What does the Brewers offense need to do to improve? I considered this very question some time ago, arranging the issue in a series of questions about the Brewers 6 major core players between the ages of 24 and 30. That post contains a good amount of year-to-year data, which is nice, but it's lacking something:

Context.

It seems to me that with the loss of Sabathia and Sheets, various rotation projections could put the Crew anywhere from 30-50 runs behind the 2008 pitching staff; maybe less, maybe more. It is also my opinion that even with Sabathia and Sheets, the rotation likely does not improve upon their 2008 marks, and the end result is the same: we're looking for extra runs from the offense.

While some might mourn losing the Brewers' healthy 750 RS, 689 RA runs differential, we can learn from utilizing a Pythagorean Record projection that replacing 50 RS in either direction results in a rather minimal difference in expected wins; whereas the Brewers' 2008 expected winning percentage was .5385 -- based solely on runs scored and runs allowed -- a 2009 exoected winning percentage with a runs differential closer to 800 RS, 739 RA yields an expected winning percentage of .53602. In terms of 162 games, those winning percentages display the difference between an 87.24 win season and an 86.84 win season.

So, my question in the last few weeks was simple: how do the Brewers score 50 more runs?

My initial thinking about this issue centered around the fact our entire young core -- minus Hardy -- regressed in 2008 from their 2007 performances, sometimes in large quantities (this is especially true for Fielder and Braun in one sense -- they couldn't possibly repeat the luck of their 2007 campaigns, and it is also true for Hart, Hall, and Weeks in a different sense -- Weeks' late-season explosion was probably unlikely to be sustained for a longer period of time, and Hart and Hall maintained habits that were not conducive for long-term hitting success).

The result of this line of thinking had me searching for "grand" outcomes. Who could increase their OBP from a .340 range into a .365 range? Or get that slugging up another 3% or 4%...

The only trouble is, in terms of baseball statistics, a 3% or 4% difference in one category is rather large. This is true for individual and team stats; for instance, the fantastic Cubs (855 RS) and awful Padres (637 RS) were separated by a 3.7% difference in the OBP category (.354 vs. .317). We probably feel the same way about Chase Utley vs. Rickie Weeks, Matt Holliday vs. Carlos Beltran, Carlos Beltran vs. Mike Cameron -- you get the picture. Each of these players have an OBP differential somewhere between 3% and 4%, and that's just my eyeballing stats and picking players off the top of my head.

So, I started to think about a way to build a more realistic, level, and less-optimistic projection of the offense that still maintained the premise of improving runs production. Luckily, I happened to be reading through The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract (New York: Free Press, 2001) for a second time; a particular comment of his, about runs created, spurred me forward:

"A hitter's job is not to compile a high batting average. A hitter's job is not to maintain a high on-base percentage, not to create a high slugging percentage, not to get 2000 hits. A hitter's job is not to hit home runs. Some hitters might hit home runs as the primary part of their job, but only some hitters, and even those only some of the time..." (James, 2001; 329).

James is correct:

"The objective of each team is to win by scoring more runs than the opponent" (MLB Official Rules, "Objectives of the Game," 1.02).

I could easily sit here and cite to you numerous shifts in BABIP (Batting Average on Balls in Play) for the Brewers' youngsters, coupled with their shifts in Balls in Play %, and the impact those luck factors will have on OBP and SLG and AVG for players such as Braun, Fielder, Hardy, Hart, and Weeks. I can explain to you why I think Braun and Hardy are most likely to regress in 2009, Hart and Hall most likely to improve, and Prince Fielder most likely to explode in 2009.

But you could still ask, "how do the Brewers score 50 more runs?"

So, I came to runs created. Runs created is a series of various formulas created and revised over time, initially conceived by James, in order to project the runs production of a particular player. Which makes sense; we can easily and readily cite a player's AVG, how many HR they hit, and their RBI; but we'd be lost for words if we were asked about their runs production.

