Milwaukee Brewers Blog - The Junkball Blues

Food for thought

2009-11-02T03:11:54Z

Lately I've been thinking about Doug Melvin's middle-man, crowd-pleasing position: that the Brewers will be willing to sacrifice some offense for some pitching.

I've wrapped my mind into a pretzel over how to determine the value of a run prevented against a run scored (in 2009 NL, the league teams allowed 9 more runs than they scored, which at a basic level means that a run prevented was very slightly more valuable than a run scored (to the tune of 1.01 RA: 1.00 RS).

On the surface, in a consistently depressed offensive environment, it seems like an intuitive way to approach the offseason; anyhow, the Brewers had one of the best offenses in the NL, scoring 67 more runs than the average offense (that's nearly 10% of the runs scored by an average offense), so it looks like the Brewers have a margin to dig into (if they give up, say, even 5% of their 2009 RS, that means around 746 RS for 2010, which could very well be an average to above average offense once again, if recent runs environment trends remain the same in the NL.

However, my thinking on this issue shifts once I think of two things:

(1) The Brewers' available resources

(2) The available free agent pitchers

(3) The likely talent required to obtain proven, average (and above) pitching via trade

(4) The level at which the Brewers' pitching staff needs to improve in order to become an average staff

Here's the deal; the average 2009 NL team allowed 727 runs, and the Brewers' 818 runs allowed requires the team to prevent 81 runs somewhere. The Brewers' bullpen isn't really a place to look for that task, given that the pen allowed 250 runs despite pitching over 540 IP (the average 2009 NL bullpen pitched 501.78 IP and allowed 242.6 runs, compared to 544 IP/250 RA for the Brewers' 2009 bullpen -- a rather exceptional performance when you consider the added requirement of 40 extra innings for the Crew's relievers).

So, the burden really falls with the rotation, which allowed approximately 74 more runs than the average NL rotation, which pitched 942.84 IP over 162 G, allowing 484 R. The Brewers starters' 891 IP and 568 R performance leaves a whole lot to be desired.

Which leads me to ask, how do you make up for that type of performance?

In order to figure this out, I needed to create two potential models for building an average rotation. The first model is simple: how does a true 1-2-3-4-5 rotation perform? The second is a bit more convoluted: how does a rotation of five #3 starters perform? Both models are unrealistic to some extent, because (a) no rotation actually goes 1-2-3-4-5 according to runs performance, and (b) no rotation actually goes 3-3-3-3-3 according to runs performance (and to show you the difference between rotation spots, the Brewers went 1-4-4-4-5 according to runs performance, which should demonstrate (a) the difficulty of using a #1 starter to offset multiple low rotation performances, and (b) the difference between #3 and #4 starters.)

Of course, the other issue is that relatively few rotations even reach 5 regular spots; there really wasn't even a such thing as a true #5 starter in the NL. The two true #5 candidates according to my survey has Manny Parra and Todd Wellemeyer sharing the dubious distinction of being the only two #5 starters according to runs performance (which is really, really awful), and Jeff Karstens lumped in as a swingman (only due to % of GS and IP, really; he was actually about as valuable as a mean #4).

That's my logic, to outline the problem.

1-2-3-4-5 MODEL: 824.56 IP, 421.57 R
3-3-3-3-3 MODEL: 827.95 IP, 429.61 R

A couple of things should really jump out:

(a) A rotation of full-time, average #3 starters is almost exactly comparable to a 1-2-3-4-5 rotation. As a theoretical point, this should be powerful. I know actual available resources, scarcity of talent, difficulty of developing pitchers, etc., makes it extremely unlikely for a team to acquire five #3 starters, but it should re-open the debate about Doug Melvin's 2008-2009 offseason plan to acquire Braden Looper (a top #3 in 2008 NL) to work with Dave Bush (the top #3 in 2008 NL) and Manny Parra (another #3 in 2008 NL). With the gambles of Yovani Gallardo and the decreasing production of Jeff Suppan fully weighed, that rotation basically looked like ?-3-3-3-4, which isn't all that far off from a 3-3-3-3-3 model if all the starters remain healthy, make all their starts, and don't regress.

