This is a continuation of my current project, which is to quantify the extent to which the Brewers' 2009 rotation core is average, below average, above average, without Sheets or Sabathia.

Preliminary links: 2008 survey of 100+ IP NL starters; Analysis of rotation levels from 1-5 and Brewers' rotation without Sheets and Sabathia.

I am more and more interested in the ways in which our thinking about starting pitchers affects our understanding of the strengthes and shortcomings of a Bush, Gallardo, Parra, Suppan McClung, Villanueva rotation. That's not to say right off the bat that the Brewers' rotation is complete as is, but the result might be to seriously consider the extent to which the Crew needs to spend a ton of $$$ on a top rotation pitcher, or whether those $$$ would be better spent on rotation depth.

***

Until any movement or signings, we can analyze the players currently under contract control. My first project is Gallardo and Parra, because they present excellent changes and endless possibilities for analysis. It's damn near impossible to project baseball production in the first place, but it's even more difficult with young players that have not fully developed their skills, pitched multiple seasons, or set of the parameters of their performance levels (i.e., what's a good year, what's an average year, what's their worst level, etc.).

So, more than anything, with Gallardo and Parra I asked two questions:

(a) what would certain types of regressions or improvements look like?

and

(b) how much of an impact can we expect IP development to be?

I believe that for young pitchers that are still developing and have yet to pitch 90-120 starts in the majors, (b) is probably more important than (a), if only because workload adjustments in earlier years, while adjusting and developing to the majors, seem more likely to affect production.

This is only an intuition and is not a fact, but it is an intuition I have nonetheless, and would like to scrutinize it.

So, with that, let's look at Gallardo:

Gallardo (23): 24 G, 21 GS, 134.3 IP, 125 H, 53 R, 121 K/45 BB; 15 quality starts; 3.55 runs average, 5.60 IP/G

 

Raw Average: 34 G, 30 GS, 190.3 IP, 177 H, 75 R, 171 K/64 BB; 21 quality starts; 3.55 runs average, 5.60 IP/G

 

10% increase: 34 G, 30 GS, 209.3 IP, 176 H, 74 R, 206 K/63 BB; 23 quality starts; 3.18 runs average, 6.16 IP/G

 

20% decrease: 34 G, 30 GS, 152.3 IP, 169 H, 72 R, 110 K/61 BB; 17 quality starts; 4.25 runs average, 4.48 IP/G

 

IP Progression:

2004: 26 IP (R, A)

2005: 121.3 IP (A)

2006: 155 IP (A+, AA) (+.278)

2007: 77.7 IP (AAA); 110.3 IP (MLB) (+.213)

2008: 15.7 IP (AAA); 24 IP (MLB) (-.789)

Ideal 2008: 218.3 IP (MLB) (+.161)

Ideal 2009: 244.3 IP (MLB) (+.119)

 

Gallardo's career opening probably could not have gone any better, and then a series of freak injuries derailed him for an entire year. Although Gallardo had worked up three seasons worth of strong IP totals, from 120, to 155, to 188, the sheer lack of any regular IP and any regular routine in 2008 present huge sets of question marks for his spot in the 2009 rotation.

While Gallardo's production levels are strong -- his averages rest him in the approximate range of a strong top rotation starter, even if he is short of an ace or elite producer -- his IP development dropped at least 148 IP off course, and possibly more than 175 IP off course. The 175 IP number is based around an approximate estimate of Gallardo's 2008 ideal IP total using the descending percentage of IP increases from 2006-2007.

The good news:

-Gallardo is 23 and well within the service requirements for another option. A trip to the minors is neither career-altering nor detrimental to his development, and we're not talking about cheating a guy out of a polished season during his prime. Further development is an option for Gallardo and the Brewers should it be necessary..

-Gallardo is closer to a 3.20 runs average than a 4.20 runs average

-Gallardo is closer to a 1.15 WHIP than a 1.50 WHIP.

-Gallardo is closer to 20 quality starts than 15 quality starts.

What this means is not exactly clear because there is no good way to project a production level for Gallardo in 2009 (what are the bets that the injury ruined his stamina to the point that he spends 2009 recovering rather than producing, and drops below league average? More bizarre things have happened to young pitchers -- like two non-consecutiive, unrelated knee injuries in the same season occurring to a 22-year old developing top rotation pitcher....). However, these are basic parameters for certain trends should Gallardo pitch the entire 2009 season, with one trend representing a noted but rather modest improvement, the other representing a rather significant regression.