All you need to know about runs created is that it basically conceives scoring runs in terms of producing runners (or getting runners onto the basepaths, and keeping them there) and advancing runners (once they are on the basepaths). Producing runners and advancing runners occurs in concrete opportunities to produce and advance runners -- basically, this concept allows us to analyze H, BB, HBP, CS, SB, SH, SF, TB, and AB in a dfferent way, with a different objective in mind: projecting runs production.

There are multiple runs created formulas, and it's not necessary to know them all here. I used the "technical" version for this survey, simply because it was readily available on Baseball-Reference player pages, and I could easily correct the data for my survey by calculating the runs created of the 2008 Brewers as a whole (using team stats), calculating runs created of the 2008 Brewers as an aggregate (adding different Brewers together), and comparing that data with the actual runs scored of the 2008 Brewers.

This is a wonderous fact about the 2008 'Crew -- we know how many runs they scored, exactly (750), and we can thus correct the runs created projection. In his 2001 Abstract, James notes that most teams in history fall within 5% of runs created projections, with certain teams deviating for various reasons. The Brewers' deviated more than 5% of their RC projections in 2008, probably because of the dearth of situational hitting coupled with the overall prevalence of extra base hits. If there is a discrepency between extra base hits and situational hitting, that will show up in a formula such as RC, given that Total Bases (TB) is utilized as the basis of advancing runners (along with SB, SH, SF, and BB) -- if a team posts a high TB total due to a high number of extra-base hits, but continually fails to execute a single or a sacrifice fly in situations with a high-probability for scoring actual runs, that difference will eventually be recorded in Runs Created if it occurs frequently.

So, here's one calculation -- the 2008 Brewers' starters, bench, and pitchers (while batting) created 813 runs, which is .92251 of the 2008 Brewers' actual runs scored 750. One of the methods that James suggested that spurred me forward is the following correction of runs created, which suddenly made the formula incredibly useful for the specific projection of projecting an improvement in 2009 for the Brewers:

"But isn't it possible, someone wonders, that on this team that has 700 runs created, and only 680 runs scored, some players actually created MORE runs than our estimates show? Of course it's possible; in fact, it's inevitable. We're not making the estimates perfect; we're only making them better. If a team scores 680 runs but has 700 runs created, we know that the average player on this team is 2.9% less productive than our best estimate shows. If we reduce all the estimates by 2.9%, we will be making some of them more accurate and some of them less accurate. What we can be absolutely certain of is that those we are making better out-number those that we are making worse" (James, 2001, 331).

Now that we have a method for projecting runs created, and a method for correcting those estimates and projections, we can ask a question about the little things: what if the 2009 Brewers improve because no member of the offense explodes, produces a career season, or produces at an outstanding level; what if the 2009 Brewers improve because of minute changes here and there in their approaches, their games, and their luck?

I want to analye the following issue: with a few hits here, a few less caught stealing there, a couple more sacrifice flies thrown in, perhaps a couple of walks, maybe a few more extra base hits...how much can the Brewers' offense improve?

Which is to say, how many runs will they create in such a scenario?

Using the "technical" version of runs created, which includes SB and CS stats in estimating a batter's success in staying on base and advancing runners, as well as SF and SH in the advancing runners section of the equation. The version I used, as well as Baseball-Reference (as far as they stated and as far as I know), goes something like:

( "Producing Baserunners / Keeping Baserunners on base" (H+BB+HBP-CS-GIDP) x

"Advancing Baserunners" (TB + (.26 x (BB - IBB + HBP)) + (.52 x (SH + SF + SB))) )  /

"Opportunities" (AB + BB + HBP + SH + SF)

All together:

( (H+BB+HBP-CS-GIDP) x (TB + (.26 x (BB - IBB + HBP)) + (.52 x (SH + SF + SB))) )  /

(AB + BB + HBP + SH + SF)

According to this metric, the 2008 Brewers as a unit created approximately 795 runs, which is approximately 5.7% runs above the Brewers' actual runs scored. I was mistaken in Part One, when I stated that the Brewers' 2008 runs created was almost 8% above the actual runs scored; the estimate of runs created I used to inform that statement featured an aggregate of the individual 2008 Brewers' runs created projections with the Brewers. That RC total was approximately 813 runs, which is approximately 2.7% above the 2008 Brewers' RC using team stats; how is this possible you ask?

