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June 2009 - Posts
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I am sorry this is late -- I forgot to submit it before rushing off to work early.
***
Fernando Nieve (3-0, 4 G, 3 GS, 1.31 runs average, 5.18 IP/G; 3 quality starts) @ Braden Looper (0-1, 5 GS, 7.18 runs average, 5.26 IP/GS; 2 quality starts)
Sometimes the most quiet of moves make the loudest noise once they hit the big leagues; enter Fernando Nieve. The slider-balling righty was claimed off of waivers by the Mets in spring training, and has provided phenomenal performances in the absence of Jon Maine and Oliver Perez. A lot of times, we spend so much time complaining about injury-plagued times, or times wrought with ineffectiveness, that we forget the benefits of hard times: sometimes a player takes the chance provided to him during those times and turns in special performances.
After a troublesome stretch, Looper pitched a quality start in his last outing, hopefully a sign of things to come for the right-hander. The splitter expert is throwing his fastball(s) much less frequently in 2009 than 2008, leaving his splitter to fill an incredibly prominent role. With Bush out to injury and Parra to ineffectiveness, Looper is the next Brewers pitcher on the slippery slope to accountability, and although the veteran is pitching as a #4 starter for the Brewers, the growing sense seems to be that the Brewers need him to reclaim the approach that made him one of the top #3 starts in 2008 NL.
Johan Santana (2-3, 5 GS, 6.24 runs average, 6.06 IP/GS; 3 quality starts) @ Mike Burns (0-1, 1 GS, 6.32 runs average, 5.70 IP/GS; 0 quality starts)
Where did the best pitcher in baseball go? In the midst of injury problems plaguing the Mets’ rotation, their #1 ace, the most valuable pitcher in the league, fell off of the face of the earth, replaced by someone with much more human numbers. I suppose we cannot always expect aces to be effective all the time, or to have their best stuff all the time, or to consistently dominate – hardly anyone is that good; but after all of these years, I guess it’s just surprising to see Santana put together a prolonged stretch of tough starts.
Mr. Replacement gets yet another chance to rest up the Brewers’ bullpen, and to fill a void, to potentially keep the universe from collapsing in on itself – or, at the very least, the Brewers’ rotation. The righty could probably serve as a role model for the remainder of the rotation: he throws his fastball frequently, and therefore relegates his secondary pitches to their rightful status as secondary pitches. This pitcher prefers secondary pitchers of the curving and “splitting” variety; on the verge of turning 31 (fittingly, on the day the Bastille was raided), Burns once again receives a shot to grab his career, and to steady it. To force the issue, staying in the major leagues.
Mike Pelfrey (1-2, 5 GS, 8.18 runs average, 5.06 IP/GS; 0 quality starts) @ Yovani Gallardo (3-2, 5 GS, 2.20 runs average, 6.54 IP/GS; 3 quality starts)
I really, really like FanGraphs. Fantastic website, with nice, brief, thought provoking articles, and some of the best scouting-stats on the planet (their plate discipline and pitch selection stats are incredibly useful for displaying the actual nuts and bolts of baseball performance). However, my only complaint is that they fail to distinguish between the 2-seam and 4-seam fastballs in their pitch selection sections; I understand that while they could not possibly capture all the instances of a pitcher doing something different with his approach on a certain pitch in a certain situation, posting one simple average fastball fails to capture the true approach of a pitcher such as Mike Pelfrey, who will feature a couple of different fastballs, at different velocities, different movements, which explains exactly how he throws his fastball nearly 80% of the time.
Gallardo provides a perfect example for how pitch counts should be viewed with young pitchers. In the first case, we should view skeptically pitch counts that approach 130. But, we should not equate that skepticism with condemning working deep into ballgames. And, we should not equate that skepticism with a certain “hard” pitch count that is always good – for instance, 100 pitches in 7 innings is fantastic, passable in 6, and awful in 5. 115 pitches in 5 is unacceptable, in 6 innings is awful, and in 7 is passable. Working into the 8th, recording outs into the 8th, on fewer than 120 pitches? That’s very strong. What I would like to see more of is equating pitch counts with efficiency in actual big league games.
