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October 2008 - Posts
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Today is an excellent day for the Milwaukee Brewers. Well, maybe not literally. The Crew lost an excellent talent evaluator in Jack Zduriencik, who was the architect of the Brewers' strong offense-first, athletic-first, defense second core of young players. While it might be easy to point out flaws as well as strengthes from the Jack Z. regime, I think that the clearest indication of his record is the actual product on the field, the people in the stands, and growing buzz around the ballclub for years -- I remember hearing stories about Prince Fielder in the minors years ago that really gave me enthusiasm as a fan, and a reason to stick around and hope for a better organizational fate to come. The bottom line is easy: Zduriencik's young core provided the foundation along with Doug Melvin's larger scouting ideology, forming a front office that is noted for its reliance upon scouts, implementing strong and direct scouting strategies to attempt valuable gambles for a club with limited resources. The increasing win totals, all-star appearances, attendance records, and playoff appearance are all votes in Zduriencik's favor.... ....and this is the excellent cost of success. The Milwaukee Brewers brand is well-regarded around the league, and perhaps the best sign that you're running a successful organization is that everyone wants your personnel. Moreover, this job opening couldn't come at a better time. Doug Melvin is extended, and gets to put a twist on his next regime. Will the offense-first, hide-the-glove strategy continue? What will come of the strong-bottom-line value scouting and value signings now that the payroll is increasing year by year? What role will acquiring young pitching play in the consideration of the next scouting director? I am interested to see how Zduriencik turns around the Mariners, what his strategies will be. Some Brewers fans mourn the fact that he will not be GM of the Brewers, but why should we assume that he'd want to take over the ship he's already built? Why wouldn't a great baseball evaluator and mind with 25 years in the business want a new challenge? Seattle certainly provides that challenge....there are not many MLB organizations that could match Seattle's mismanagement in the past couple of years, mainly stemming from profound talent mis-evaluating, culminating in a disastrous win-now bid without the talent to do so. In terms of a challenge and implementing an ideology, I think that makes the Mariners' job much more appealing for a mind like that of Zduriencik's -- he will get to put yet another stamp on yet another MLB club....what will the results of this stamp be? By the way, watch Melvin's moves closely. What will his next scouting strategy be? What is the Brewers' ideology for the future? The beauty of these questions is that the uncertainty of their answers follows a playoff berth this time, rather than a 100-loss season.
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Boy, is it a great time to be a baseball fan. The steroids era is out, and suddenly it's apparent that the MLB has a ton of young star power, in the form of lots of different players with different skills and attributes and personalities, and the beauty is, these guys should be able to stick around for a while. Even the big market Dodgers and Red Sox have solid young talent to show off -- from Lester to Pedroia to Billingsley to Loney to Kemp, and maybe even to Kershaw, who is still developing.The White Sox boast the young Danks, a Cuban Missile, and Carlos Quentin. I don't need to remind anyone of the Brewers' young star power, and the Rays and Phillies will display some fine young stars in this World Series. I think this off-season provides great marketing opportunities for the MLB. Will the league continue to favor and promote its larger markets, even in the face of two successful teams coming out of the shadows of Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago? The MLB has a great chance to put a wonderful spin on the young talent, featuring up-and-coming black stars -- including one of the best pure sluggers and RBI men in the game and his excellent power/speed infield-mate, a great young change-up pitcher, a third baseman that signed a contract without a single year of service time, a starting pitching prospect out of Vanderbilt that jumped onto the Rays' playoff roster to help the team in the bullpen... ...we should watch carefully to see the types of spins and advertisements the MLB produces for this World Series, but I have to think that this World Series provides the best possible opportunity to showcase the league's new stars, rather than focusing on the ones we already know. So, enjoy the World Series! And especially, enjoy the young talent that this league will place on center stage for at least 4 games, and hopefully 7! I'm not sure that the casual American fan knows it, but it's a great time to be a baseball fan, and if you aren't already a baseball fan, there's finally no reason you shouldn't become one.
