I've designed an informal index to rank relievers according to the % of leads they converted. The index should be read like ERA+ or OPS+, where 100 = average. I calculate each individual's leads converted % against the league average %. So, in the 2007 NL, where the league average leads converted was .085085, I divide the player's % of leads converted by the league average, and then multiple that number by 100 (i.e., 85085 / 85085 = 1 x 100 = 100 = league average).

Here's a list of relievers with 10 or more leads opportunities from the NL in 2007, arranged according to number of leads opportunities, and then according to their % of leads converted.

***

(An example of the calculation is... Brian Fuentes (28/35, 80%), so 80000 / 85085 = 0.94 x 100 = 94.0. This number is simply an index number used to more accurately compare relievers according to each other and according to league average. It should be read simply like ERA+ or OPS+, where 100 = average. +100 = above league average, -100 = below league average.).

40-54 opportunities

Brandon Lyon, Ari: 37 leads converted (35 hld, 2 sv)           40 opportunities          108.7

Kevin Gregg, Fla: 38 leads converted (32 sv, 6 hld)              42 opportunities          106.3

Takashi Saito, LAD: 40 leads converted (39 sv, 1 hld)          44 opportunities          106.8

Heath Bell, SD: 36 leads converted (34 hld, 2 sv)                 40 opportunities          105.7

 

Jose Valverde, Ari: 47 leads converted (47 sv)                      54 opportunities          102.3

Francisco Cordero, Mil: 44 leads converted (44 sv)               51 opportunities          101.4

Jon Rauch, Was: 37 leads converted (33 hld, 4 sv)                43 opportunities          101.1

Trevor Hoffman, SD: 42 leads converted (42 sv)                  49 opportunities          100.7

Jonathan Broxton, LAD: 34 leads converted (32 hld, 2 sv)   40 opportunities          99.9

Chad Cordero, Was: 38 leads converted (37 sv, 1 hld)          47 opportunities          95.0

 

40-54 opportunities: 393 leads converted / 450 opportunities, .87333                       102.6

In this first group, we see a small group of relievers that were able to face a lot of leads opportunities because of their role. The interesting thing about these relievers is that while only two of them were below league average as a whole (Broxton and Chad Cordero), six of the ten relievers were below the group average, meaning that although they were mostly better than a leaguer average NL reliever, most of the members of this group did not do their job as well as the average of the group. This suggests, in some ways, that it is very tough to find a closer that converts leads at 90% or higher (which Lyon, Gregg, Saito, and Bell accomplished). Meanwhile, closers that convert fewer than 90% of their leads are much less valuable because not only are they closer to league average, and therefore more easily replaced, but they are also not converted leads at a % demanded by the role.

According to the 2007 NL, relievers that face 40-54 opportunities should convert leads above 87%.

31-39 opportunities

Jason Isringhausen, StL: 32 leads converted (32 sv)              34 opportunities          110.6

Manuel Corpas, Col: 35 leads converted (19 sv, 16 hld)        38 opportunities          108.3

Derrick Turnbow, Mil: 34 leads converted (33 hld, 1 sv)       37 opportunities          108.0

Matt Capps, Pit: 33 leads converted (18 sv, 15 hld)              36 opportunities          107.7

Tony Pena, Ari: 32 leads converted (30 hld, 2 sv)                 35 opportunities          107.5

Rafael Soriano, Atl: 28 leads converted (19 hld, 9 sv)           31 opportunities          106.2

Ryan Dempster, ChC: 28 leads converted (28 sv)                 31 opportunities          106.2

Bob Howry, ChC: 30 leads converted (22 hld, 8 sv)             34 opportunities          103.7

 

Billy Wagner, NYM: 34 leads converted (34 sv)                   39 opportunities          102.5

Brad Hennessey, SF: 32 leads converted (19 sv, 13 hld)       37 opportunities          101.6

David Weathers, Cin: 33 leads converted (33 sv)                  39 opportunities          99.4

