|
| |
October 2008 - Posts
-
Post note: If you don't want the stats, I've summed the main points below.
***
Using OPD (Offense + Defense) calculations (which uses extrapolated runs for offense, and defensive runs prevented), this is a simple reference to see what Escobar would have to produce at SS and Hardy would need to do at 3B... J.J. Hardy (SS): +4.6 OPD
Offense: +13.3 runs (i.e., 13.3 runs above average SS production) Defense: -8.7 runs (i.e., 8.7 runs below average SS defense)
Bill Hall (3B): -6.6 OPD
Offense: -13.8 runs (i.e., 13.8 runs below average 3B production) Defense: +7.3 runs (i.e., 7.3 runs above average 3B defense) *** If Hardy switches to 3B, his bat will be less valuable (NL 2008 splits):
Hardy (2008): .283/.343/.478 NL SS (2008): .276/.334/.404 NL 3B (2008): .265/.335/.441 (If we use BP Marginal Line Up Value (MLV)
and Positional MLV (PMLV), we could estimate that the regression in
moving Hardy to 3B would be anywhere between 4 and 10 runs. This is a
difficult projection to make without doing the hard math, so I will
probably try that later, but as an eyeballing-projection, the closest
PA, OPS, and MLV/PMLV comparisons at 3B are Troy Glaus and Jorge Cantu). *** The wager with Escobar's defense is the following: (1) He will be at least an average defender. If (1) is true, add at least 9 runs in Escobar's favor. (2) He will be at least an average bat. If (2) is true, subtract no more than 13.3 runs from Escobar. What we have to bank on is that Escobar's defensive gains are larger than his offensive losses. *** The wager with Hardy moving to third is the following: (1) He will be at least an average defender. If (1) is true, push on Hall's +7.3 runs, which would be a +16 run swing for Hardy (from -8.7 as a SS to +7.3 as a 3B, which is Hall's 2008 level. (2) He will be at least an average bat. If (1) is true, subtract no more than
10 runs from Hardy's offensive total, which would mean at least a +3.3
ranking at 3B (which is a +17 run swing from Hall's 2008 offense). *** Very, very basic projections, so far without the hard math (these are merely logical or conceptual projections, not mathematical. That will come later): Escobar (SS): +0.0 OPD
Offense: +0 runs Defense: +0 runs Hardy (3B): +10.6 OPD
Offense: +3,3 runs Defense: +7.3 runs *** With these projections, Hardy + Escobar would be worth almost +13 runs (1) But Hardy must match Hall's level of 3B defense (2) Escobar must be an average SS bat (.276/.334/.404) (3) Hardy must maintain his 2008 level of production (.283/.343/.478) (4) Escobar must be at least an average SS defender *** So
that's the wager that needs to be made when considering Hardy and
Escobar on the left side of the infield, and the possible return on all
bets paying off is approximately one win (13 runs)... *** What cannot occur: (1) Hardy is not as good a defensive 3B as Hall (-7.3 runs) (2) Escobar is not an average SS bat (- ??? runs) (3) Hardy does not maintain his 2008 production level (still +??? runs above Hall's 2008 bat) (4) Escobar is not an average defensive SS (but is he still better than Hardy?)
-
I'm watching national analysts tear apart Selig -- it seems like one
supports Selig for every five that second guess him -- and it's
occurred to me: why is this such a huge issue? First off, more baseball is never
a bad thing, and that's a fact -- the weather was bad in Philadelphia,
and that forces the first suspended game in the history of the World
Series (due to rain). That's way cool. Now we have an historical opportunity to watch the final 3 innings on a separate night, and the game will be finished. Secondly,
for all the trouble Selig is getting for allowing the game to go into
the sixth inning, why isn't he getting more credit for an absolutely
correct judgment: that no World Series game will end this way, that he
would not have officially called the game after 4.5, even with the
Phillies leading, and that "this is no way to end a World Series." Say
what you will about other Selig blunders, even the decision to let the
game go later, but I think Selig actually upheld the integrity of the
game by "skirting" the rules -- that is, I believe he got the spirit of
the game correct, even if he didn't completely go by the letter. Third,
there are all sorts of issues with the type of information that Selig
was being fed, and he himself noted that he was working with the ground
crew during the 4th and after, and there's an extent to which he can
only go by the info he has. Couple that with the fact that the front
offices, umpires, and grounds crew all met with Selig before the game
and decided that the game would be played, and you have some context to
explain why the game went forward. I think that people enjoy
second guessing Selig, and he's an easy target because a lot of people