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Problem: Rickie Weeks is an average second baseman regarding the double play. Now, the reason that I suggest this is a problem is that Brewers fans will almost intuitively tell you, if you ask them, that Rickie Weeks is a poor defender who cannot turn the double play. But, looking at all of the MLB second basemen that accumulated at least 600 fielding innings at second, Weeks' 84 double plays turned is exactly where he should be: the average MLB 2B with at least 200 fielding innings turned 0.077805 double plays per fielding inning. At 1056 fielding innings, Weeks should have turned approximately 82 double plays -- he turned 84. This is not simply a fact that exists with the busiest MLB 2B....looking at every MLB 2B who accumulated at least 100 innings in the field at that position, Weeks' average double play rate should have yielded approximately 81 double plays -- he turned 84. What accounts for this phenomenon? Certainly we trust our eyes to report with accuracy that Weeks cannot turn the double play, and yet there he is -- as perfectly average as average can get, and even a bit better. I've been reading The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract, which has enlightened me on some fielding issues and fielding stats problems. I strongly recommend the book, by the way -- James' is genius is not as much his innovation, creativity, and extensive factual rigor as much as it is sheer comedy and story telling. For a really thick book, this one has a ton of rhythm, and the history reads as a series of fragmented stories, articles, and facts, making it a really informative and easy page turner. Anyone, drawing from some of James' ideas, here is what I think causes Weeks' average double play total, despite some of his defensive issues: (1) Opportunities: Throughout his book, James notes that fielding stats can often falsely portray defenders on poor teams as strong fielders simply because some defenders on poor teams have more double play opportunities, because the pitching staff puts more men on base.... This might not be terribly plausible in the Brewers' case: the 3.26 BB/9 IP, while certainly not awful, put more men on first base more frequently than several other teams; however, a 3.26 BB/'9 IP is well within the 2008 NL average of 3.44 BB/9 IP. So, the Brewers' pitchers were not putting more men on first more regularly than many other NL teams. As for WHIP, the Brewers' 1.33 WHIP is well within the NL league average of 1.39. Even in the case of extra HBP or errors, the extra opportunities for GIDP would not provide Weeks with that much material with which to botch GIDP and manage to post an average double play rate. (2) Range: stated simply, Rickie Weeks' range is above league average, both as a raw factor and as a 9 inning measure. Are those precious few extra balls that Weeks can even get to allowing him more opportunities to make a poor throw? Weeks, in this case, would have the unique combination of fine range and poor throwing -- which I believe could account for the phenomena of botching some double plays while maintaining an average number of double plays as well. J.J. Hardy's range is also average-to-above average. That might provide Weeks more double play opportunities, as well. (3) J.J. Hardy turned a slightly below average number of double plays. Looking at the MLB SS that posted above 600 innings at shortstop, Hardy slightly underperforms his average -- the MLB average for the busiest MLB shortstops (26 of them with 600 innings or more) suggests that Hardy should have turned approximately 89 double plays in 1268.3 innings... ...which leads me to ask: is Weeks the center of the double play combination? Is he the focal point? I don't think it is crazy to suggest that the average second baseman turns slightly more double plays per defensive inning than the average shortstop -- could that help to explain why Weeks turned an average number of double plays? Could it be that the plays that Weeks botched, the poor double play throws, were simply the result of extra opportunities afforded by his middle infield partner? Moreover, what would even be a reasonable number of botched double plays for Weeks? The average fan will have it that Weeks botched a double play in approximately 162 games....but how many did Weeks actually cost the Brewers Could it be that Weeks' shortcomings actually exhibit an average second baseman experiencing growing pains entering the next level of production? How can we explain that Weeks is an "awful" defender -- as many fans say -- when his range is above average, and his double plays turned are average? His fielding percentage might indicate that he is below average, which is fine, but that lower fielding percentage could also be explained partially by Weeks' ability to get to balls in the field. But who knows? For the record, I do not think Weeks is an awful defender. I think he is an average defender that has the pieces to become an above-average defender, just like he is an average offensive player that has the pieces to become an above-average hitter.
Anyhow, it's just a unique fact...next time you're at the bar debating with your friends, let them know that Weeks was a perfectly average MLB second baseman at turning the double play....
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This is a continuation of my survey of the Brewers' pitching rotation. See the earlier installments on Parra and Gallardo here, and on pitching rotations from 1-to-5 here; the survey of NL 100+ IP starters is here. ***
While its
usefulness as an offensive measurement might be questionable, BABIP
(Batting Average on Balls in Play, (H-HR)/(AB-HR-K+SF), as listed on BR.
