 5,976 CG; 48.51%

1931-1940 NL: 12,318 G, 5,433 CG; 44.11%

1941-1950 NL: 12,394 G, 5,057 CG; 40.80%

1951-1961 NL: 13,616 G, 4,225  CG; 31.03%

1962-1974 NL: 22,938 G, 6,011 CG; 26.21%

1975-1984 NL: 18,782 G, 3,230 CG; 17.20%

1985-1994 NL: 19,410 G, 1,959 CG; 10.09%

1995-2008 NL: 33,960 G, 1,427 CG; 4.20%

1901-1910 AL: 11,898 G, 9,289 CG; 78.07%

1911-1920 AL: 12,062 G, 6,782 CG; 56.23%

1921-1930 AL: 12,328 G, 5,956 CG; 48.31%

1931-1940 AL: 12,308 G, 5,548 CG; 45.08%

1941-1950 AL: 12,362 G, 5,401 CG; 43.69%

1951-1960 AL: 12,366 G, 4,061 CG; 32.84%

1961-1974 AL: 24,532 G, 6,142 CG; 25.04%

1975-1984 AL: 21,212 G, 5,192 CG; 24.48%

1985-1997 AL: 28,542 G, 3,190 CG; 11.18%

1998-2008 AL: 26,234 G, 1,153 CG; 4.40%

When we look at the actual development of the complete game in the history of baseball, we find that there have always been reasons for the decline of the complete game. After the Carl Mays / Ray Chapman incident forced MLB to address the rough-and-tumble state of affairs that was baseball's spitball era, complete games declined in both the American and National Leagues, as new baseballs were to be utilized as soon as any dirt was noticed on the ball. This could have been one of baseball's single most radical developments, as it almost immediately shifted the balance in favor of the offense, at least for some time.

The percentage of complete games steadily declined in both leagues, with one notable exception: the immediate effect of the designated hitter on the American League helped to maintain a higher percentage of complete games in the American League than the National League, which makes perfect sense from a strategical standpoint (if American League managers are no longer forced by the mere progression of the game to make a pitching decision, the immediate effect will probably be a situation of hands-off managing). Of course,a steady diet of expansion and the advent of the LaRussa bullpen eventually caught up with the American League, as did free agency.

Notice that the progression of the complete game is quite similar between the two leagues, except for the decade immediately following the introduction of the designated hitter. This is probably quite easily attributed to the fact that most baseball managers manage the game according to the same broad ideology, with only a few mavericks here and there challenging the norms (no one wants to be named the maverick that attempts a new baseball strategy that fails miserably).

With each passing milestone -- Tommy John's successful return in 1976, and the steady improvement in sports medicine treatments, free agency, new spitball policies, new expansion teams, etc., we can find changes in the percentage of complete games.

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Perhaps only a handful of baseballs were used during the whole game, and pitchers were encouraged to scuff up the ball, dirty it up, and ready it for play; perhaps only eight teams played in each league; perhaps each team utilized some form of a four-man rotation; perhaps pitchers were subject to a stronger reserve clause; perhaps pitchers had to sign a contract each year based upon their previous performance; perhaps an arm injury meant the end of a career; perhaps a lack of preventative medical knowledge allowed pitchers to perform at a lower level of conditioning and specific training; peraps contractual money was not guaranteed...

....baseball would have more complete games.