And there's your issue. After all, this is only a model, but really, think it through, thoroughly, and allow it to frame your logic of pitching acquisitions for a week. Then revisit it.

(b) Neither a 1-2-3-4-5 or 3-3-3-3-3 rotation completes the league average IP for NL 2009 starters, or fills 162 games. I will repeat it again for effect: Neither a 1-2-3-4-5 or 3-3-3-3-3 rotation completes the league average IP for NL 2009 starters, or fills 162 games.

I am fond of saying that a lot of baseball is just killing time, or biding time, and this seems to reflect that point: a team should expect to use 6 starters in this day and age, and probably have a swingman or two ready on top of that.

Either way, in a 1-2-3-4-5 model, or a 3-3-3-3-3 model, someone has to step up beyond what an average spot produces in a rotation, to the tune of 114-118 IP and a runs average of approximately 4.26 to 4.75.

This is significant for the 2010 Brewers because even theoretically, a 1-4-4-4-5 rotation is so much further from a passable starting pitching performance provided by a 3-3-3-3-3 / 1-2-3-4-5 model before those extra innings filled by a sixth starter are even considered.

1-4-4-4-5 MODEL: 761.09 IP, 432.34 R

This rotation needs 180 IP at a 2.65 runs average just to break even.

Think about that. That's better than a #1. That's like Tim Lincecum good. And that's even giving Gallardo the benefit of the doubt at a #1 (he was, in reality, the best #2 starter in the 2009 NL, but I basically felt like giving this team a benefit of the doubt somewhere, so I'm praising Gallardo).

THINK ABOUT THAT. Seriously think about it. Imagine that Dave Bush's scar tissue is serious, his elbow issue is more serious than thought, and it affects his ability to bounce back in 2010. Imagine that the Brewers either bring back Looper or need to fill his spot. Suppan is here. Gallardo is here. Parra is somewhere, or else the Brewers need to acquire yet another arm to improve this rotation.

And the Brewers are going to somehow accomplish this through (a) best case scenario projections again, and (b) acquiring two pitchers?

***

Which leads me to point out that

(a) The cost of acquiring the type of pitching that will be needed to improve the club -- not stay the course from 2009 -- will require either (1) giving up more than 5% of their 2009 runs scored equation, or (2) spending more money than is currently available to the Brewers.

(b) The Brewers are arguably in a better position to acquire multiple, reasonable depth options without the goal of reaching an average starting rotation production level, and instead spend the available resources on ADDING offense to the 2010 Brewers.

(c) The logic behind "giving up some offense for pitching" is paradoxical, and therefore false, for the 2010 Brewers. It requires either spending more resources than are available, or depleting the offense beyond an acceptable level.

My hypothesis is simple:

IF THE BREWERS SURRENDER OFFENSE FOR PITCHING THIS OFFSEASON -- GIVEN THE AVAILABLE RESOURCES -- THEY WILL END UP WITH AN AVERAGE TO BELOW AVERAGE OFFENSE WITHOUT AN ABOVE AVERAGE PITCHING STAFF.

My recommended plan of action is simple:

WORK TO IMPROVE THE ONE NOTABLY ABOVE AVERAGE ASPECT OF THE CLUB (OFFENSE), MAINTAIN THE OTHER ABOVE AVERAGE ASPECT (BULLPEN), WITH THE GOAL OF SACRIFICING THE BELOW AVERAGE ASPECT OF THE CLUB IN ORDER TO ATTEMPT TO HAVE ONE EXCEPTIONAL ASPECT OF THE CLUB.

Food for thought.

2007-2009 Batting Luck

2009-10-31T19:21:18Z

Most of our debates around here dance around one point, but rarely seem to tackle it directly: run scoring does not depend upon putting the ball in play, so much as it is framed by how the ball is put in play. Subsequently, an approach at the plate is framed or outlined by balls not put in play -- home runs, walks, hit by pitch, and strike outs -- which in turn help to shape the value of a batter's balls in play. In a search for the evasive plate discipline, or patience, we can in turn study the ratios between K, BB, and HR.

For instance, it is not simply a bad thing to K. It is a bad thing to K and not hit HR in a complementary ratio; it is a bad thing to K and not BB; but all three outcomes must be taken in order. Similarly, it is not always a good thing to be a contact hitter and put the ball in play frequently; if that is shaped by excessive K, no BB, and no HR, contact approaches become less valuable.