Quite simply, the Brewers as an aggregate of individual production are different from the Brewers as an actual unit, a unit that plays through situations, and produces in sequence with one another. There are ways in which we can intertwine the individual aggregate projections in order to bring them back to the 795 runs created projection, and closer to the actual 750 RS. Those methods were, quite frankly, more difficult and in-depth than I wanted to employ here; I wanted this to be a somewhat easy survey to follow!

So, for the sake of convenience, I used the Brewers' individual runs created projections from Baseball-Reference, simply because of their availability. You should follow along via B-R player pages; it's rather easy to do -- runs created, as well as other stats, are listed under " Special Batting" sections on each player page. In order to bring the individual RC projections closer to the actual RS by the Brewers, I divided the Brewers' 2008 RS (750) by the 2008 aggregate RC (813), and then multiplied each player's individual RC by that percentage (which is .92251; meaning, each RC projection is approximately 92% of that player's actual runs production in the Brewers' team environment.

I am aware that there are more accurate methods to rectify this issue, but as I stated above, I wanted to keep this rather simple, and I wanted to use methods I am more familiar and comfortable with.

Here's the fun stuff:

2008 Brewers' starters (Braun, Cameron, Fielder, Hall, Hardy, Hart, Kendall, and Weeks): 649 aggregate RC in 4746 PA; corrected to approximately 598.71 RS.

2008 Brewers' main bench (Branyan, Counsell, Dillon, Durham, Gross, Gwynn, Kapler, and Rivera): 144 aggregate RC in 1083 PA; corrected to approximately 132.48 RS.

2008 Brewers' auxiliary bench and pitchers: 20 aggregate RC; corrected to approximately 18.45 RC.

The starters and main bench account for the vast majority of the Brewers' production in 2008, of course; the starters' 4746 PA accounted for just over 75% of the team's total PA, and their approximate 598 runs scored / adjusted runs created account for almost 80% of the Brewers' total run production in '08. The bench's 1083 PA account for over 17% of the team's total PA, and their 132 runs scored / adjusted runs created account for just under 18% of the team's runs scored.

***

Now, an exercise involving the starters, and an exercise showcasing some of the value of Runs Created, as it concerns "small" or "background" stats that nonetheless affect advancement of runners and ultimately, creating runs...here are eight "little" things for our starters, which alone account for almost one win above the Brewers' '08 Pythagorean W-L (which was approximately 87 wins):

Notice how the little things add up -- without considering issues with extra base hits, luck with BABIP and balls-in-play %, K% or BB%, without concerning any major hitting issues, we've accounted for almost one win's worth of production in stolen base attempts, sacrifice flies, and double play ground balls. And that's just looking at one aspect of the player's game that changed; if we scrutinized the record, we might gain a run or so back, but we might also find more "little thing" blindspots, too...

This is just a start to answering my initial question, which was, How do we account for 50 runs scored for 2009? We've accounted for almost 9 runs thus far....now it's time to move forward....

Now that we understand the power of better baserunning, sacrifice flies, and double play groundouts, I think that we can move on to other runs created exercises, with other areas of production, with hopes of learning the impact of production increases for each player in the Brewers' starting eight.

Keeping with the theme of "little things," I purposefully kept these increases small, with the hopes of drawing further conclusions about runs created (and using runs created) with small increases, realistic increases -- usually within 1% in OBP and SLG categories, and never more than 2%.

To keep things interesting, I eye-balled the statistical lines of 2008, adding and subtracting just a few elements here or there, according to conclusions or general guidelines I put together in the original "Six Questions" appraisal of the offense. Thus, I focused on Hart's HR drop in 2008, Braun's hitting drop, Fielder's 2B drop, Weeks' hitting drop, and Hall's discipline decline (i.e., lower K/BB discipline without the hitting results of previous seasons).