I don't agree with some of the ways in which it is calculated, but
that's another issue) provides a useful tool for analyzing the rate at
which a pitchers' balls in play drop for htis, or are converted into
outs. The other aspect of this calculation, Defensive Efficiency
(listed as ((H + ROE - HR) / (PA - BB - SO - HBP - HR)) on BP,
although if you're in a rush Def.Eff. can be approximated by
calculating 1-BABIP), measures the defensive aspect of BABIP more
extensively, and is a rate at which the balls put into play are
converted into outs by a defense.
Both of these measurements, taken for individual pitchers and teams alike, can implicate certain things:
(1) Is the pitcher pitching in front of a good defense? Now, I
understand that there is a lot of resistance to defensive stats based
on individual aspects of defense, or the individual defensive stats
taken as an aggregate for the team, but all I mean to use Def.Eff for
here is to simply provide one approximation of whether or not the
individual pitchers on the Brewers had good defense behind them, or bad
defense -- and it does vary throughout the team.
(2) Is the pitcher lucky? I believe this is a logical conclusion of
(1). If one starting pitcher receives better-than-average defensive
support from the team, and another starting pitcher receives
less-than-average defensive support from the team, we can say that the
first pitcher is indeed lucky, for an external circumstance not
completely within his control is helping to contribute to his success.
Now, we can certainly say that a pitcher can help his defense by
working quickly, throwing strikes, etc., but I'm not exactly certain
there's a proven correlation between working fast, throwing strikes --
keeping the defense on its toes -- and better defensive support.
So, I compiled a very simple survey: I took the Brewers' team
pitching BABIP and the Brewers' team Defensive Efficiency, and compared
it to the individual rates and the individual support given to
individual pitchers.
Team BABIP: .289
Bush: .238
McClung: .284
Gallardo: .297
Sheets: .299
Sabathia: .301
Villanueva: .302
Suppan: .306
Parra: .333
Team Defensive Effieicncy: .698
Bush: .744
McClung: .710
Sheets: .708
Sabathia: .700
Gallardo: .697
Suppan: .691
Villanueva: .688
Parra: .647
Not taking anything away from Dave Bush, or giving any extra
sympathy to Parra, but the "luck spectrum" of the 2008 Brewers' staff
found Bush at the apex, and Parra in a much more disadvantaged position.
The other pitchers don't really have terribly alarming defensive
support or a terribly alarming rate of batted balls dropping for hits.
Maybe McClung is the only other pitcher we might worry about having
better-than-average defensive support in a manner that distorted his
performance....but more on that below.
So, what does this tell us? I took our pitchers currently (and
likely) under contract for 2009, and put together their "luck factors"
for 2008, and listed them against their H/9 IP. I have provided career
H/9 IP, as well as the luck factors and H/9 IP for three other seasons
(2005-2007). I'm not sure any of this proves anything, I just found it
really, really interesting to see how much H/9 IP can fluctuate from
year to year, and how those increases and decreases can be tied to
performance, and especially hits allowed.
You can read this chart the following way:
Year (Team, ERA+, H/9 IP): Ind. BABIP / Team BABIP; Ind. Def.Eff./Team Def.Eff
And here it is: our 2009 Brewers' "luck factors":
Bush’s Luck Context: (9.03 H/9 IP career)
2008 (Mil; 104 ERA+; 7.93 H/9 IP): .238/.289 Team; .744/.698 Team
2007 (Mil; 88 ERA+; 10.48 H/9 IP): .323/.312 Team; .676/.677 Team
2006 (Mil; 103 ERA+; 8.61 H/9 IP): .286/.302 Team; .711/.687 Team
2005 (Tor; 99 ERA+; 9.38 H/9 IP): .280/.288 Team; .718/.701 Team
Suppan’s Luck Context: (9.92 H/9 IP career)
2008 (Mil; 87 ERA+, 10.49 H/9 IP): .306/.289 Team; .691/.698 Team
2007 (Mil; 97 ERA+; 10.58 H/9 IP): .324/.312 Team; .671/.677 Team
2006 (StL; 108 ERA+, 9.81 H/9 IP): .298/.294 Team; .701/.697 Team
2005 (StL; 119 ERA+, 9.54 H.9 IP): .296/.286 Team; .702/.704 Team
McClung’s Luck Context: (8.87 H/9 IP career)
2008 (Mil; 108 ERA+; 7.95 H/9 IP): .284/.289 Team; .710/.698 Team
2007 (Mil; 120 ERA+; 8.25 H/9 IP): .324/.312 Team; .667/.677 Team
2006 (TB; 73 ERA+; 10.49 H/9 IP): .308/.315 Team; .684/.672 Team
2005 (TB; 66 ERA+; 8.73 H/9 IP): .270/.305 Team; .726/.684 Team
Parra’s Luck Context: (9.64 H/9 IP)