In understanding the circumstances by which a player puts the ball in play, we are understanding their luck. Luck is not here meant to be something insulting to a hitter, as most people who believe in moral desert in baseball believe luck to be. Luck is pervasive; every aspect of a hitter's approach encounters luck in one way or another, simply by the manner of circumstances in which the hitter finds himself.

This basic balance between the percentage of balls in play ((PA-HR-BB-K-HBP)/PA) and BABIP will reveal more foundational aspects of a hitter's approach than his AVG/OBP/SLG splits, and looking at batting luck over a period of years will be more instructive about hitting trends than the AVG/OBP/SLG taken together. The point is not to explain that a hitter hit a certain way, but to attempt to comprehend why.

This is a simple survey of Brewers' 2009 batting luck, and those players' 2007-2009 progressions. I have also included HR/PA, BB/PA, and K/PA to help frame the type of balls not put in play by a batter. As I said, it is not simply a good or bad thing to strike out, and not simply a good or bad thing to be a contact hitter; there are degrees of patience, discipline, power, etc., that also frame those aspects of hitting, which keep us from making sweeping general claims.

NL Averages ` BIP% BABIP
BB% K% HR%

2007
0.706 0.301
0.085 0.173 0.027

2008
0.697 0.298
0.088 0.181 0.027

2009
0.0693 0.299
0.09 0.184 0.025

Jason kendall BIP% BABIP
BB% K% HR%

2007
0.834 0.259
0.06 0.082 0.006

2008
0.813 0.265
0.085 0.077 0.003

2009
0.766 0.27
0.087 0.11 0.004

Ick. Exhibit A against contact hitting. Kendall is exactly the type of contact hitter that baseball doesn't need. Increasing K in 2009, negligable home run total, and rather steady batting average on balls in play.

Ick.

Prince Fielder BIP% BABIP
BB% K% HR%

2007
0.596 0.283
0.132 0.178 0.073

2008
0.62 0.298
0.121 0.193 0.049

2009
0.597 0.315
0.153 0.192 0.064

This is a thing of beauty. Prince hit more home runs than 2008, while striking out more frequently than his last huge HR total season (2007), and of course, those walks picked up big time.

Prince's BABIP might be likely to drop a little bit in 2010, but the main trend that we should keep in our minds here is Prince's phenomenal K/BB ratio.

Rickie Weeks BIP% BABIP
BB% K% HR%

2007
0.557 0.287
0.154 0.229 0.032

2008
0.627 0.277
0.118 0.205 0.025

2009
0.611 0.313
0.074 0.241 0.056

Joe Average Fan cheered mightily at the sight of Weeks' apparent hitting breakout this year, but I am more skeptical of Weeks' 2009 than his steady 2007-2008 trends.

What do we make of Weeks' complete lack of discipline in 2009? Sure, he hit more home runs, and sure enough, his BABIP came around in a big way. But look at his actual trends: his strike outs increased by 4%, walks dropped 4%, and while this is made worthwhile by a 3% increase in HR frequency, what happens should Weeks maintain his ridiculous K/BB (worse than 3/1) rate and the home runs don't come again in 2010?

I am not confident about what we'll see from Weeks in 2010.

Casey McGehee BIP% BABIP
BB% K% HR%

2007
DNP DNP
DNP DNP DNP

2008
0.68 0.235
0 0.32 0

2009
0.7 0.33
0.086 0.17 0.041

The good news is that McGehee burst onto the MLB scene in 2010. The bad news is that his BB% increased over his minor league norms, and so did his BABIP and HR%.

Not good for 2010. Trade now.

J.J. Hardy
BIP% BABIP
BB% K% HR%

2007
0.781 0.279
0.063 0.114 0.041

2008
0.722 0.305
0.083 0.156 0.038

2009
0.697 0.26
0.092 0.183 0.024

Alcides Escobar BIP% BABIP
BB% K% HR%

2007
DNP DNP
DNP DNP DNP

2008
0.75 0.667
0 0.25 0

2009
0.813 0.304
0.03 0.134 0.007

Escobar made major strides in the minors during 2009, improving his discipline and power numbers. He didn't take that to the majors, which means he has his work cut out for him in 2010. He won't go anywhere as a player with a K/BB that is worse than 4/1, and a BB% lower than 5%.