believe that baseball is no longer the national pasttime, that baseball
is a flawed sport since the steroids disaster, etc. But I think people
need to separate their previous (and legitimate) criticisms of Selig
from this event... ...and frankly, do people even watch baseball
anymore? If we really tried, we could think of handfuls of games that
we've seen in the last few years that were continued in even worse
weather conditions than the conditions last night, and anyone
that watches baseball regularly will admit that they often see games
being rushed along through bad weather a couple of innings after there
was a logical stopping point. This is always something that
happens in baseball with bad weather, and I frankly think it is really
stupid to criticize Selig for this particular game. And what
really escapes me is that all of this criticism and second guessing
occurs without one mention of how great the quality of play has been in
this series. We've seen late game comebacks, runners stranded and late
game comeback attempts stopped, and we've only had one blow-out thus
far through 4+ games. We're in the midst of an incredibly exciting elimination game, and I don't understand why no one
is promoting the young stars, or patting baseball on the back for their
post-steroids brand of play, which seems to be faster, including more
young stars who combine power and speed, and some nice young pitchers
with excellent approaches and pretty good stuff. I thoroughly
disagree with anyone that suggests that this weather debacle is just
another chapter in the demise of baseball -- I think this is clearly
the most exciting World Series since '03, and I think the national
media is more annoyed that their beloved Chicago, New York, Los
Angeles, and Boston teams are not in the Series than anything else... Frankly,
with these young stars, I think the game is in better hands than it has
been in a very long time, and I am more excited to be a baseball fan
than ever before. I just wish that people would see this series
for what it is -- a fine display of post-steroids baseball -- and
forget things that cannot be stopped (like Mother Nature....)
-
Rotation II: Luck Factors Rotation I: Gallardo and Parra Rotation averages 1-5 Rotation III (part one): Individual projections
** There are all sorts of comments, analyses, opinions, and other words flying around about Sabathia.
In terms of dollar signs, we can guess that Sabathia is probably
worth between $20 and $25 million on the free agency market. We could
calculate the increases throughout the past 4-5 free agency markets, or
even the last two, and figure out where a Sabathia offer stands (and
add in the Santana extension, which was not a free agency contract but
will most definitely factor into the Sabathia signing).
But what about runs?
It's very difficult to project the 2009 rotation, for several reasons:
(1) We don't know the future
(2) Sheets and Sabathia so thoroughly over-performed 2008 averages that the 2009 rotation is most likely to regress
(3) The 2008 bullpen was so good that the 2009 bullpen is probably likely to regress
Given the back-and-forth nature of how bullpens work, and the fact
that precious little bullpen performances remain stable from year to
year, the best way to project the 2009 bullpen is to provide a range of
options based upon the past. Assuming that Melvin builds the 2009
bullpen with roughly the same assumptions and increasing resources with
which he progressively built the 2003-2008 bullpens, we can at least
provide a guess to a likely range that Melvin's bullpens occupy:
2008 Bullpen: 472.3 IP, 443 H, 224 R, 385 K/214 BB; 4.27 runs average
2007 Bullpen: 511.3 IP, 493 H, 276 R, 477 K/200 BB; 4.86 runs average
2006 Bullpen: 463 IP, 459 H, 290 R, 380 K/218 BB; 5.64 runs average
2005 Bullpen: 446.3 IP, 420 H, 209 R, 377 K/223 BB; 4.21 runs average
2004 Bullpen: 521 IP, 521 H, 277 R, 358 K/165 BB; 4.79 runs average
2003 Bullpen: 522 IP, 529 H, 260 R, 414 K/205 BB; 4.48 runs average
Total: 2936 IP, 2865 H, 1536 R, 2391 K/1225 BB; 4.71 runs average
10% increase: 489.3 IP, 429 H, 230 R, 438 K/184 BB; 4.23 runs average
5% increase: 489.3 IP, 453 H, 243 R, 418 K/194 BB; 4.47 runs average
Raw average: 489.3 IP, 477 H, 256 R, 398 K/204 BB; 4.71 runs average
5% decrease: 489.3 IP, 501 H, 269 R, 378 K/214 BB; 4.95 runs average
10% decrease: 489.3 IP, 525 H, 282 R, 358 K/224 BB; 5.19 runs average
With a simple range of averages provided, we can see that Melvin's
2008 bullpen is pretty much as good as it gets for his history of
bullpen building, at least in terms of runs allowed.
Of course, runs distribution is crucial for bullpen work, and
in that department, the Brewers' bullpen in 2008 was in fact worse than
the 2007 bullpen, for instance, at converting leads.