2008 (Mil; 99 ERA+; 9.81 H/9 IP): .333/.289 Team; .647/.698 Team
2007 (Mil; 119 ERA+; 8.56 H.9 IP): .324/312 Team; .662/.677 Team
Villanueva’s Luck Context (8.34 H/9 IP)
2008 (Mil; 107 ERA+; 9.31 H/9 IP): .302/.289 Team; .688/.698 Team
2007 (Mil; 114 ERA+; 7.95 H/9 IP): .271/.312 Team; .728/.677 Team
Gallardo’s Luck Context: (8.38 H/9 IP)
2008 (Mil; 231 ERA+; 8.40 H/9 IP): .297/.289 Team; .697/.698 Team
2007 (Mil; 122 ERA+; 8.25 H/9 IP): .303/.312 Team; .695/.677 Team
Here are some really interesting things this chart exposes:
(1) From 2007-2008 the defense converted balls-in-play into outs
more frequently behind Suppan in 2008, but yet Suppan's performance
still dropped (97 ERA+ to 87 ERA+).That's because Suppan allowed one of
his worst career HR totals in 2008, and the defense cannot convert
balls in the bleachers into outs....Coupled with his rather alarming
increase in walks, compared with any number of his previous seasons
(just eyeballing, this was probably his worst walk rate since approx.
1996 or 2000). Of course, walks will also not be counted in defensive
efficiency, because a walk cannot be converted into an out by the
defense.
(2) Dave Bush is one lucky,.,well, you know. In almost the same
number of IP as 2007, in 2008 he allowed almost the same number of
walks, almost the same number of HR, but of course, his hits total dropped by 54!
This is even more remarkable considering that he struck out 30 fewer
batters, meaning that more balls were put in play in front of the
defense. Now, I am not terribly worried about what this does for Bush's
2009 outlook, as he is showing other signs, on his own, of putting it
together with his approach, but damn! He was L-U-C-K-Y in 2008! The one
thing I'd look for to offset those factors in 2009 is not simply to
watch the hits column, but keep an eye on his HR column and his K/BB.
If he can allow slightly fewer HR, and increase that K total again,
while keeping his walk total low, he won't get completely slaughtered
by his tumble back to average defensive support.
(3) Parra was one poor, unlucky case in 2008. That defensive support
is so low, you have to wonder if the Brewers actually played with 8
guys behind our little lefty. Now, other than the fact that every now
and then you hear a player talk about how much they love fielding for
Sheets because he fires the ball back in there so quickly and never
walks anyone, I don't truly believe we have any reason to think that
the defense is particularly opposed to working behind Parra, a slow
worker. And it's not all Parra's fault, but frankly, the kid should be
walking fewer, and he also showed a penchant for quickly starting an
inning, and then coming apart once one guy reached base. If Parra
throws more strikes, increases that K/BB, he will make fewer problems
for himself when that defense does fail him -- instead of that error
granting a run and the third baserunner of the inning with two outs
(probably following two walks), that error will go relatively
unnoticed. But when you're walking guys and not throwing strikes, those
errors are huge.
With these factors corrected in 2009, and new luck factors emerging,
I foresee reason to believe that Parra's overall performance will
improve with better support, and we might see Bush's performance drop
slightly. Suppan is difficult to project because so much of his
problems in 2008 were his own doing, and cannot be placed on the
defense.
But one thing is certain: a portion of the fate of the 2009 rotation
will hinge upon the defensive support....and for that, we can only wait
to see how the cards fall next year.
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This is a
continuation of my current project, which is to quantify the extent to
which the Brewers' 2009 rotation core is average, below average, above
average, without Sheets or Sabathia.
Preliminary links: 2008 survey of 100+ IP NL starters; Analysis of rotation levels from 1-5 and Brewers' rotation without Sheets and Sabathia.
I am more and more interested in the ways in which our thinking
about starting pitchers affects our understanding of the strengthes and
shortcomings of a Bush, Gallardo, Parra, Suppan McClung, Villanueva
rotation. That's not to say right off the bat that the Brewers'
rotation is complete as is, but the result might be to seriously
consider the extent to which the Crew needs to spend a ton of $$$ on a
top rotation pitcher, or whether those $$$ would be better spent on
rotation depth.