Ryan Franklin, StL: 26 leads converted (25 hld, 1 sv)          31 opportunities          98.6

Chad Qualls, Hou: 26 leads converted (21 hld, 5 sv)             32 opportunities          95.5

Brian Fuentes, Col: 28 leads converted (20 hld, 8 sv)            35 opportunities          94.0

Brad Lidge, Hou: 26 leads converted (19 sv, 7 hld)              34 opportunities          89.9

 

31-39 opportunities: 457 leads converted / 523 opportunities, .87380                       102.7

  20-28 opportunities

J.C. Romero, Phi: 22 leads converted (22 hld)                       23 opportunities          112.4

Pedro Feliciano, NYM: 20 leads comverted (18 hld, 2 sv)    22 opportunities          106.8

Matt Lindstrom, Fla: 19 leads converted (19 hld)                  21 opportunities          106.3

Brett Myers, Phi: 24 leads converted (21 sv, 3 hld)               27 opportunities          104.5

Brian Shouse, Mil: 22 leads converted (21 hld, 1 sv)             25 opportunities          103.4

Saul Rivera, Was: 22 leads converted (19 hld, 3 sv)              25 opportunities          103.4

Justin Miller, Fla: 17 leads converted (17 hld)                       20 opportunities          99.9

Aaron Heilman, NYM: 23 leads converted (22 hld, 1 sv)      28 opportunities          96.5

A. Alfonseca, Phi: 23 leads converted (15 hld, 8 sv)             28 opportunities          96.5

 

Dan Wheeler, Hou: 17 leads converted (11 sv, 6 hld)            21 opportunities          95.1

Tom Gordon, Phi: 20 leads converted (14 hld, 6 sv)              25 opportunities          94.0

LaTroy Hawkins, Col: 18 leads converted (18 hld)               23 opportunities          91.9

Renyel Pinto, Fla: 17 leads converted (16 hld, 1 sv)              22 opportunities          90.8

Bob Wickman, Atl: 20 leads converted (20 sv)                      26 opportunities          90.4

Jorge Julio, Col: 16 leads converted (16 hld)                         21 opportunities          89.5

Salomon Torres, Pit: 17 leads converted (12 sv, 5 hld)          23 opportunities          86.9

Scott Linebrink, SD: 16 leads converted (15 hld, 1 sv)         22 opportunities          85.5

Shawn Chacon, Pit: 13 leads converted (12 hld, 1 sv)           20 opportunities          76.4

 

20-28 opportunities: 346 leads converted / 422 opportunities, .81991                       96.3

I put these two groups together because they are a study in contrasts. It seems that the relievers that faced 31-39 opportunities were actually the best relievers in the NL of those that faced 20 or more opportunities. Again, like the higher appearance closers, their role requires a higher lead conversion %, and they need to do their job at a high level. Unlike the higher appearance relievers, however, these relievers are more readily available, and it seems to be easier to find a reliever that faces 31-39 leads and does their job well than a reliever that faces 40-54 leads and does their job well. Perhaps this suggests something about how managers use their bullpen; maybe all relievers should be provided a lower number of appearances with a lead, in the hopes that more members of the bullpen can participate in a leads converted opportunity, and more relievers can do their job well.

By contrast, the 20-28 group was the worst of those relievers that faced 20 or more leads opportunities. As a whole, this group was below league average, meaning that their level of production is very easily replaced on any given team in the NL. This group is full of a range of good middle innings set up men that simply do not face a ton of leads, but do their jobs very well (Romero, Lindstrom, Feliciano, Shouse, and Rivera), and closers that do not face a lot of opportunities, or were bad at their job and were replaced (Myers, Gordon, Wickman).