Hardy was an interesting case -- I could not, with an honest mind, project him for any type of improvement, even small, given his luck increase in 2008 (he put fewer balls in play and a higher percentage of those balls in play dropped for hits). So, I turned Hardy into my "counter" case -- I purposefully set him up for a rather large regression, in hopes of seeing how the smaller increases from a few players stacked up against a larger regression from one player.

Outside of the young core, I did a few simple things with Kendall. Cameron was a tough case, given the anticipated playing tiem discrepency between '08 and '09. So, I put together three models: (1) I used his career averages to build a startling regression season; (2) I used his career averages to build a realistic full seaon; (3) I used his 2004 campaign, which was the last full season in which Cameron played in an offensive environment that was near the offensive environment of Miller Park (for this I used Baseball-Reference's AIR index, which is rather intuitive and easy to read and digest).

Here are the results...enjoy!

(1)

Braun (663 PA): .295/.341/.568 (.909) = 107 RC (+.006 OBP, +.015 SLG).

(Braun: +6 H, +3 2B, -2 BB, +2 SB, +2 SF)

(2)

Fielder (694 PA): .282/.378/.520 (.898) = 110 RC (+.006 OBP, +.013 SLG).

 (Fielder: +4 H, +4 2B)

(3)

(4)

Hardy (629 PA): .273/.326/.447 (.773) = 76 RC (-.017 OBP, -.031 SLG)

(Hardy: -5 H, -2 HR, -4 BB, -2 SH, +4 SF, -3 GDP)

(5)

Weeks (560 PA): .239/.348/.412 (.760) = 70 RC (+.006 OBP, +.014 SLG)

 (Weeks: +2 H, +1 2B, +1 HR, +4 SB, +1 CS, +2 BB)

(6)

Hart (657 PA): .268/.298/.479 (.777) = 79 RC (-.002 OBP, +.020 SLG)

 (Hart: +4 HR, +2 SB, -2 CS, -4 GDP)

(7)

Kendall (587 PA): .254/.337/.333 (.670) = 58 RC (+.010 OBP, +.009 SLG)

The results of this survey: from the lowest Cameron estimates for playing time and runs created, to the highest estimates, the Brewers starting eight can be projected to perform anywhere from 4800 to 4806 PA, creating 607 Runs to 620 Runs.

Adjusted for playing time, the lowest runs created projection -- 607 runs -- is pretty much the same offensive output as the 2008 Brewers' starting eight. 620 runs created is basically a runs created increase of 13 runs, which is significant in this model because (a) not all of the gains from the "True Little Things" model (see Part Two) were incorporated, leaving the chance at a few more "here and there" runs created in the shadows behind the main stats; (b) these models include at least one significant regression (Hardy), and standard, average and below average projections for Cameron.

With slight improvements allotted to either Hardy or Cameron, from their 2008 level of production, the aggregate runs created jumps anywhere between 622 to 630 RC; if both Hardy or Cameron improve, that means an aggregate of approximately 633 runs created from the core (these improvements are anywhere between 15 runs and 26 runs above the 2008 core eight).

Remember, all of these improvements occur without assuming any improvement above 2% in either OBP or SLG. In fact, many of the projected improvements were easily between .005 and .015, and hardly any of the projected improvements bumped against the .020 level (Hart's HR correction is the only one that hits a 2% increase).

Marked improvement can occur without break-out seasons, and it can also occur even with a case of one player regressing significantly. Without assuming grand, optimistic positions, we have found scenarios in which the Brewers reach higher levels of runs production from their starting eight. This should favorably shape our opinion regarding the chances of improved runs production, and furthermore, should make our next consideration -- that of break-out seasons -- even more interesting now that we know that the team is not doomed if any of the starters fail to show radical improvement over 2008.