I hate to see a young arm consistently work through 5 innings on 100 pitches much more than I am concerned with a young arm that works between 7-8 innings on 110-120 pitches. While hard pitch counts in some cases can help pitchers, I feel as though the pitch count movement should gravitate towards rolling pitch counts, which lead managers to pull pitchers earlier when they are struggling to finish 5 innings in fewer than 90 pitches, and encourage managers to allow youngsters to work into (and through) the 8th into the 120 pitch range.
-
 More of the same; the fans still think the Brewers are probably a bad team, but that’s old hat. That’s occurred since December. Now, of course, the trick is convincing people that when you lose the effectiveness of two starters almost simultaneously, you’re going to hit some rough times.
This coming stretch of games, over the next 3-4 weeks, is a crucial point for the Brewers. Not to win, not to lose, but to stay put; to stay even. With two rotational replacements inked for the moment, there is no better time for the Brewers to simply stay the course, win in whatever ways possible.
I think people underrate the effect losing two starters that opened the season as rotational mainstays. That surely does not mean a team is bad, but to those that would like to be convinced of its truth, there is usually no better time to point out that the team looks bad.
Matt Cain (4-0, 5 GS, 2.33 runs average, 6.94 IP/GS; 4 quality starts) @ Yovani Gallardo (3-1, 5 GS, 2.67 runs average, 6.06 IP/GS; 2 quality starts)
Let’s call this a power match-up: two of the Top 10 NL pitchers (minimum 64 IP) face one another to open the series; both are on rather strong stretches as well, although Gallardo’s outings are a touch shorter than those of Cain.
Cain is so good because of the simplicity of the whole operation: 92 MPH fastball, change, curve, slider, thrown at rather equal clips. The 75 MPH curve is Cain’s main off-speed choice, followed by the 86 MPH change and the 85 MPH slider. Few hits, a touch high on the walks, but that’s obviously not hurting his overall results. A “regular” righty, meat and potatoes ace.
Gallardo put together one of his first efficient and long starts when he took the hill in Detroit. The righty really only has two other outings this season that were more efficient than his 107 pitch, 7 IP effort in Hockeytown: in consecutive starts from April 24 to April 29, Gallardo collected his first complete game in 106 pitches, and then followed that with a 116 pitch, 8 inning affair. If Gallardo can keep this kind of efficiency, his consistency will follow, and his pitch workload will immensely improve.
Barry Zito (3-2, 5 GS, 5.60 runs average, 5.46 IP/GS; 2 quality starts) @ Seth McClung (0-0, 5 G, 5.63 runs average, 1.60 IP/GS; n/a quality starts)
It seems rather odd, but talk of Zito’s fastball slowing down seem really over-exaggerated. Given the way people talk about him, I thought that he used to throw 88 or 89 consistently, but really, it couldn’t have been that consistent; during his great years in Oakland, he averaged 87 MPH at his very best, and sat around 86 in his last season on the other side of the bay. His first two seasons in San Francisco saw his fastball drop to 84-85 MPH (closer to 85 MPH last year), and now he’s back up between 86 and 87. Oddly enough, he is now featuring a third breaking / off-speed pitch, which comes in between 79 and 80 MPH, and he throws it more frequently than his bloop curveball (which is now thrown as hard as ever).
Big Seth McClung, one of last year’s rotational heroes, one of last year’s best swingmen in the NL, one of Brewers’ fans new favorite folk heroes, the kind that roams the mountaintops so heartily and leave footprints so large that entire rivers following in his trail; big Seth McClung is at it again. With Bush on the DL with a microtear, McClung takes over and looks to accomplish precisely what he did last year: work consistently out of the rotation, keep the team in games, and pitch a few quality starts in the meantime.
Jonathan Sanchez (0-4, 5 GS, 7.59 runs average, 4.74 IP/GS; 0 quality starts) @ Jeff Suppan (2-1, 5 GS, 4.50 runs average, 5.60 IP/GS; 2 quality starts)
One swingman in, another one out? America’s favorite erratic left-hander west of the Mississippi, Sanchez is pitching for his rotational life. Manager Bruce Bochy says that it’s all in the breaking balls and change ups, or more specifically, Sanchez’s inability to control them. Of course, it would help if he threw them. In a distinctly anti-Manny Parra breakthrough, Sanchez throws his fastball over 70% of the time, and splits time equally between his breaking ball and change up.
Suppan’s stretch of serviceable, quality starts was snapped during a 5 inning, 7 run affair against the Twins, but we should not despair yet. Suppan showed signs of cracking on May 26, too, during a 3.7 inning, 5 run affair against the Cardinals. From that outing, he returned with four straight serviceable and quality starts, allowing only 7 runs in 23 innings.