Hardy's luck was due to drop, and it fell in a bad way, which looked even worse given that his steady 2007-2008 HR rate dropped, and he struck out a lot more.

I don't know what to say other than not only did Hardy look completely lost in person, but also on paper. Is it just Murphy's Law, and moreover, is trading Hardy such a good idea with Escobar leaving a few question marks as well?

Mark me down as generally perplexed about our SS situation.

Ryan Braun
BIP% BABIP
BB% K% HR%

2007
0.63 0.361
0.056 0.228 0.069

2008
0.677 0.305
0.063 0.195 0.056

2009
0.685 0.353
0.081 0.171 0.045

Ryan Braun is nothing more than a pure hitter, and I would not be surprised to see his contact continue to rise, putting more balls in play, hopefully accompanied by maintaining his 2009 BB% improvements, progressively lower K%, and progressively lower HR%.

Braun seems to show more of a desire simply to hit, and he said so at the end of the year. I see him morphing into a Moises Alou style hitter, very high average, pretty decent HR, and swinging away, for the most part.

Mike Cameron BIP% BABIP
BB% K% HR%

2007
0.607 0.298
0.103 0.246 0.032

2008
0.553 0.296
0.106 0.28 0.049

2009
0.588 0.304
0.119 0.248 0.038

Cameron is pretty damn consistent, isn't he?

Corey Hart
BIP% BABIP
BB% K% HR%

2007
0.696 0.321
0.064 0.175 0.042

2008
0.755 0.293
0.041 0.166 0.03

2009
0.676 0.305
0.091 0.195 0.025

Everything went right for Hart in 2007, and that's excellent, but now he's morphing into a useful hitter after dropping off in 2008. His marked BB% increase in 2009 is really promising, and if he can work the strike outs down a little bit more (if he's not going to be hitting home runs as frequently as 2007), I think we can see Hart morph into a very useful hitter for the 2010 Brewers.

There is an outside chance, if you look at it a certain way, that Hart's sudden discipline improvements, should they stick, will eventually yield more power through better selectivity at the plate, and better patience. Should Hart's power return a little bit to better than average levels, and he continues to walk, he could become more than a useful bat.

4-man rotation continued: Yovani Gallardo's workload

2009-10-21T12:03:13Z

As you already know, I am developing a position on pitching value and rotation usage that supports moving to a more traditional 4-man rotation, using a 5th starter only as a swingman, to handle approximately 16 starts and then work out of the bullpen the remainder of his appearances. I support this rotation pattern because (a) there is a shortage of pitchers that are skilled enough to pitch even 100 innings, (b) the number of pitchers able to reach the 100 IP range is historically consistent, throughout the entire expansion era (except approx. 1977-1982, when relief appearances surged for relief aces, and there were more relievers pitching ridiculous IP totals), and perhaps most importantly, (c) there is no pitcher worth signing and depending upon for 30-36 starts in the off-season market. In this regard, using a swingman rotation would allow the team to maximize an injury reclamation project, or perhaps break any young, promising pitchers into the rotation (eventually; maybe this would only be a relevant issue in 2011, 2012, or 2013 when more notable young pitchers might be available to the Brewers).

One of my growing concerns with this plan is the workload required of Yovani Gallardo. In such a scheme, he would need to start approximately 36 games (or more), which would mean well over 210 IP given his career averages. Given Gallardo's almost-shocking inefficiency, I hesitate to offer full-fledged support of a 4-man/swingman rotation without breaking down his workload.

What is more crucial than pitch count or innings pitched in a true 4-man/swingman oriented rotation is working on that 5th day regularly -- and pitching consecutive 5th day starts for just about the entire season.