There are all sorts of stats we could work with that would help us
to figure out how runs are distributed throughout the bullpen, but that
is outside of the scope of this first step of projections, which I
would simply like to base around runs allowed.
(Given the fact that I cannot predict the future, I am perfectly
happy providing a flawed, basic projection at first, because at least
then we will be able to poke it with sticks, ask questions, and figure
out where to go from there....)
Now, there are plenty of rotation questions, with or without the signing of Sabathia:
(a) If Sabathia is likely to incur an injury due to his workload, when is that injury likely to occur?
(b) How much did Dave Bush's luck affect his 2008 campaign, and how much will average defensive luck hurt his 2009 campaign?
(c) How much did Parra's luck hurt his 2008 campaign, and how much will average defense help his 2009 campaign?
(d) How much did Suppan's injury hurt his 2008 campaign?
(e) Is Suppan's regression the beginning of a downward career trend?
(f) How will Gallardo's stamina respond to a regular IP workload?
(g) How likely is McClung to succeed in a broader starting role (or a more important bullpen role)?
(h) Was Villanueva's starting work in 2008 a fluke?
(j) What is the likelihood of Sabathia's three-year upward trend to continue?
...and so on...
There are ways in which we could answer each of these questions, but
I want to put the basic cart before the horse, again, just to see what
we're looking at.
***
So, here's what I did:
-I calculated the raw career averages for Sabathia, Bush, Suppan, Parra, Gallado, McClung, and Villanueva
-I issued projection ranges based on the raw average, a 10%
increase, and a 10% decrease. In the case of Parra and Gallardo, given
that their performances are so difficult to project due to all sorts of
questions about youth and workload, I over-estimated Parra's chances of
improving, and I over-estimated Gallardo's changes of regressing. I did
that for the simple fact that we have no real career norm for either of
these players, and therefore I decided to be a bit more cautious with
Gallardo, and a bit more optimistic with Parra.
You can find more reasoning about that, here.
-I did not issue regressions for McClung simply because his poor
performance in Tampa weighs down his career average to a large extent.
***
Then, I went ahead and calculated some projections, using various
combinations of these rotations, with and without Sabathia, and I added
on various combinations of bullpen performance..... *** Here is my first set of projection ranges...
Projection #1: Averages + Average Bullpen (4.71 runs average)
Rotation One: Sabathia, Bush, Suppan, Parra, Gallardo, Villanueva: 726 R
1064.7 IP, 520 R; 84 quality starts
393.3 IP, 206 R
Rotation Two: Bush, Suppan, Parra, Gallardo, McClung, Villanueva: 752 R
1074 IP, 551 R; 79 quality starts
384 IP, 201 R Projection #2: Sabathia Increase/Staff Decreases + Average Bullpen (4.71 runs average)
Rotation Three: Sabathia, Bush, Suppan, Parra, Gallardo, Villanueva: 771 R
1003.3 IP, 533 R; 80 quality starts
454.7 IP, 238 R
Projection #3: Everyone decreases, McClung average + Average Bullpen (4.71 runs average)
Rotation Four: Bush, Suppan, Parra, Gallardo, Villanueva, McClung: 835 R
966 IP, 578 R; 73 quality starts
492 IP, 257 R; Projection #4: Non-Sabathia rotation increases + Average Bullpen (4.71 runs average)
Rotation Five: Bush, Suppan, Parra, Gallardo, Villanueva, McClung: 654 R
1117 IP, 476 R; 89 quality starts
341 IP, 178 R
Projection #5: Sabathia rotation increases + Average Bullpen (4.71 runs average)
Rotation Six: Sabathia, Bush, Suppan, Parra, Gallardo, Villanueva: 623 R
1185.7 IP, 480 R; 94 quality starts
272.3 IP, 143 R;
Projection #6: Everyone decreases, McClung average + 10% increase Bullpen (4.23 runs average)
Rotation Seven: Bush, Suppan, Parra, Gallardo, Villanueva, McClung: 809 R
966 IP, 578 R; 73 quality starts
492 IP, 231 R;
Projection #7: Sabathia Increase/Staff Decreases + 10% increase Bullpen (4.23 runs average)
Rotation Eight: Sabathia, Bush, Suppan, Parra, Gallardo, Villanueva: 747 R
1003.3 IP, 533 R; 80 quality starts
454.7 IP, 214R Projection #8: Sabathia Increase/Staff Average + Average bullpen (4.71 runs average)
Rotation Nine: Sabathia, Bush, Suppan, Parra, Gallardo, Villanueva: 704 R
1086.7 IP, 510 R; 86 quality starts
371.3 IP, 194 R Projection #9: 2008 averages + Gallardo average + Average bullpen (4.71 runs average)
Rotation Ten: Bush, Suppan, Parra, Gallardo, Villanueva, McClung: 736 R
1053.3 IP, 524 R; 78 quality starts
404.7 IP, 212 R
Projection #10: 2008 averages + Gallardo average + 5% increase bullpen (4.47 runs average)
Rotation Ten: Bush, Suppan, Parra, Gallardo, Villanueva, McClung: 725 R
1053.3 IP, 524 R; 78 quality starts
404.7 IP, 201 R;
In the most
extreme cases of placing Sabathia in an otherwise comparable situation,
we'll find the value of Sabathia to be around 60 runs.