***
Until any movement or signings, we can analyze the players currently
under contract control. My first project is Gallardo and Parra, because
they present excellent changes and endless possibilities for analysis.
It's damn near impossible to project baseball production in the first
place, but it's even more difficult with young players that have not
fully developed their skills, pitched multiple seasons, or set of the
parameters of their performance levels (i.e., what's a good year,
what's an average year, what's their worst level, etc.).
So, more than anything, with Gallardo and Parra I asked two questions:
(a) what would certain types of regressions or improvements look like?
and
(b) how much of an impact can we expect IP development to be?
I believe that for young pitchers that are still developing and have
yet to pitch 90-120 starts in the majors, (b) is probably more
important than (a), if only because workload adjustments in earlier
years, while adjusting and developing to the majors, seem more likely
to affect production.
This is only an intuition and is not a fact, but it is an intuition I have nonetheless, and would like to scrutinize it.
So, with that, let's look at Gallardo:
Gallardo (23): 24 G, 21 GS, 134.3 IP, 125 H, 53 R, 121 K/45 BB; 15 quality starts; 3.55 runs average, 5.60 IP/G
Raw Average: 34 G, 30 GS, 190.3 IP, 177 H, 75 R, 171 K/64 BB; 21 quality starts; 3.55 runs average, 5.60 IP/G
10% increase: 34 G, 30 GS, 209.3 IP, 176 H, 74 R, 206 K/63 BB; 23 quality starts; 3.18 runs average, 6.16 IP/G
20% decrease: 34 G, 30 GS, 152.3 IP, 169 H, 72 R, 110 K/61 BB; 17 quality starts; 4.25 runs average, 4.48 IP/G
IP Progression:
2004: 26 IP (R, A)
2005: 121.3 IP (A)
2006: 155 IP (A+, AA) (+.278)
2007: 77.7 IP (AAA); 110.3 IP (MLB) (+.213)
2008: 15.7 IP (AAA); 24 IP (MLB) (-.789) Ideal 2008: 218.3 IP (MLB) (+.161)
Ideal 2009: 244.3 IP (MLB) (+.119)
Gallardo's career opening probably could not have gone any better,
and then a series of freak injuries derailed him for an entire year.
Although Gallardo had worked up three seasons worth of strong IP
totals, from 120, to 155, to 188, the sheer lack of any regular IP and
any regular routine in 2008 present huge sets of question marks for his
spot in the 2009 rotation.
While Gallardo's production levels are strong -- his averages rest
him in the approximate range of a strong top rotation starter, even if
he is short of an ace or elite producer -- his IP development dropped at least
148 IP off course, and possibly more than 175 IP off course. The 175 IP
number is based around an approximate estimate of Gallardo's 2008 ideal
IP total using the descending percentage of IP increases from
2006-2007.
The good news:
-Gallardo is 23 and well within the service requirements for another
option. A trip to the minors is neither career-altering nor detrimental
to his development, and we're not talking about cheating a guy out of a
polished season during his prime. Further development is an option for
Gallardo and the Brewers should it be necessary..
-Gallardo is closer to a 3.20 runs average than a 4.20 runs average
-Gallardo is closer to a 1.15 WHIP than a 1.50 WHIP.
-Gallardo is closer to 20 quality starts than 15 quality starts.
What this means is not exactly clear because there is no good way to
project a production level for Gallardo in 2009 (what are the bets that
the injury ruined his stamina to the point that he spends 2009
recovering rather than producing, and drops below league average? More
bizarre things have happened to young pitchers -- like two
non-consecutiive, unrelated knee injuries in the same season occurring
to a 22-year old developing top rotation pitcher....). However, these
are basic parameters for certain trends should Gallardo pitch the
entire 2009 season, with one trend representing a noted but rather
modest improvement, the other representing a rather significant
regression.