Parra (26): 41 G, 31 GS, 192.3 IP, 206 H, 104 R, 173 K/87 BB; 11 quality starts; 4.87 runs average, 4.69 IP/G

 

Raw Average: 34 G, 26 GS, 159.7 IP, 171 H, 86 R, 144 K/72 BB; 9 quality starts; 4.87 runs average, 4.69 IP/G

 

20% increase: 34 G, 26 GS, 190.7 IP, 164 H, 83 R, 205 K/68 BB; 11 quality starts; 3.92 runs average, 5.61 IP/G

 

10% decrease: 34 G, 26 GS, 144.3 IP, 184 H, 85 R, 117 K/71 BB; 8 quality starts; 5.30 runs average, 4.25 IP/G

 

IP Progression:

2002: 50 IP (R)

2003: 139 IP (A)

2004: 73 IP (A+, AA) (-.475)

2005: 91 IP (AA) (+.247)

2006: 86 IP (A+, AA) (-.055)

2007: 106.7 IP (AA, AAA), 26.3 IP (MLB) (+.547)

2008: 166 IP (MLB) (+.248)

 

My concerns about Parra have completely turned in the opposite direction since I thought about the results of this survey. Initially, I seemed convinced of Parra's talent and production level and concerned with his IP development after a sketchy injury history. Now I am much more concerned about Parra's production than his IP development.

Shutting down Parra might have been Sveum's best and longest-lasting strategy, and I'm being dead serious. The only other result of his tenure that readily beats the potential long-term impact of shutting down a tired Parra is the potential future financial impact of making the playoffs. Given that Sveum managed to (a) make the playoffs while (b) shutting Parra down leads me to re-analyze my own position about Sveum and what he accomplished in two brief weeks.

Needless to say, after a necessarily large IP increase in 2007 after years of injurt rehab, Parra did not necessarily have the stamina to finish strong during another IP increase in 2008, but the fact that the Brewers cut him out when he was tiring shows a surprising amount of foresight in the midst of a pennant race -- thankfully that fatigue was accompanied by ineffectiveness, so even if Parra wasn't truly tired and didn't truly need to be rested, his ineffectiveness played the de facto role of forcing the Brewers to address their (previously lacking) plan for limiting Parra's workload.

Now to the performance. Parra will not realize his potential if he does not pitch aggressively, stop nibbling, and rely on that power fastball. I am not arguing that Parra has bad stuff; for anyone that has not watched Parra up close, I highly recommend buying a ticket right behind home plate for one of his starts. I did so during a mid-afternoon discount game against the Cardinals, and was blown away by the strength and movement of his stuff when he's right -- it's his control and his approach that are constantly and coming and goind, and unfortunately no matter how powerful your stuff is or how much your stuff moves, if you do not use proper or appropriate pitch sequencing or pitch aggressively, all of that is a waste. For most of the season I felt this was an issue with Kendall. I get that he wants these young pitchers to learn, but there's something to be said in favor of Parra raring back and blowing that fastball by batters, rather than focusing on nibbling around the plate with his blurry set of breaking pitches.

This might actually be a point against Parra -- he huge suitcase of off-speed pitches rivals that of Dave Bush and Jeff Suppan, and really, it's not clear that Parra needs to be more than a 3-pitch pitcher. And I mean that as a compliment. I am such a firm believer in Parra's stuff that I think he could get by with an aggressive rotation of fastballs and a trimmed down set of breaking pitches.

Thus, I flipped around the scenario for Parra from that of Gallardo, as their scenarios in general seem to be flipped: afterall, whereas Gallardo pitched entirely too few innings in 2008, there were serious questions until mid-September about how many innings would be too many for Parra. And here's the issue: if we work with a rather significant improvement, Parra jumps flat into the solid range of a top rotation pitcher. But a marked but rather modest regression lowers his production to a rather unsatisfactory level.

Which leads me to be concerned more with Parra's production and Gallardo's innings workload in 2009. But the recap need not be negative, even if we could raise 100,001 questions and concerns about our young pitching combination. Let's be positive: Gallardo's strong riding fastball and backwards-pitching set up is simply stunning, and his ability to pitch, his composure, and his overall development appear years beyond his age. Parra's power stuff supplies the Brewers with a rather rare and coveted asset -- a left-handed pitcher with a strong arm.

The upside for this duo could easily carry the Brewers to the playoffs in 2009 and beyond. The downsides and question marks need to be thoroughly analyzed because I firmly believe that it will be issues of workload, the progression of innings, and the development of pitch selection / pitching approaches that help to make two strong, complementary seasons from these two pitchers possible in 2009.

So what do we expect?