Six Questions

I have long thought that the Brewers’ young core underachieved in 2008, and this stroke in fortune cost the Brewers dearly in overall runs totals throughout the season. What an odd occurrence, if you think about it – how likely is it that of the 6 regulars aged 28 or younger, 5 of them regress during the same season?

 

I’ve assembled a series of questions based around each player’s individual regressions, or in Hardy’s case, evaluating why he didn’t regress and assessing his chances at regression in 2009.

 

Most of the stats I’ve used should be intuitive, and I’ve linked the main Baseball-Reference pages so you can read along with me, year by year. I went within the basic AVG/OBP/SLG trio to provide a more precise picture of their production. Here are two stats that might not seem intuitive:

 

-BABIP (Batting Average on Balls in Play). This is simply the rate at which every batted ball that was not a home run drops in for a hit. It makes a bit more sense as a defensive metric, i.e., how opposing defenses convert a batter’s balls in play into outs (which would be easily approximated by: ((1) – BABIP)). I took BABIP figures from B-R.

 

-BIP% (Balls in Play Percentage): This should be intuitive: it’s simply the rate at which a batter puts the ball in play. I calculate this as ( (AB – HR – K) / (PA) ), simply to correspond with the BABIP stats. I understand that we could use a more thorough calculation for this figure, but that requires more in-depth debate than I’d prefer for this analysis, and that might also compromise the compatibility of BABIP and my BIP%.

 

These six players are the bread and butter of the Brewers in 2009, regardless of other acquisitions, and these are some ways to approach their expected production.

 

1. How can Braun improve his OBP?

 

Ryan Braun is a bizarre player. He slugs the ball like nobody else, and manages to maintain a high batting average while striking out frequently, and doesn’t walk (although to his credit, he improved his walk rate slightly in 2008).

 

Year

H/PA

BB/PA

BABIP

BIP%

2007

.297

.059

.361

.620

2008

.262

.063

.305

.671

Career

.277

.061

.328

.649


The issue for Braun in 2008 was simple: he put the ball in play more frequently, and defenses corrected themselves from the unrealistic AVG on balls in play from Braun’s Rookie of the Year campaign.

 

For Braun to build his OBP, he will need to do one of two things: (1) Find more ways to get those balls in play to drop for hits, which may or may not force him to abandon some of his powerful approach, or (2) Walk more, which may or may not force him to abandon the approach that allows him to hit for such power.

 

As it stands, Braun relies so thoroughly on pure hitting that his ability to make fewer outs has hit a wall, depending upon how defenses play him, and how pitchers pitch him. If he cannot add more dimensions to his offensive game, his OBP will continue to follow his basic ability to get the hits to drop, which can fluctuate very much from year to year (witness the transition from 2007 to 2008, which fluctuated by 6%).

 

2. How likely is it for Prince to improve his production?

 

Before Prince’s monstrous September, the major complaint about the slugger was that his power numbers declined – specifically his home runs. Throughout his power outage, however, Prince’s doubles total was consistently more alarming. It should have been clear that Prince’s HR surge in 2007 might not have been likely to be repeated in 2008, but along with that HR return to reality, the doubles total declined.

 

Year

H/PA

BB/PA

HR/H

2B/H

XBH/H

2006

.238

.091

.182

.227

.416

2007

.242

.132

.303

.212

.527

2008

.233

.121

.210

.185

.407

Career

.239

.113

.229

.209

.448

 

Analyzing Prince’s production and the possibility for improvement depends upon the definition of improvement. If improving his rate of getting on base is the issue, it seems clear that there are some ways in which Prince can find his way on base on a more frequent basis. Behind his power issues in 2008, Fielder drew slightly fewer walks and hit at a lower rate. These rates fell in a very moderate way, and might be easier to correct than his power numbers.

 

If improvement for Prince means more power, then the issue might seem more problematic. Although Prince’s HR totals, even in 2008, are at a strong level, his doubles rate has dropped in both 2007 and 2008, and the question remains: how does Prince hit more doubles?

 

Overall improvement for Fielder might actually mean more of a dip in HR, a corresponding raise in 2B, and slightly higher hitting and walking totals – that is, more OBP, and a SLG driven more by doubles and less by the long ball.

 

3. Will Hardy regress?

 

Hardy was the only youngster that did not regress in 2008. But, many fans questioned his ability to sustain his 2007 production, which was not as much of a fluke as some expected. That said, are there areas in which we can expect regression for 2009?

 

Year

H/PA

BB/PA

2B/H

HR/H

XBH/H

BABIP

BIP%

2005

.215

.103

.239

.098

.348

.262

.738

2006

.223

.072

.161

.161

.323

.257

.719

2007

.257

.063

.183

.159

.348

.279

.772

2008

.256

.083

.193

.149

.366

.305

.711

Career

.244

.080

.196

.143

.353

.282

.739

 

The main issue with Hardy in 2009 will be to maintain the walk level that he produced in 2008. He improved by a strong 2% from 2007 to 2008, while maintaining strong hitting totals. This will be crucial to his 2009 success, given the consistency with which he has hit for power in recent years.

