Contact / Balance

 

One of the most common comments about the 2009 Brewers goes something like this: "Doug Melvin knew what was wrong last year, and did nothing to address those problems before 2009. Specifically, he did not sign any contact hitters to go along with the free swingers."

There's a lot going on in this single statement: (1) It suggests, implicitly, that a balanced offense is better than an offense that features one type of hitter. (2) It suggests that a contact hitter is not a free swinger. (3) It suggests that contact hitters are readily available, and also, implicitly, that contact hitters are productive. 

I have a lot of issues with this line of thinking, all of which cannot be expressed fully here. The main issue I won't be able to examine just yet is the relationship between discipline and contact hitting. There should be two main divisions: one between "contact" and "true outcome" hitters, the other between "disciplined" and "undisciplined" hitters. A contact hitter is a hitter that places the ball in play more frequently than an average hitter. If you sit down and think about it, there is no reason to think that contact hitters are inherently more disciplined than true outcome players. Sure, they probably strike out less, but that says nothing about how frequently they swing at bad pitches.

Two controversial examples of disciplined true outcomes hitters are Rickie Weeks and Mike Cameron. Both Weeks and Cam strike out a lot, hit home runs (Cam moreso), and walk a bunch (usually Weeks has the edge here). But, despite their high K%, these guys simply do not swing at a high percentage of pitches outside the zone. It so happens that they are disciplined hitters that work very deep into counts, see a lot of pitches, and therefore strike out a lot; and of course, they also walk a lot. 

Disciplined hitters can be both contact hitters and true outcomes hitters.

There is nothing inherently disciplined about contact hitting.

But, contact hitting is a completely different style of hitting; the results should be noticeably different. On first glance, I am tempted to denote contact hitters simply by strike outs, but that isn't right. That would make someone like Albert Pujols a contact hitter, which is ridiculous given the combination of walks, home runs, and strike outs for Albert; when all is said and done, even though he only struck out 54 times in 641 PA in 2008, Pujols did not manage to put the ball in play at an average rate. His walks and home runs ate too far into his BIP%, meaning that even though he almost never strikes out, he is not a contact hitter. 

So, beyond strike out hitting, contact hitting indicates a certain ratio between the true outcomes: I';d suggest that an arbitrary limit be placed around 5%+ league average BIP% for contact hitting; that is, if an average MLB batter puts the ball in play 70% of his PA, a contact hitter would do so in at least 75% of his PA. Maybe even moreso, but 75% is an easy number to apply to create a basic study group of comtact hitters. 

This means, by extension, that a contact hitter produces a true outcome (HR, BB, K) in only 25% (or less) of his PA; by contrast, an average MLB player produces a true outcome (HR, BB, K) in at least 30% (probably more) of his PA.

Of course, K/BB ratio has something to do with it, too; I don't believe we'd call a hitter like Alexei Ramirez a contact hitter, even though he does not produce a true outcome in more than 25% of his PA; his K/BB ratio (61 K / 18 BB) was terrible in 2008, even though he only produced 100 true outcomes in 509 PA. If a player has close to a 2 K / 1 BB ratio, or worse, we should probably question whether or not he is truly a contact hitter.

This can be analyzed at league levels, too. We can analyze the average BIP%, and also look at the K% and BB% to figure out, on the whole, how balanced teams are. Here is 2008, featuring the average (or better) offenses from the AL and NL:

 

Team R K% BB% BIP%

CHC 855 0.186 0.1 0.678

NYM 799 0.16 0.097 0.696

Phi 799 0.178 0.093 0.684

StL 779 0.155 0.091 0.721

Fla 770 0.221 0.087 0.658

Atl 753 0.161 0.097 0.715

Mil 750 0.192 0.088 0.677

Col 747 0.192 0.09 0.684

Tex 901 0.186 0.092 0.682

Bos 845 0.167 0.101 0.694

Min 829 0.155 0.084 0.739

Det 821 0.17 0.09 0.701

CWS 811 0.163 0.087 0.702

Cle 805 0.193 0.089 0.675

NYY 789 0.162 0.086 0.71

Bal 782 0.159 0.086 0.72

TB 774 0.194 0.099 0.668








2008 AL
0.710 BIP% .169 K% .086 BB%
2008 NL
0.697 BIP% .181 K% .088 BB%

 

Look very carefully at those team numbers; only one team, St. Louis, features team numbers that even begin to suggest a contact offense. The remainder of the average-or-better offenses generally feature (a) average or better walks, (b) average or worse strike outs, and (c) below average BIP%.

In 2008, only 6 of the 17 best offenses put the ball in play at an average (or better) rate. In fact, 11 of the 17 best offenses were pretty much fully below average at placing the ball in play.

 ***

We seem to forget a lot of things when analyzing team offense; for one, we forget that Runs Scored is the be-all, end-all. We might not like how a team scores their runs, but all that matters is that they score their runs. In this regard, AVG/OBP/SLG is much less important on a team level than in analyzing individuals (where it is notably more difficult to accurately extrapolate runs production). Another conclusion, then, is that when analyzing average or better offenses, statistical criticism often forms in the realm of personal preference; persons that favor contact offenses will probably criticize offenses such as Tampa Bay, Florida, Philadlephia, Milwaukee, Cleveland, the Cubs, and Texas, among others, because their offenses generally feature more strike outs, and most certainly feature fewer balls in play.