-
Researching the Twins' starters this year, I have found a lot of things intriguing about them. Here are their pitch selections (data from FanGraphs):
Kevin Slowey: 89 MPH fastball (69.2%), 84 MPH slider (13.5%), 83 MPH change and 74 MPH curve (around 8.5% each)
Glen Perkins: 89 MPH fastball (67.2%), 82 MPH slider (16.5%), 81 MPH change (16%)
Nick Blackburn: 90 MPH fastball (62.3%), 86 MPH cutter (22.3%), 77 MPH curveball (10.5%)
Scott Baker: 91 MPH fastball (60.7%), 83 MPH slider (22.4%), 78 MPH curve, 84 MPH change (around 8% each)
Francisco Liriano: 91 MPH fastball (58.3%), 86 MPH slider (26.7%), 84 MPH change (15%)
By contrast:
Yovani Gallardo: 92 MPH fastball (61.1%), 80 MPH curveball (24.5%), 85 MPH slider (8.9%), 85 MPH change (5.8%)
Manny Parra: 91 MPH fastball (55.9%), 83 MPH change (21.3%), 76 MPH curve (13.5%), 83 MPH splitter (8.6%)
Jeff Suppan: 87 MPH fastball (52%), 83 MPH slider (20.2%), 81 MPH change (16.5%), 72 MPH curve (11.2%)
Braden Looper: 89 MPH fastball (50.6%), 82 MPH splitter (32.9%), 84 MPH slider (16.5%)
Dave Bush: 88 MPH fastball (49.6%), 67 MPH curveball (18.6%), 85 MPH cutter (15.8%), 82 MPH slider and 82 MPH change (around 7.5-8.5% each)
Here are the overall starting pitching lines:
2009 Twins rotation: 71 GS, 429.3 IP, 295 K/115 BB; 4.72 runs average
2009 Brewers rotation: 69 GS, 388.7 IP, 295 K/161 BB; 5.28 runs average
A few things:
-Notice that although the Crew strike out batters more frequently, they walk them even more frequently.
-Notice that four Brewers starters have a secondary pitch at or over 20% plus a third pitch around or over 15%. Only one Twins starter features both a secondary pitch over 20% plus a third pitch around or over 15%. The rest of their starters either don't have a secondary pitch at or over 20%, or don't have a third pitch over 10%.
The direct consequence of throwing fewer fastballs is throwing more breaking pitches or change ups. In only two cases does this not apply (Bush and Blackburn) because they both prominently feature a cutter, or second fastball. (I am not counting a splitter with an 8 MPH differential as a fastball here, in the case of Looper).
-Three Twins pitchers feature the fastball at or above 62% of the time. Two of them feature it above 67% of the time. One Brewers starter features the fastball at or above 60%.
-Four of the Twins starters feature the slider as their secondary pitch. The only one that doesn't (Blackburn) throws a cutter.
Two thoughts:
-It is clear that the organizational approach of the Twins has yielded a collection of similar-minded, coherent, cohesive slider/fastball pitchers who work with their fastballs rather prominently, and do not mess around with multiple pitches.
-The Brewers, it seems to me, suffer from a lack of direction with their fastballs, along with a robust collection of secondary pitches. Compared to the Twins' starters, who use a fastball and a slider almost to a fault, the Brewers' starters look downright disorganized, using their fastball less and then brag two curveballs, a slider, a splitter, and a change up as their secondary pitch.
I have long thought that someone like Parra could benefit from a less-is-more approach, and feature just two of his pitches, rather than all four (and thus use his fastball smarter, more aggressively, and more frequently). But maybe this approach could be employed by the entire staff, and especially Jason Kendall. I have little doubt in my mind that Kendall's game-calling is well-reflected here -- tailored to each pitcher's breaking ball or change up, rather than employing a staff-wide ideology, and featuring the fastball almost so infrequently that that pitch selection conjures up images of that once-famous Harvey Wallbangers catcher that was such a fastball hitter that he prominently called breaking balls.
Something must change with Brewers pitchers: they must use their fastballs more, and more effectively, and they must cut some of their breaking balls or change ups, and focus on throwing one or two pitches well, rather than three or four pedestrian pitches.