I think that the lower leads converted% of the 20-28 group reflects managerial usage of relievers more than any other group. What is suggests to me is that by saving their better relievers for later in the game, managers then use relievers that are not as good in the middle innings, and these are the relievers that face 20-28 leads opportunities a year. They're not as good as top closers and set-up men, so they face less high leverage situations to begin with, and they also face fewer appearances because a starter is more likely to make it into the 6th or 7th than into the 8th or 9th. All of these factors taken together create a below average group from 20-28. I'd suggest that this is the aspect of bullpen management that needs to change the most.

10-19 opportunities

Joe Beimel, LAD: 17 leads converted (16 hld, 1 sv)              17 opportunities          117.6

Damaso Marte, Pit: 15 leads converted (15 hld)                    15 opportunities          117.6

Will Ohman, ChC: 13 leads converted (12 hld, 1 sv)             13 opportunities          117.6

Lee Gardner, Fla: 11 leads converted (9 sv, 2 hld)                11 opportunities          117.6

Ray King, Was: 10 leads converted (10 hld)                          10 opportunities          117.6

Doug Brocail, SD: 10 leads converted (10 hld)                     10 opportunities          117.6

Joe Smith, NYM: 10 leads converted (10 hld)                       10 opportunities          117.6

Carlos Marmol, ChC: 17 leads converted (16 hld, 1 sv)        18 opportunities          110.9

Randy Flores, StL: 15 leads converted (14 hld, 1 sv)                        16 opportunities          110.2

Tyler Yates, Atl: 15 leads converted (13 hld, 2 sv)                16 opportunities          110.2

Brian Wilson, SF: 15 leads converted (9 hld, 6 sv)                16 opportunities          110.2

Matt Wise, Mil: 14 leads converted (13 hld, 1 sv)                 15 opportunities          109.7

S. Schoeneweis, NYM: 13 leads converted (11 hld, 2 sv)     14 opportunities          109.1

T. Tankersley, Fla: 17 leads converted (16 hld, 1 sv)             19 opportunities          105.2

Carlos Villanueva, Mil: 17 leads converted (16 hld, 1 sv)      19 opportunities          105.2

 

Jack Taschner, SF: 13 leads converted (13 hld)                     15 opportunities          101.9

Trever Miller, Hou: 13 leads converted (12 hld, 1 sv)            15 opportunities          101.9

Russ Springer, StL: 11 leads converted (11 hld)                    13 opportunities          99.4

Steve Kline, SF: 11 leads converted (9 hld, 2 sv)                  13 opportunities          99.4

Jesus Colome, Was: 13 leads converted (12 hld, 1 sv)           16 opportunities          95.5

Kevin Correia, SF: 12 leads converted (12 hld)                     15 opportunities          94.0

Jared Burton, Cin: 11 leads converted (11 hld)                      14 opportunities          92.3

Mike Stanton, Cin: 10 leads converted (10 hld)                     13 opportunities          90.4

A. Benitez, Fla: 11 leads converted (11 hld)                          16 opportunities          80.8

Cla Meredith, SD: 10 leads converted (10 hld)                      15 opportunities          78.4

 

10-19 opportunities: 324 leads converted / 364 opportunities, .89011                       104.6

The relievers that face 10-19 opportunities have the highest percentage of any group of NL relievers because, let's face it, they face fewer opportunities and thus probably have more leverage to succeed. They are probably less likely to work multiple days in the week in this group, and they are also relievers that are used for multiple tasks. Some that snuck into this group, like Wilson, Marmol, and Beimel, have the chance of being better relievers than this group indicates, and simply faced a different opportunity in the bullpen for 2007. They will all likely face different roles throughout 2008.

In celebration of Braun's 8-year contract, let's take a trip through the history of baseball and look at some of the greats that had seasons at age 23 that match Braun's rookie campaign...

I generally looked for guys that hit for high average, had OBP .400 or under, and had a very high SLG.

Here's what I found, with my favorites marked...