But of course, the flip side is, team offenses that do not put the ball in play at an average level probably are more likely to walk more, hit more home runs, and strike out more; on the whole, creating more opportunities to score runs without depending upon batted balls in play.

The Twins and Cardinals are pretty much the other extreme. 

Remember, none of this matters if the team produces above average runs scored, or even average runs scored; a completely "unbalanced" team of true outcome players -- and nothing else -- probably produces rather decent situations in which to score runs. The lack of contact hitting, or balls in play, might not hurt the team, but a team that is average in runs scoring or better is rather clearly in need of less help than below average offenses.

2008 MLB Contact Hitters (at least 400 PA)

Asterik in cases where strike out ratio or K/BB ratio is probably problematic, and player should be analyzed more fully.

 

 

642 to 763 no more than 191 HR+BB+K


no more than 161 HR+BB+K
J. Reyes
.297/.358/.475

I. Suzuki
.310/.361/.386

O. Cabrera .281/.334/.371

D. Pedroia .326/.376/.493

J. Lopez
.297/.322/.443

D. Jeter*
.300/.363/.408

R. Winn*
.306/.363/.408

M. Tejada* .283/.314/.415

R. Theriot
.307/.387/.359

B. Giles
.306/.398/.456







587 to 641 PA no more than 147 HR+BB+K


no more than 160 HR+BB+K






R. Cano
.271/.305/.410

J. Mauer
.328/.413/.451

P.Polanco .307/.350/417

S. Victorino .293/.352/.447

J. Rollins
.277/.349/.437

C. Guzman .316/.345/.440

C. Jackson .300/.376/.446

J. Ellsbury* .280/.336/.394

F. Sanchez* .271/.298/.371

S. Schumaker .302/.359/.406

Y. Betancourt* .279/.300/.392

K. Suzuki
.279/.346/.370

J. Kendall
.246/.327/.324







482 to 587 no more than 147 HR+BB+K


no more than 121 HR+BB+K






I. Kinsler
.319/.375/.517

D. Dejesus .307/.366/452

B. McCann .301/.373/.523

M. Mora*
.285/.342/.483

B. Molina
.292/.322/.445

E. Renteria .270/.317/.382

W. Taveras* .251/.308/.296

F. Lopez*
.283/.343/.387

M. Ellis
.233/.321/.373

R. Hernandez* .257/.308/.406

J. Keppinger .266/.310/346

Y. Molina
.304/.349/.392







409 to 482 no more than 121 HR+BB+K


no more than 102 HR+BB+K






C. Lee
.314/.368/.569

B. Butler
.275/.324/.400

J. Kent
.280/.327/.418

D. Navarro .295/.349/.407

M. Lowell
.271/.338/.461

V. Wells
.300/.343/.496

P. Feliz
.249/.302.402

M. Byrd
.298/.380/.462

O. Hudson .305/.367/.450

C. Izturis
.263/.319/.309

R. Aurillia* .283/.332/.413

A. Casilla
.281/.333/.374

K. Matsui* .293/.354/.427

T. Tulowitzki* .263/.332/.401

R. Gload
.273/.317/.348

C. Crisp*
.283/.344/.407

K. Johjima .227/.277/.332







A. Miles
.317/.355/.398

J. Pierre
.283/.327/.328

C. Kotchman (LA) .287/.327/.448







55 contact hitters; 30 on top 17 offenses

***

Of course, look prudently at the list of contact hitters by top team.

If you're thinking the Crew could use more hitters like Marlon Byrd, Ian Kinsler, Jimmy Rollins, and Shane Victorino, then yes, I couldn't agree more, the Brewers could use more contact hitters.

But how about Yadier Molina, Cesar Izturis, Felipe Lopez, Aaron Miles, and Skip Schumaker? Well, I'd take Yadier, sure, but seriously, is this the type of group contact hitting that would enhance the Brewers' offense?

 

Comments

 

The Monday Mug said:

Pingback from  The Monday Mug

June 22, 2009 2:09 PM
 

The Monday Mug said:

Pingback from  The Monday Mug

June 22, 2009 2:09 PM
 

Milwaukee Brewers Blog - The Junkball Blues said:

Note: I hope that this is part of an on-going series on this issue. I specifically plan to survey 1969

October 14, 2009 11:12 PM

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About This Blog

I'm Nicholas Zettel, and I've got the Junkball Blues. All I need for a cure is a sinkerball pitcher here, a curveball specialist there, and a bunch of guys with fastballs that top out in the high-80s. And those days when the knuckleball wasn't a speciality pitch, and pitchers simply kept one in their back pocket? That's what I'm talking about!

I write for Sportsbubbler.com, and this is the research I compile along the way. I love power-speed combo players, garbage time relievers, and the walking medicine cabinets that played baseball in the 1960s and 1970s, and got away with it.

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