Let's cut to the chase; here is how Gallardo fared in one-or-more consecutive 5th day starts in 2009:

Dates

IP R H+BB+HBP Pitches

1. April 13-18, 2009
11 7 16 203

2. April 29-May 9, 2009 20 5 22 326

3. June 16-July 1, 2009 26.7 7 34 455

4. July 30-August 29, 2009 41.3 23 62 756

16 GS

99 42 134 1740

Gallardo's pitch efficiency in these stretches of 5th day starts is downright shocking, standing at nearly 17.6 NP/IP over those starts. Even worse, from the stretch of three April-May 5th day starts, to four June-July 5th day starts, to seven July-August 5th day starts, his inefficiency worsened as the season progressed.

Oddly enough, Gallardo's 3.82 runs average, 6.18 IP/GS, and 1.35 WHIP during those 16 games started was not that far off from his numbers in 14-other starts (non-consecutive 5th day starts, and 6th+ day starts); during this grab bag of 14 other starts, Gallardo's efficiency dropped to a cool 16.96, with a runs average of 3.74, 6.19 IP/GS, and 1.33 WHIP.

So, here's the difficulty: how do we gauge Gallardo's alarming inefficiency and decreasing performance as the season wore into the dog days of summer alongside the fact that in his other 14 grab-bag starts (following longer rest periods, or less consistent rest patterns), well, Gallardo was pretty damn inefficient anyway, and has the same alarming workload issues...

I am inclined to suggest two solutions to fitting the problem of Gallardo's inefficiencies into a 4-man rotation:

(1) Simply limit inefficient starts by pulling Gallardo earlier when he doesn't have it. This follows logically from the fact that Gallardo will receive approximately six extra starts in this system, and frankly, with more starts from a better pitcher otherwise, the Brewers can afford to pack it in and call it a day earlier when Gallardo doesn't have it. More starts by an above average pitcher (the best #2 starter in the 2009 NL) will lessen the significance of a few more short outings; should Gallardo be pulled in the 4th-5th when his inefficiency places him around 75 pitches after 4 or near-100 after 5 aq couple of times a year, the extra six starts basically serve as a buffer.

(Nevermind that even in the course of inefficient 5 inning starts, Gallardo can still deliver a performance better than most Brewers starters on a somewhat more regular basis).

(2) Simply build in an extra 2-3 starts during the year for the main swingman, or a second swingman. Or, pitch Gallardo out of the bullpen every now and then, say, to cut his workload during the colder parts of the year, when his performance may decline in outdoor stadia, therefore concentrating his starts into the warmer parts of April and September, and the middle of the season, too.

Either of these solutions will either (a) provide Gallardo three more starts on five days' rest, rather than four, or (b) an opportunity to maximize potentially long stretches of consecutive starts during times of the season when Gallardo is more likely to be fresh, and then avoiding the possible impact of a late season "meltdown" or regression by building in bullpen time after the middle of September.

This is no doubt radical to think about when you imagine a stretch run without an ace, or something like that, but on the flipside, imagine a stretch of baseball from April 15 to September 15 where Yovani Gallardo makes 36 starts;

By removing a regular fifth starter, the Brewers can minimize the number of starts by a replacement or below-replacement starter. And, by regulating the workload of their young ace during the most adventageous points of the season (in terms of being rested), the Brewers can maximize the extra work received from their ace in lieu of a fifth starter.

Why the Brewers should trade Casey McGehee...

2009-10-19T12:45:34Z

Here's Casey McGehee as a minor leaguer:

Minors (2836 PA): .279/.332/.409; 75% BIP, 1.9 HR%, .316 BABIP
AAA (1153 PA): .282/.334/.410; 75% BIP, 2.1 HR%, .313 BABIP
2009 (394 PA): .301/.360/.499; 70% BIP, 4.1% HR, .330 BABIP
Two notes: (1) if someone could double check my BABIP math on McGehee's minor league stats, that'd be awesome. I've calculated it about 4-5 different times, and .316, .313 don't look right. (2) If someone could point me to PCL park factors, that'd really be helpful. I can't find 'em.

Now, here's the problem: A 26-year old high-contact hitter (75% minor league BIP rate) comes to the majors and in a neutral offensive environment doubles his HR% and suddenly puts the ball in play 5% less frequently (huge shift!) as a result (he also increased his BB%), while collecting hits on balls in play nearly 2% more frequently (huge shift!) and 4% above average league defensive efficiency.