Braun (23, 2007): 146 H, 26 2B, 6 3B, 34 HR, 15/20 SB, 112/29 K, .324/.370/.634 (1.004)

Greenberg (23, 1934): 201 H, 63 2B, 7 3B, 26 HR, 9/14 SB, 93/63 K, .339/.404/.600 (1.004)

Juan Gonzalez (23, 1993): 166 H, 33 2B, 1 3B, 46 HR, 4/5 SB, 99/37 K, .310/.368/.632 (1.000)

Mize (23, 1936): 469 PA, 414 AB, 136 H, 30 2B, 8 3B, 19 HR, 1 SB, 32/50 K, .329/.402/.577 (0.979)

Aaron (23, 1957): 198 H, 27 2B, 6 3B, 44 HR, ½ SB, 58/57 K, .322/.378/.600 (0.978)

V. Guerrero (23, 1999): 193 H, 37 2B, 5 3B, 42 HR, 14/21 SB, 62/55 K, .316/.378/.600 (0.978)

F. Robinson (23, 1959): 168 H, 31 2B, 4 3B, 36 HR, 18/26 SB, 93/69 K, .311/.391/.583 (0.974)

DiMaggio (23, 1938): 215 H, 35 2B, 15 3B, 46 HR, 3 SB, 37/64 K, .324/.386/.581 (0.967)

Lynn (23, 1975): 175 H, 47 2B, 7 3B, 21 HR, 10/15 SB, 90/62 K, .331/.401/.566 (0.967)

Bottomley (23, 1923): 194 H, 34 2B, 14 3B, 8 HR, 4/10 SB, 44/45 K, .371/.425/.535 (0.960)

M. Ramirez (23, 1995): 149 H, 26 2B,  1 3B, 31 HR, 6/12 SB, 112/75 K, .308/.402/.558 (0.960)

Conseco (23, 1988): 187 H, 34 2B, 42 HR, 40/56 SB, 128/78 K, .307/.391/.569 (.960)

W. Clark (23, 1987): 163 H, 29 2B, 5 3B, 35 HR, 5/22 SB, 98/49 K, .308/.371/.580 (0.951)

H. Ramirez (23, 2007): 212 H, 48 2B, 6 3B, 29 HR, 51/65 SB, 95/52 K, .332/.386/.562 (0.948)

Duke Snider (23, 1950): 199 H, 31 2B, 10 3B, 31 HR, 16 SB, 79/58 K, .321/.379/.553 (0.932)

Mattingly (23, 1984): 207 H, 44 2B, 2 3B, 23 HR, ½ SB, 33/41 K, .343/.381/.537 (0.918)

Don Hurst (23, 1929): 179 H, 29 2B, 4 3B, 31 HR, 10 SB, 36/80 K, .304/.390/.525 (0.915)

A. Jones (23, 2000): 199 H, 36 2B, 6 3B, 36 HR, 21/27 SB, 100/59 K, .303/.366/.541 (0.907)

Bob Meusel (23, 1920): 151 H, 40 2B, 7 3B, 11 HR, 4/8 SB, 72/20 K, .328/.359/.517 (0.876)

*** Allen (23, 1965): 187 H, 31 2B, 14 3B, 20 HR, 15/17 SB, 150/74 K, .302/.375/.494 (0.869)

It's been a bit difficult finding good spots to update the bullpen stats. The bullpen had one tough day in Houston, and then did not face a single tie or lead in Florida. But, now we've got some leads to add to the mix from this great St.Louis series win:

Adjusted Bullpen Stats May 2-4

Adjusted leads converted (3/5, 60%; season 44/58, 76%)

Shouse 1/1 (hold)

Mota 1/1 (hold)

Torres 1/1 (tie)

Gagne 0/1 (SVO)

Stetter 0/1 (tie)

Shared blown saves: 0

Adjusted reliever WHIP (season) (R+IS)/(BB+H+IR):

Stetter: 13% (2+0)/(3+6+6)

Shouse: 32% (5+5)/(3+8+20)

Riske: 32% (10+1)/(8+19+7)