Pitching Match-ups:
Francisco Liriano (0-3, 5 GS, 5.67 runs average, 5.40 IP/GS; 2 quality starts) @ Jeff Suppan (2-1, 5 GS, 4.04 runs average, 5.34 IP/GS; 2 quality starts)
Liriano looks to continually improve his endurance, as well as his performance, in order to reclaim his performance that preceded his injury issues. He’s not quite the fireballer we remember; his fastball averages between 91 and 92 now, meaning that that wicked slider comes in slower, too.
At a time when he is most needed, Suppan has consistently worked quality starts as well as good “non”-quality starts. The junkballer is working his stuff off of the corners and out of the zone, switching his pitches enough to keep batters off balance, giving the Brewers an excellent chance to win.
Nick Blackburn (3-0, 5 GS, 2.19 runs average, 7.40 IP/GS; 5 quality starts) @ Braden Looper (1-1, 5 GS. 6.59 runs average, 5.46 IP/GS; 2 quality starts)
Over 84% of his pitches selected are fastballs, including a “cut” variety, and his recent results could hardly be any better: the righty is working consistently deep into games, keeping scoring down, and therefore gaining his fair share of wins on behalf of the Twins.
While the big story is Bush’s fatigue, Looper’s performance has also dropped off, especially his IP/GS. The splitter-pitcher is working relatively short outings and not limiting his runs allowed especially well.
Scott Baker (2-1, 5 GS, 3.97 runs average, 6.80 IP/GS; 4 quality starts) @ TBA / Dave Bush (0-3, 5 GS, 10.56 runs average, 4.26 IP/GS; 0 quality starts)
After a tough start, Baker seems to have reclaimed his magic, working consistent quality starts and working deep into games. Closing the series, Baker might be a perfect example of the Twins’ pitching approach with his fastball and slider; only Liriano throws his slider more frequently on the Twins.
This start is marked TBA, should the Brewers decided to rest the fatigued Bush’s arm.
-
One of the most common comments about the 2009 Brewers goes
something like this: "Doug Melvin knew what was wrong last year, and
did nothing to address those problems before 2009. Specifically, he did
not sign any contact hitters to go along with the free swingers." There's
a lot going on in this single statement: (1) It suggests, implicitly,
that a balanced offense is better than an offense that features one
type of hitter. (2) It suggests that a contact hitter is not a
free swinger. (3) It suggests that contact hitters are readily
available, and also, implicitly, that contact hitters are productive. I
have a lot of issues with this line of thinking, all of which cannot be
expressed fully here. The main issue I won't be able to examine just
yet is the relationship between discipline and contact hitting. There
should be two main divisions: one between "contact" and "true outcome"
hitters, the other between "disciplined" and "undisciplined" hitters. A contact hitter is a hitter that places the ball in play more frequently than an average hitter. If you sit down and think about it, there is no reason to think that contact hitters are inherently more disciplined than true outcome players. Sure, they probably strike out less, but that says nothing about how frequently they swing at bad pitches. Two
controversial examples of disciplined true outcomes hitters are Rickie
Weeks and Mike Cameron. Both Weeks and Cam strike out a lot, hit home
runs (Cam moreso), and walk a bunch (usually Weeks has the edge here).
But, despite their high K%, these guys simply do not swing at a high
percentage of pitches outside the zone. It so happens that they are
disciplined hitters that work very deep into counts, see a lot of
pitches, and therefore strike out a lot; and of course, they also walk
a lot. Disciplined hitters can be both contact hitters and true outcomes hitters. There is nothing inherently disciplined about contact hitting. But,
contact hitting is a completely different style of hitting; the results
should be noticeably different. On first glance, I am tempted to denote
contact hitters simply by strike outs, but that isn't right. That would
make someone like Albert Pujols a contact hitter, which is ridiculous
given the combination of walks, home runs, and strike outs for Albert;
when all is said and done, even though he only struck out 54 times in
641 PA in 2008, Pujols did not manage to put the ball in play at an
average rate. His walks and home runs ate too far into his BIP%,
meaning that even though he almost never strikes out, he is not a contact hitter. So,
beyond strike out hitting, contact hitting indicates a certain ratio
between the true outcomes: I';d suggest that an arbitrary limit be
placed around 5%+ league average BIP% for contact hitting; that is, if
an average MLB batter puts the ball in play 70% of his PA, a contact
hitter would do so in at least 75% of his PA. Maybe even moreso, but 75% is an easy number to apply to create a basic study group of comtact hitters. This
means, by extension, that a contact hitter produces a true outcome (HR,
BB, K) in only 25% (or less) of his PA; by contrast, an average MLB
player produces a true outcome (HR, BB, K) in at least 30% (probably
more) of his PA. Of course, K/BB ratio has something to do with
it, too; I don't believe we'd call a hitter like Alexei Ramirez a
contact hitter, even though he does not produce a true outcome in more
than 25% of his PA; his K/BB ratio (61 K / 18 BB) was terrible in 2008,
even though he only produced 100 true outcomes in 509 PA. If a player
has close to a 2 K / 1 BB ratio, or worse, we should probably question
whether or not he is truly a contact hitter.