Now, even without minor league records, that season looks flukey; somehow, a clunker like McGehee was able to beat defenses by 4% on balls in play, while also nearly doubling the league average HR% -- without collecting an overly high K% or BB%. With minor league records we can see that McGehee's HR rates were completely out of the norm in 2009, completely out of nowhere, alongside his BABIP shift (in a neutral offensive environment!) and BIP% rate.

Just think about this for a second: McGehee managed to put the ball in play significantly less frequently while collecting hits on those BIP notably more frequently, all the while doubling his HR% and increasing his BB%. Of course, he did this as a 26-year old rookie, with absolutely no MLB playing time to ramp up to his prime years or anything like that.

Does that scream "I will regress for 2010" to anyone else? (That's why I say trade McGehee now. He's served his purpose, proven Melvin can still pull 'em off the scrap heaps, and now it's time to turn him into a trade piece).

***

Here's what McGehee's corrections look like (I've kept the walks, correcting only the BABIP and HR, and therefore the BIP%):

League average efficiency: 400 PA, 288 BIP; .299 BABIP, 86 BIPH; 8 HR, 32 BB, 70 K, 2 HBP; 366 AB, 94 H, 22 2B, 0 3B, 8 HR; .257/.320/.383

Minor league BABIP: 400 PA, 288 BIP; .315 BABIP, 91 BIPH; 8 HR, 32 BB, 70 K, 2 HBP; 366 AB, 99 H, 24 2B, 0 3B, 8 HR; .270/.333/.402

Series: Contact / Balance

2009-10-15T04:12:38Z

Note: I hope that this is part of an on-going series on this issue. I specifically plan to survey 1969-mid-1980s next, and then 1987-approx. 1999....

I think that it is rather clear that run scoring is framed by how the ball is put in play. However, it's not always clear that putting the ball in play works as we expect -- our intuition is that "if you just put the ball in play, you have a chance for something to happen." But, it is not the case that contact -- or putting the ball in play more frequently than average -- is more conducive to scoring runs.

I worked on this problem in the past (most notably here), and have found that in recent years, it is clearly the case that above average offenses are rarely contact offenses; instead, offenses in which batters regularly strike out, hit home runs, and walk are more frequently above average in terms of runs scored.

However, what I want to learn is how this changes over time; in the last two months, I began looking into contact rates from 1962-1968 -- baseball's second deadball era -- and I was surprised at what I found. At first glance, even in a severely depressed offensive environment, I found that offenses put the ball in play less frequently were more likely to be above average.

In the decade, there were 53 "high" contact offenses -- offenses that put the ball in plat at an above average rate (28 NL, 25 AL). Of those offenses, 14 were above average in the NL, 10 in the AL, meaning that 24 of the 53 high contact offenses were above average. By contrast, there were 87 "low" contact offenses (42 NL, 45 AL), and of those offenses that put the ball in play less frequently than average, 50 were above average (26 NL, 24 AL).

Overall, even in a depressed era, there were not even as many contact offenses -- teams still were playing towards the 1940s and 1950s norms, to some extent, and the "contact" norms we might expect in such an era didn't actually take over until the 1970s.

Another lesson in the exploration of balls in play: it is not always what we intuit about the game that corresponds to run scoring, and it is not the case that contact necessarily -- or even regularly -- leads to more runs scored.

What this means (I worked on the NL today, the AL comes tomorrow or Friday):

CONTACT OFFENSES
Of the above average offenses from 1962-1968 in the NL, only five teams (a) put the ball in play more frequently than average and (b) were below average in BB%, HR%, and K%. These teams are marked by unrealistic BABIP in some cases, or exceptional situational hitting:
1. 1962 Cardinals (.296 BABIP, .270 RISP, .275 Men on)
2. 1964 Cardinals (.308 BABIP, .266 RISP, .275 Men on)
3. 1967 Pirates (.314 BABIP, .265 RISP, .280 Men on)
4. 1968 Cardinals (.283 BABIP, .250 RISP, .255 Men on) '
5. 1968 Pirates (.289 BABIP, .244 RISP, .248 Men on)

It is rare for truly contact offenses -- offenses that do not walk, do not strike out, and do not hit home runs -- to score runs at an above average rate.