Parra (26): 41 G, 31 GS, 192.3 IP, 206 H, 104 R, 173 K/87 BB; 11 quality starts; 4.87 runs average, 4.69 IP/G
Raw Average: 34 G, 26 GS, 159.7 IP, 171 H, 86 R, 144 K/72 BB; 9 quality starts; 4.87 runs average, 4.69 IP/G
20% increase: 34 G, 26 GS, 190.7 IP, 164 H, 83 R, 205 K/68 BB; 11 quality starts; 3.92 runs average, 5.61 IP/G
10% decrease: 34 G, 26 GS, 144.3 IP, 184 H, 85 R, 117 K/71 BB; 8 quality starts; 5.30 runs average, 4.25 IP/G
IP Progression:
2002: 50 IP (R)
2003: 139 IP (A)
2004: 73 IP (A+, AA) (-.475)
2005: 91 IP (AA) (+.247)
2006: 86 IP (A+, AA) (-.055)
2007: 106.7 IP (AA, AAA), 26.3 IP (MLB) (+.547)
2008: 166 IP (MLB) (+.248)
My concerns about Parra have completely turned in the opposite
direction since I thought about the results of this survey. Initially,
I seemed convinced of Parra's talent and production level and concerned
with his IP development after a sketchy injury history. Now I am much
more concerned about Parra's production than his IP development.
Shutting down Parra might have been Sveum's best and longest-lasting
strategy, and I'm being dead serious. The only other result of his
tenure that readily beats the potential long-term impact of shutting
down a tired Parra is the potential future financial impact of making
the playoffs. Given that Sveum managed to (a) make the playoffs while
(b) shutting Parra down leads me to re-analyze my own position about
Sveum and what he accomplished in two brief weeks.
Needless to say, after a necessarily large IP increase in 2007 after
years of injurt rehab, Parra did not necessarily have the stamina to
finish strong during another IP increase in 2008, but the fact that the
Brewers cut him out when he was tiring shows a surprising amount of
foresight in the midst of a pennant race -- thankfully that fatigue was
accompanied by ineffectiveness, so even if Parra wasn't truly tired and didn't truly need to be rested, his ineffectiveness played the de facto role of forcing the Brewers to address their (previously lacking) plan for limiting Parra's workload.
Now to the performance. Parra will not realize his potential if he does not pitch aggressively, stop nibbling, and rely on that power fastball.
I am not arguing that Parra has bad stuff; for anyone that has not
watched Parra up close, I highly recommend buying a ticket right behind
home plate for one of his starts. I did so during a mid-afternoon
discount game against the Cardinals, and was blown away by the strength
and movement of his stuff when he's right -- it's his control and his
approach that are constantly and coming and goind, and unfortunately no
matter how powerful your stuff is or how much your stuff moves, if you
do not use proper or appropriate pitch sequencing or pitch
aggressively, all of that is a waste. For most of the season I felt
this was an issue with Kendall. I get that he wants these young
pitchers to learn, but there's something to be said in favor of Parra
raring back and blowing that fastball by batters, rather than focusing
on nibbling around the plate with his blurry set of breaking pitches.
This might actually be a point against Parra -- he huge suitcase of
off-speed pitches rivals that of Dave Bush and Jeff Suppan, and really,
it's not clear that Parra needs to be more than a 3-pitch pitcher. And
I mean that as a compliment. I am such a firm believer in Parra's stuff
that I think he could get by with an aggressive rotation of fastballs
and a trimmed down set of breaking pitches.
Thus, I flipped around the scenario for Parra from that of Gallardo,
as their scenarios in general seem to be flipped: afterall, whereas
Gallardo pitched entirely too few innings in 2008, there were serious
questions until mid-September about how many innings would be too many
for Parra. And here's the issue: if we work with a rather significant
improvement, Parra jumps flat into the solid range of a top rotation
pitcher. But a marked but rather modest regression lowers his
production to a rather unsatisfactory level.
Which leads me to be concerned more with Parra's production and
Gallardo's innings workload in 2009. But the recap need not be
negative, even if we could raise 100,001 questions and concerns about
our young pitching combination. Let's be positive: Gallardo's strong
riding fastball and backwards-pitching set up is simply stunning, and
his ability to pitch, his composure, and his overall development appear
years beyond his age. Parra's power stuff supplies the Brewers with a
rather rare and coveted asset -- a left-handed pitcher with a strong
arm.
The upside for this duo could easily carry the Brewers to the
playoffs in 2009 and beyond. The downsides and question marks need to
be thoroughly analyzed because I firmly believe that it will be issues
of workload, the progression of innings, and the development of pitch
selection / pitching approaches that help to make two strong,
complementary seasons from these two pitchers possible in 2009.
So what do we expect?
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