Now, those are extreme cases where every other pitcher regresses, and what's crucical to note is that even with Sabathia in those cases, the pitching staff allows over 80 more runs from 2008-2009.
So, those extreme differences provide rather bleak situations all
around -- the choice with Sabathia there is basically between below
average and awful, and either way the Brewers are basically screwed.
(BTW, average runs for 2009, based on 2008, would be around 749, but
given recent trends, a decent range or runs forecast might
realistically see runs production per team run between 727 and 757
runs, depending upon how much the post-steroids era context deflates
runs -- or how quickly runs are deflated).
In most of the other cases, i.e., the non-extreme cases,the value of Sabathia is between approximately 26 and 32 runs.
Note how crucial Sabathia's incredible 2008 performance, Sheets'
2008 performance, and the 2008 bullpen were for the 2008 Crew's success:
Almost every single model, with or without Sabathia,
anticipating a basic, average bullpen, finds the Brewers allowing more
runs than 2008.
-
Rotation Projections (including Sabathia): Here are the basic SP projection ranges, including 2009 OD age:
Sabathia (28): 254 GS, 1659.3 IP, 1541 H, 731 R, 1393 K/523 BB; 150 quality starts; 3.96 runs average, 6.53 IP/GS
Raw average: 34 GS, 222 IP, 206 H, 98 R, 186 K/70 BB; 20 quality starts; 3.97 runs average, 6.53 IP/GS
10% increase: 34 GS, 244 IP, 185 H, 88 R, 215 K/63 BB; 22 quality starts; 3.25 runs average, 7.18 IP/GS
(2006-2008): 97 G, 686.7 IP, 262 R; 3.43 runs average, 7.08 IP/G
10% decrease: 34 GS, 200 IP, 227 H, 108 R, 168 K/77 BB; 18 quality starts; 4.86 runs average, 5.88 IP/GS
**
Dave Bush (29): 139 G, 132 GS, 815.3 IP, 818 H, 433 R, 548 K/184 BB; 66 quality starts; 4.78 runs average, 5.87 IP/G
Raw average: 34 G, 32 GS, 199.7 IP, 200 H, 106 R, 134 K/45 BB; 16 quality starts; 4.78 runs average, 5.87 IP/G
10% increase: 34 G, 32 GS, 219.7 IP, 180 H, 95 R, 147 K/41 BB; 18 quality starts; 3.89 runs average, 6.46 IP/G
10% decrease: 34 G, 32 GS, 179.7 IP, 220 H, 117 R, 121 K/49 BB; 14 quality starts; 5.86 runs average, 5.29 IP/G
**
Suppan (34): 382 G, 366 GS, 2249 IP, 2479 H, 1265 R, 1252 K/747 BB; 170 quality starts; 5.06 runs average, 5.89 IP/G
Raw average: 34 G, 33 GS, 200 IP, 220 H, 112 R, 111 K/66 BB; 15 quality starts; 5.04 runs average, 5.89 IP/G
10% increase: 34 G, 33 GS, 220 IP, 200 H, 101 R, 122 K/60 BB; 17 quality starts; 4.13 runs average, 6.47 IP/G
10% decrease: 34 G, 33 GS, 180 IP, 240 H, 123 R, 101 K/72 BB; 14 quality starts; 6.15 runs average, 5.29 IP/G
**
Parra (26): 41 G, 31 GS, 192.3 IP, 206 H, 104 R, 173 K/87 BB; 11 quality starts; 4.87 runs average, 4.69 IP/G
Raw Average: 34 G, 26 GS, 159.7 IP, 171 H, 86 R, 144 K/72 BB; 9 quality starts; 4.87 runs average, 4.69 IP/G
20% increase: 34 G, 26 GS, 190.7 IP, 164 H, 83 R, 205 K/68 BB; 11 quality starts; 3.92 runs average, 5.61 IP/G
10% decrease: 34 G, 26 GS, 144.3 IP, 184 H, 85 R, 117 K/71 BB; 8 quality starts; 5.30 runs average, 4.25 IP/G
**
Gallardo (23): 24 G, 21 GS, 134.3 IP, 125 H, 53 R, 121 K/45 BB; 15 quality starts; 3.55 runs average, 5.60 IP/G
Raw Average: 34 G, 30 GS, 190.3 IP, 177 H, 75 R, 171 K/64 BB; 21 quality starts; 3.55 runs average, 5.60 IP/G