Notable offenses:
These offenses matched at least two of three HR%, BB%, K%:
1. 1963 Braves (2.2 HR%, 8.5 BB%)
2. 1963 Phillies (2.1 HR%, 15.7 K%)
3. 1964 Braves (2.6 HR%, 7.8 BB%)
4. 1964 Pirates (2 HR%, 15.9 K%)
5. 1964 Giants (8.2 BB%, 2.7 HR%)
6. 1965 Giants (2.6 HR%, 7.8 BB%)
7. 1965 Braves (3.2 HR%, 16.1 K%)
8. 1966 Braves (3.3 HR%, 8.2 BB%)
9. 1966 Pirates (2.5 HR%, 16.2 K%)
10. 1966 Phillies (8.2 BB%, 15.5 K%)
11. 1967 Cubs (2.1 HR%, 8.3 BB%)

Only two of these eight offenses managed to put the ball in play more frequently than average (1964 Braves, 1965 Giants).

TRUE OUTCOME OFFENSES:

These are the offenses that matched or surpassed the averages in HR%, BB%, and K%. I posted their top attribute:

1. 1962 Braves(9.4 BB%)

2. 1963 Reds (7.9 BB%)

3. 1964 Reds (15.8 K%)

4, 1965 Reds (2.9 HR%)

5. 1965 Phillies (17.7 HR%)

6. 1967 Giants (2.3 HR%)

7. 1967 Braves (2.6 HR%)

NL Averages	`	BIP%	BABIP	BB%	K%	HR%
2007		0.706	0.301	0.085	0.173	0.027
2008		0.697	0.298	0.088	0.181	0.027
2009		0.0693	0.299	0.09	0.184	0.025

Jason kendall	BIP%	BABIP	BB%	K%	HR%
2007	0.834	0.259	0.06	0.082	0.006
2008	0.813	0.265	0.085	0.077	0.003
2009	0.766	0.27	0.087	0.11	0.004

Prince Fielder	BIP%	BABIP	BB%	K%	HR%
2007	0.596	0.283	0.132	0.178	0.073
2008	0.62	0.298	0.121	0.193	0.049
2009	0.597	0.315	0.153	0.192	0.064

Rickie Weeks	BIP%	BABIP	BB%	K%	HR%
2007	0.557	0.287	0.154	0.229	0.032
2008	0.627	0.277	0.118	0.205	0.025
2009	0.611	0.313	0.074	0.241	0.056

Casey McGehee	BIP%	BABIP	BB%	K%	HR%
2007	DNP	DNP	DNP	DNP	DNP
2008	0.68	0.235	0	0.32	0
2009	0.7	0.33	0.086	0.17	0.041

J.J. Hardy	BIP%	BABIP	BB%	K%	HR%
2007	0.781	0.279	0.063	0.114	0.041
2008	0.722	0.305	0.083	0.156	0.038
2009	0.697	0.26	0.092	0.183	0.024

Alcides Escobar	BIP%	BABIP	BB%	K%	HR%
2007	DNP	DNP	DNP	DNP	DNP
2008	0.75	0.667	0	0.25	0
2009	0.813	0.304	0.03	0.134	0.007

Ryan Braun	BIP%	BABIP	BB%	K%	HR%
2007	0.63	0.361	0.056	0.228	0.069
2008	0.677	0.305	0.063	0.195	0.056
2009	0.685	0.353	0.081	0.171	0.045

Mike Cameron	BIP%	BABIP	BB%	K%	HR%
2007	0.607	0.298	0.103	0.246	0.032
2008	0.553	0.296	0.106	0.28	0.049
2009	0.588	0.304	0.119	0.248	0.038

Corey Hart	BIP%	BABIP	BB%	K%	HR%
2007	0.696	0.321	0.064	0.175	0.042
2008	0.755	0.293	0.041	0.166	0.03
2009	0.676	0.305	0.091	0.195	0.025

Dates	IP	R	H+BB+HBP	Pitches
1. April 13-18, 2009	11	7	16	203
2. April 29-May 9, 2009	20	5	22	326
3. June 16-July 1, 2009	26.7	7	34	455
4. July 30-August 29, 2009	41.3	23	62	756
16 GS	99	42	134	1740