I am not jealous of the Yanks' ability to sign free agent pitchers to 5 or 6 or 7 year contracts.

I know I'm supposed to be -- hell, all baseball fans and casual fans are supposed to marvel at the idea of building a club through free agency. "Who wouldn't want to sign the biggest stars and bring them to their team?"

While most baseball fans pay attention to the huge money that free agents are bringing in, and look after those coveted ace arms, another trend slugs behind the surging level of free agency contracts -- that is, the arbitration buy-out deal.

It is not the case that every free agency pitching deal will automatically become a failure, but it is the case that the more evidence you assemble regarding free agency pitching deals, the more evidence you find against signing free agency pitchers. Meanwhile, the arbitration buy-out deal is often over-looked because the given player does not change teams; the given player does not sign for an insane amount of money; the given player might only have a year of free agency purchased out by such a contract.

And yet, with these contracts, the teams that sign them are placed in a situation of not acquiring an arm for years beyond any prudent scope of innings and pitch workloads or arm injuries or ineffectiveness or aging; rather the teams simply maintain their current rotation arrangement with their current ace, and purchase his arby years and a free agency year to boot. This provides a reasonable contract, one that does not require years of speculation about workloads, injuries, age, or how a previous team handled the arm.

Moreover, while free agency pitching contracts have sky-rocketed in the last few years (one only needs to look at A.J. Burnett, who just received a $5 million raise without improving his performance track record in Toronto), the level of arbitration deals remains consistent.

Here are the last 32 arbitration buyout deals that I could find for aces, loosely using the term to mean a pitcher who produced an ERA+ between 110 and 120 or so (at least) prior to signing the buyout deal:

Tim Hudson (2001; 4/$9.1 + $6 mil option; 5/$15.1)

Barry Zito (2002; 4/$9.3 + $7 mil option; 5/$16.3)

Mark Mulder (2002; 4/$14.2 + $7.25 mil option; 5/$21.45)

Brandon Webb (2004; 3/$3.3 + replaced $4 mil option; 4/$7.3)

Mark Buehrle (2004; 4/$18 + $9.5 mil option; 5/$27.5)

Roy Halladay (2004; 4/$42)

Javier Vazquez (2004; 4/$45)

Kerry Wood (2004; 3/$32.5 + declined $13.5 mil option; 4/$46)

Jake Westbrook (2005; 2/$7.5 + $5.6 mil option; 3/$13.1)

Roy Oswalt (2005; 2/$16.9)

Rich Harden (2005; 4/$9 + $7 mil option; 5/$16)

Jake Peavy (2005; 4/$14.5 + $8 mil option; 5/$22.5)

Ben Sheets (2005; 4/$38.5)

Johan Santana (2005; 4/$39.75)

Aaron Cook (2006; 2/$4.55 + $4.5 mil option; 3/$9.55)

Noah Lowry (2006; 4/$9.25 + $6.25 mil option; 5/$15.50)

Dan Haren (2006; 4/$12.65 mil + replaced $6.75 mil option; 5/$19.35)

John Lackey (2006; 3/$17.01 + $9 mil option; 4/$26.01)

Brandon Webb (2006; (4/$19.5 + $8.5 mil option; 5/$28)

Matt Cain (2007; 4/$9 + $6.25 mil option; 5/$15.25)

Jeff Francis (2007; 4/$13.25 + $7 mil option; 5/$20.25)

Chris Young (2007; 4/$14.5 + $8.5 mil option; 5/$22.5)

Brett Myers (2007; 3/$25.75)

C.C. Sabathia (2007; 2/$17.5)

Jeremy Bonderman (2007; 4/$38)

Josh Beckett (2007; 3/$30 + $12 mil option; 4/$42)

Ian Snell (2008; 3/$8.6 + $16 mil club options; 5/$24.6)

Dontrelle Willis (2008; 3/$29)

Adam Wainwright (2008; 4/$15 + $21 mil club options; 6/$36)

Joakim Soria (2009; 3/$8.75 + $22.75 mil options; 6/$31.50)

Aaron Cook (2009; 3/$30 + $11 mil option; 4/$41)

Scott Kazmir (2009; 3/$28.5 + $13.5 mil option; 4/$42)

At the end of the day, it's not simply that I don't think the Brewers cannot afford to sign multi-year free agency deals to build their rotation; they can't. It's that I don't think such deals are viable options, it's that such deals do not produce valuable performance for their cost, and moreover, it's the simple fact that there is a strong alternative available: an alternative that provides a more constant price, a rate based on service, and the chance at keeping your pitcher at least one year into his free agency years.

Instead of focusing on the free agency market whatsoever, the Brewers need to trade, draft, and develop young pitchers who can be controlled through the "renewal" and "arbitration" stages of the contract; these pitchers then present the Brewers with an opportunity for a valuable extension, which doesn't look as lucrative or impressive as a free agency deal, but is a more sound financial decision, one that returns better value for production than a free agency contract.

It's not that I am not concerned about whether or not the Brewers will find a free agent pitcher to fill-out their rotation and provide depth for 2009; it's that I see so few options in the near future for providing the Brewers with 7-8 valuable years of service, between age 21 and age 31, pitchers that would allow the Brewers to not focus on signing aging pitchers who are well into their 30s, following extensive IP workloads throughout years of service.

I want the Brewers to keep starting pitchers for 5-7 years, but not through the free agency market. The Brewers could benefit greatly from finding their pitching production from young controllable arms, both because of the actual financial requirements of such controllable arms, and also because of the value of production per dollar.