This can
be analyzed at league levels, too. We can analyze the average BIP%, and
also look at the K% and BB% to figure out, on the whole, how balanced
teams are. Here is 2008, featuring the average (or better) offenses
from the AL and NL:
| Team |
R |
K% |
BB% |
BIP% |
|
|
| CHC |
855 |
0.186 |
0.1 |
0.678 |
|
|
| NYM |
799 |
0.16 |
0.097 |
0.696 |
|
|
| Phi |
799 |
0.178 |
0.093 |
0.684 |
|
|
| StL |
779 |
0.155 |
0.091 |
0.721 |
|
|
| Fla |
770 |
0.221 |
0.087 |
0.658 |
|
|
| Atl |
753 |
0.161 |
0.097 |
0.715 |
|
|
| Mil |
750 |
0.192 |
0.088 |
0.677 |
|
|
| Col |
747 |
0.192 |
0.09 |
0.684 |
|
|
| Tex |
901 |
0.186 |
0.092 |
0.682 |
|
|
| Bos |
845 |
0.167 |
0.101 |
0.694 |
|
|
| Min |
829 |
0.155 |
0.084 |
0.739 |
|
|
| Det |
821 |
0.17 |
0.09 |
0.701 |
|
|
| CWS |
811 |
0.163 |
0.087 |
0.702 |
|
|
| Cle |
805 |
0.193 |
0.089 |
0.675 |
|
|
| NYY |
789 |
0.162 |
0.086 |
0.71 |
|
|
| Bal |
782 |
0.159 |
0.086 |
0.72 |
|
|
| TB |
774 |
0.194 |
0.099 |
0.668 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2008 AL |
|
0.710 BIP% |
.169 K% |
.086 BB% |
|
| 2008 NL |
|
0.697 BIP% |
.181 K% |
.088 BB% |
|
Look very carefully at those team numbers; only one team, St. Louis, features team numbers
that even begin to suggest a contact offense. The remainder of the
average-or-better offenses generally feature (a) average or better
walks, (b) average or worse strike outs, and (c) below average BIP%. In 2008, only 6 of the 17 best offenses put the ball in play at an average (or better) rate. In fact, 11 of the 17 best offenses were pretty much fully below average at placing the ball in play. *** We
seem to forget a lot of things when analyzing team offense; for one, we
forget that Runs Scored is the be-all, end-all. We might not like how a team scores their runs, but all that matters is that
they score their runs. In this regard, AVG/OBP/SLG is much less
important on a team level than in analyzing individuals (where it is
notably more difficult to accurately extrapolate runs production).
Another conclusion, then, is that when analyzing average or better
offenses, statistical criticism often forms in the realm of personal
preference; persons that favor contact offenses will probably criticize
offenses such as Tampa Bay, Florida, Philadlephia, Milwaukee,
Cleveland, the Cubs, and Texas, among others, because their offenses
generally feature more strike outs, and most certainly feature fewer
balls in play. But of course, the flip side is, team offenses
that do not put the ball in play at an average level probably are more
likely to walk more, hit more home runs, and strike out more; on the
whole, creating more opportunities to score runs without depending upon
batted balls in play. The Twins and Cardinals are pretty much the other extreme. Remember,
none of this matters if the team produces above average runs scored, or
even average runs scored; a completely "unbalanced" team of true
outcome players -- and nothing else -- probably produces rather decent
situations in which to score runs. The lack of contact hitting, or
balls in play, might not hurt the team, but a team that is average in
runs scoring or better is rather clearly in need of less help than
below average offenses. 2008 MLB Contact Hitters (at least 400 PA) Asterik in cases where strike out ratio or K/BB ratio is probably problematic, and player should be analyzed more fully.
| 642 to 763 |
no more than
191 HR+BB+K |
|
|
|
no more than 161 HR+BB+K |
|
| J. Reyes |
|
.297/.358/.475 |
|
|
| I. Suzuki |
|
.310/.361/.386 |
|
|
| O.