10% increase: 34 G, 30 GS, 209.3 IP, 176 H, 74 R, 206 K/63 BB; 23 quality starts; 3.18 runs average, 6.16 IP/G
10% decrease: 34 G, 30 GS, 171.3 IP, 175 H, 73 R, 138 K/64 BB; 19 quality starts; 3.84 runs average, 5.04 IP/G
**
McClung (28): 136 G, 49 GS, 368.3 IP, 363 H, 241 R, 274 K/215 BB; 19 quality starts; 5.89 runs average, 2.71 IP/G
Raw average: 27 G, 10 GS, 73 IP, 72 H, 48 R, 54 K/43 BB; 4 quality starts; 5.92 runs average, 2.71 IP/G
10% increase: 27 G, 10 GS, 80 IP, 65 H, 43 R, 59 K/39 BB; 4 quality starts; 4.84 runs average, 2.96 IP/G
20% increase: 27 G, 10 GS, 87 IP, 58 H, 38 R, 64 K/35 BB; 5 quality starts; 3.93 runs average, 3.22 IP/G
**
Carlos Villanueva (25): 116 G, 21 GS, 276.3 IP, 256 H, 127 R, 231 K/94 BB; 9 quality starts; 4.14 runs average, 2.38 IP/G
Raw average: 39 G, 7 GS, 93 IP, 86 H, 43 R, 78 K/32 BB; 3 quality starts; 4.16 runs average, 2.38 IP/G
10% increase: 39 G, 7 GS, 102 IP, 77 H, 39 R, 86 K/29 BB; 3 quality starts; 3.44 runs average, 2.62 IP/G
10% decrease: 39 G, 7 GS, 84 IP, 95 H, 47 R, 69 K/35 BB; 3 quality starts; 5.04 runs average, 2.15 IP/G
For those worried about accurately
accounting for Sabathia's recent success, note that his 2006-2008
improvements are easily accounted for with a 10% improvement from his
career average.
-
Here's a little something to rethink the Crew's offense -- a secondary average measures aspects of the game that are not covered by the primary hitting average, or batting average (H/AB). Secondary average combines power (TB-H), speed (SB, CS), and patience/discipline (BB) into one average (TB-H+BB+SB-CS)/AB.
This is a little something to read next to AVG, OBP, etc., stats, and another way of measuring the productivity of the Brewers' offense in 2008:
Branyan: (77-33+19+1-0)/132= .485
Cameron: (212-108+54+17-5)/444 = .383
Fielder: (298-162+84+3-2)/588 = .376
Braun: (338-174+42+14-4)/611 = .354
Weeks: (189-111+66+19-5)/475 = .333
Durham: (160-107+53+8-4)/370 = .297
Hardy: (272-161+52+2-1)/569 = .288
Counsell: (75-56+46+3-1)/248= .270
Kapler: (114-69+13+3-1)/229= .262
Hart: (281-164+27+23-7)/612 = .261
Hall: (160-91+37+5-6)/404 = .259
Kendall: (167-127+50+8-3)/516 = .184
Branyan leads because of his raw power; Cameron is more intriguing because of his all-around game. Cam posted one of the best BB rates of anyone on the team, hit for great power, and stole some bases effectively. He is, in this sense, the ultimate "secondary" player -- keep this in mind when simply judging players by AVG. AVG does not capture other valuable aspects of the game, such as speed productivity, power, and patience.
Braun and Fielder are obviously strong secondary players due to their power, and Fielder's patience also helps. Braun's speed contributes, too.
Weeks is another strong secondary player, compared with his batting average -- he draws walks, steals bases, and hits for extra bases at a good clip.
From Durham and below, we're getting into the range of players that have more one-dimensional games (except for Hart, who has good power and speed, but whose patience takes away from his secondary average).
Kendall and Hall are the least-productive secondary players on the team. Hall due to a lack of patience and speed, Kendall due to a rather one-dimensional game based around AVG.
Just another measure to think about when analyzing the Brewers.
More Posts Next page »
|
|
|