 

The second issue to look for is a defensive correction. Hardy’s AVG on balls in play jumped by almost 3% in 2008, and he put the ball in play almost 6% less frequently than he did in 2007. That correction allowed Hardy’s hitting rate between 2007 and 2008 to remain consistent, although for completely different reasons.

 

If Hardy does not put the ball in play more frequently and defenses correct their approach, Hardy will be in for a noticeable regression in 2009.

 

4. Why did Hart regress?

 

Hart’s fall from grace is extreme and baffling: he literally became one of the least valuable right fielders in the 2008 NL after producing as one of the best in 2007. Given the fact that his struggles were compacted in just a couple months’ time, the perception of his struggles were amplified. What gives?

  

Year

H/PA

BB/PA

XBH/H

K/PA

BABIP

BIP%

2007

.263

.064

.443

.175

.321

.675

2008

.250

.041

.433

.166

.293

.735

Career

.253

.056

.425

.180

.306

.699

 

Here’s the simple issue: Hart suffered almost the exact opposite fate of Hardy. He put the ball in play almost 6% more frequently than in 2007, but his AVG on balls in play dropped significantly (3%), which explains his overall drop in hitting.

 

Hart consistently walked less, struck out less, and homered less in 2008, which spelled disaster when coupled with worse luck. It might be a stretch simply to suggest that luck will correct itself in 2009, but one thing is for certain: Hart needs to walk more so that his production does not depend so exclusively on his hitting fortunes, and at the very least that will afford him more consistent production potential.

 

5. Which Hall is the real Hall?

 

Hall’s fall from 2006 seemed shocking in 2007, and 2008 was simply odd: how is it that he managed to regress once again, from a regression?

 

Year

H/PA

BB/PA

2B/H

HR/H

K/PA

BIP%

2005

.267

.071

.267

.116

.189

.698

2006

.238

.104

.269

.241

.266

.559

2007

.229

.080

.304

.122

.254

.616

2008

.203

.083

.241

.165

.277

.592

Career

.234

.077

.260

.151

.249

.622

 

Here’s the deal: (a) since 2005, Hall is putting the ball in play at a consistently low level, but (b) he is doing so without hitting home runs as frequently. This means that although his percentage of balls in play is consistently low, it does not occur from year to year for the same reasons. (c) Coupled with a drop in walks from 2006, and a strong drop in hitting rate, well, you know the rest.

 

All told, the 2006 Hall is a rather bizarre occurrence, but the 2005 Hall looks rather nice: put the ball in play more, hit fewer HR, walk at a lower rate, hit a lot of doubles, and hit at a strong rate.

 

Hall without a power approach might be the best chance at improvement.

 

6. What might more hitting mean for Weeks?

 

I am convinced that Weeks is criticized so frequently by fans because he is a strong secondary player. He walks at a very good rate, gets hit by pitches, and steals bases. His overall power percentages are not bad, but they don’t get noticed because his primary hitting level is so low.

 

In his career, what does more hitting mean?

 

Year

H/PA

BB/PA

2B/H

HR/H

K/PA

BIP%

2005

.208

.010

.152

.151

.232

.606

2006

.242

.073

.150

.080

.223

.627

2007

.190

.154

.219

.167

.229

.547

2008

.198

.118

.198

.126

.205

.618

Career

.207

.113

.182

.129

.223

.597

 

It seems interesting to suggest that, based around his career, hitting and walking seem to be exclusive for Weeks. We might not want to expect his hitting to be added to his ability to walk at a high level. Furthermore, his best hitting season (2006) was accompanied by lower power totals. The strike out rate remains rather consistent, although Weeks made a huge improvement in that regard in 2008, and he did raise the percentage of balls in play and overall hitting percentage from 2007 to 2008. That’s a good thing.

 

If Weeks can put more balls in play, at the expense of walks and home runs, that might be the best way for him to improve that primary hitting. The question is, how will that affect the rest of his offensive approach?

Comments

 

Milwaukee Brewers Blog - The Junkball Blues said:

What does the Brewers offense need to do to improve? I considered this very question some time ago, arranging

January 19, 2009 11:12 PM
 

Milwaukee Brewers Blog - The Junkball Blues said:

This is a repost from January 19 to 24, 2009 : What does the Brewers offense need to do to improve? I

March 31, 2009 6:54 AM

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About This Blog

I'm Nicholas Zettel, and I've got the Junkball Blues. All I need for a cure is a sinkerball pitcher here, a curveball specialist there, and a bunch of guys with fastballs that top out in the high-80s. And those days when the knuckleball wasn't a speciality pitch, and pitchers simply kept one in their back pocket? That's what I'm talking about!

I write for Sportsbubbler.com, and this is the research I compile along the way. I love power-speed combo players, garbage time relievers, and the walking medicine cabinets that played baseball in the 1960s and 1970s, and got away with it.

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