Cabrera |
.281/.334/.371 |
|
|
| D.
Pedroia |
.326/.376/.493 |
|
|
| J. Lopez |
|
.297/.322/.443 |
|
|
| D. Jeter* |
|
.300/.363/.408 |
|
|
| R. Winn* |
|
.306/.363/.408 |
|
|
| M. Tejada* |
.283/.314/.415 |
|
|
| R. Theriot |
|
.307/.387/.359 |
|
|
| B. Giles |
|
.306/.398/.456 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 587 to 641
PA |
no more than 147 HR+BB+K |
|
|
|
no more than 160 HR+BB+K |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| R. Cano |
|
.271/.305/.410 |
|
|
| J. Mauer |
|
.328/.413/.451 |
|
|
| P.Polanco |
.307/.350/417 |
|
|
| S.
Victorino |
.293/.352/.447 |
|
|
| J. Rollins |
|
.277/.349/.437 |
|
|
| C. Guzman |
.316/.345/.440 |
|
|
| C. Jackson |
.300/.376/.446 |
|
|
| J.
Ellsbury* |
.280/.336/.394 |
|
|
| F. Sanchez* |
.271/.298/.371 |
|
|
| S.
Schumaker |
.302/.359/.406 |
|
|
| Y.
Betancourt* |
.279/.300/.392 |
|
|
| K. Suzuki |
|
.279/.346/.370 |
|
|
| J. Kendall |
|
.246/.327/.324 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 482 to 587 |
no more than 147 HR+BB+K |
|
|
|
no more than 121 HR+BB+K |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| I. Kinsler |
|
.319/.375/.517 |
|
|
| D. Dejesus |
.307/.366/452 |
|
|
| B.
McCann |
.301/.373/.523 |
|
|
| M. Mora* |
|
.285/.342/.483 |
|
|
| B. Molina |
|
.292/.322/.445 |
|
|
| E.
Renteria |
.270/.317/.382 |
|
|
| W. Taveras* |
.251/.308/.296 |
|
|
| F. Lopez* |
|
.283/.343/.387 |
|
|
| M. Ellis |
|
.233/.321/.373 |
|
|
| R.
Hernandez* |
.257/.308/.406 |
|
|
| J.
Keppinger |
.266/.310/346 |
|
|
| Y. Molina |
|
.304/.349/.392 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 409 to 482 |
no more than 121 HR+BB+K |
|
|
|
no more than 102 HR+BB+K |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| C. Lee |
|
.314/.368/.569 |
|
|
| B. Butler |
|
.275/.324/.400 |
|
|
| J. Kent |
|
.280/.327/.418 |
|
|
| D.
Navarro |
.295/.349/.407 |
|
|
| M. Lowell |
|
.271/.338/.461 |
|
|
| V. Wells |
|
.300/.343/.496 |
|
|
| P. Feliz |
|
.249/.302.402 |
|
|
| M. Byrd |
|
.298/.380/.462 |
|
|
| O. Hudson |
.305/.367/.450 |
|
|
| C. Izturis |
|
.263/.319/.309 |
|
|
| R.
Aurillia* |
.283/.332/.413 |
|
|
| A. Casilla |
|
.281/.333/.374 |
|
|
| K. Matsui* |
.293/.354/.427 |
|
|
| T.
Tulowitzki* |
.263/.332/.401 |
|
|
| R. Gload |
|
.273/.317/.348 |
|
|
| C. Crisp* |
|
.283/.344/.407 |
|
|
| K. Johjima |
.227/.277/.332 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| A. Miles |
|
.317/.355/.398 |
|
|
| J. Pierre |
|
.283/.327/.328 |
|
|
| C. Kotchman
(LA) |
.287/.327/.448 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 55 contact
hitters; 30 on top 17 offenses |
*** Of course, look prudently at the list of contact hitters by top team. If
you're thinking the Crew could use more hitters like Marlon Byrd, Ian
Kinsler, Jimmy Rollins, and Shane Victorino, then yes, I couldn't agree
more, the Brewers could use more contact hitters. But how about
Yadier Molina, Cesar Izturis, Felipe Lopez, Aaron
Miles, and Skip Schumaker? Well, I'd take Yadier, sure, but seriously,
is this the type of group contact hitting that would enhance the Brewers' offense?
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 Once again, Detroit.
Remember a few years ago, when the Brewers were no-hit by Verlander and then went on to take two games in a thrilling series? That series has always stayed in my mind as one of the better road series the Brewers played in the last few years, given the fact that they had to rebound from a no-hitter, win with a spot-starter on approximately 30 minutes notice, and win with an ace who lacked his best stuff (one of Ben Sheets’ better “guts” starts occurred in that Tigers series).
Let’s hope for another fun series on the road, and another thrilling series at Comerica.
Braden Looper (1-1, 5 GS, 5.45 runs average, 5.94 IP/GS; 2 quality starts) @ Armando Galarraga (0-4, 5 GS, 5.79 runs average, 5.60 IP/GS; 2 quality starts)
What’s in a splitter? Or more specifically, Braden Looper’s splitter. This season, Milwaukee Brewers’ catchers (mostly Jason Kendall) have called upon Looper for the splitter over 30% of his pitches, thus limiting his fastball/sinker to near-50% usage. Perhaps the selection is a continuation of a strategy over the last few years that has Looper throwing more and more splitters each and every year; perhaps the pitch, at 80 MPH, more readily achieves Looper’s goals for keeping the ball down than his trustworthy sinker. That splitter is the Brewers rotation’s most prolific breaking pitch.
Galarraga is struggling over the course of his last 7 starts, along with most of the Tigers’ staff; it must be a trend of sorts. The young righty simply is not matching his results that took the American League by storm in 2008.
By the way, if a junkballer is a pitcher that uses a change of speeds for his most frequent selection, and does not rely on an above average fastball (supposedly), what do we call a pitcher who throws a 91 MPH fastball only around 50% of the time, and throws his 85 MPH slider over 40% of the time?
Dave Bush (0-3, 5 GS, 8.64 runs average, 5.00 IP/GS; 0 quality starts) @ Alfredo Figaro (0-0, 0 GS)
Perhaps it was simply good luck that kept the frequent home runs solo shots; the aggressive, inside pitching style of Bush is catching up with the righty. Bush simply has not been the same pitcher after his Florida start, during which he was hit on the arm with a batted ball. More baserunners are on, there are more walks allowed, and a couple multi-run homers to boot. Bush is perhaps the Brewers’ most aggressive – and certainly their most efficient pitcher, meaning that a return to form is vital for their overall success.
Entering the Tigers’ rotation in the place of Dontrelle Willis, Figaro is a young, hard-throwing righty making the trek to Detroit from AA Erie. The jump will test Figaro’s composure, and ability to mix pitches to big leaguers, as he features a hard fastball and good curveball with slider and change up selections that could use work. Perhaps he will learn the lesson that Manny Parra – for instance – could not, which is that you don’t need more than two pitches to succeed at the Major League level; you simply need to command them and throw them aggressively in sequence.
Yovani Gallardo (3-1, 5 GS, 1.73 runs average, 6.26 IP/GS; 2 quality starts) @ Justin Verlander (3-1, 5 GS, 2.38 runs average, 6.80 IP/GS; 4 quality starts)
Efficiency is simply not in the stars for Gallardo this year. The budding ace is hurting himself with walks, and perhaps wasting too many pitches, hindering his ability to pitch deep into games. Get this: of his six 5 (to 6) IP starts, only two have clocked in under 100 pitches, and his lowest pitch total in a 5 IP start is 94, which equals nearly 19 pitches per inning. I know I have written about this in the last few previews, but Gallardo’s efficiency is alarming, and will continue to affect his ability to work deep into ballgames.
Verlander is once again the king of fastball velocity, sort of. At the very least, his velocity has returned to the level at which it stood several years ago; his fastball averages 95 MPH. This means, of course, that he can throw his curveball for a strong 15-20 MPH differential, depending upon whether his top fastball shows up (opposed to his merely “average” fastball). From the looks of it, Verlander has also added a cutter/slider at 89 MPH, which he throws sparingly, along with his curveball – his favorite off-speed selection – and change up.
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