Torres: 28%  (7+3)/(8+21+7)

McClung: 40% (7+1)/(9+10+1)

Gagne: 41% (10+1)/(10+15+2)

Bush (reliever only): 33% (0+1)/(0+1+2)

Series: 2/1 (Bush 2/1)

Scoreless IP (season):

Torres: 15.0

Mota: 14.3

Riske: 11.3

Gagne: 9.7

Stetter: 8.3

McClung: 7.7

Shouse: 6.7

Turnbow: 3.0

Bush: 1.0

Bullpen Stats May 6-12 (Florida and St. Louis)

Adjusted leads converted (4/5, 80%; season 48/63, 76%)

Shouse: 1/1 (save)

Mota: 1/1 (save)

Torres: 1/1 (hold)

Riske: 1/1 (hold)

Gagne: 0/1 (tie)

Shared blown saves: 0

Adjusted reliever WHIP (season) (R+IS)/(BB+H+IR):

Stetter: 15% (3+0)/(8+6+6)

Mota: 17% (4+1)/(11+13+6)

Torres: 28%  (8+3)/(10+23+7)

Shouse: 30% (5+6)/(5+10+22)

Riske: 30% (11+1)/(8+22+10)

McClung: 32% (7+1)/(11+13+1)

Gagne: 40% (13+1)/(13+20+2)

Bush (reliever only): 33% (0+1)/(0+1+2)

Series: 9/1 (Florida: Riske 3/0, St. Louis: Mota 4/0, Shouse 2/1)

Scoreless IP (season):

Torres: 16.7

Mota: 15.7

Riske: 14.3

Gagne: 10.7

Stetter: 10.3

McClung: 11.7

Shouse: 8.3

Turnbow: 3.0

Bush: 1.0

Much has been made of the Brewers collective slump on offense, but at this point of the season we ought to dive into the issue and see what we can actually learn about our batters' plate approaches.

First, what goes into a plate approach? Presuably each hitter has a goal in the box, and this goal could be more or less specific due to a particular line up spot, or a particular game situation. But, I think there are at least four general aspects of a plate approach: (1) the ability to get on base, (2) the ability to see a lot of pitches, (3) the ability to draw a walk, and (4) the ability to get a hit. (3) sort of requires (2), and both (3) and (4) are related to (1), and help to compose (1). I think I placed the ability to see a lot of pitches in front of the actual abilty to draw a walk and get a hit because walking and hitting will depend upon the types of pitches a batter sees, and presumably a batter will be able to judge pitches better when he sees more pitches. Of course, there are extreme cases: a batter could presumably bat 1.000 by getting a hit off the first pitch every time, and a batter could also bat 0,000 by getting outs after 10 pitches every time.

In the middle, we find major league hitters, who more than likely know their pitch, and know what they're looking for in a given situation, and thus at the plate will find a certain combination of seeing pitches, getting on base, and then their rewards: getting hits and taking walks.

So, first things first: what are the Brewers' OBP?

1. Kendall .366

2. Fielder .362

3. Hart .357

4. Hardy .321

5. Weeks .319

6. Braun .296

7. Hall .278

8. Cameron .277

This list right here helps to explain the Brewers' collective slump -- 5 of 8 batters are currently getting on base at below the league average.

But, let's dig further....how many pitches are these batters taking?

NP/PA

1. Cameron 4.30 (202/47)

2. Hall 4.20 (609/145)

3. Weeks 4.04 (658/163)

4. Hardy 3.96 (523/132)

5. Fielder 3.85 (573/149)

6. Kendall 3.76 (466/124)

7. Hart 3.59 (506/141)

8. Braun 3.53 (536/152)

I found this list to be incredibly counter-intuitive. I thought for sure that Weeks would be at the top, and though he's not far off, surely Hall and Cameron are somewhat surprising entries (especially given their current OBP). Hardy also falls in the surprising camp of batters that see a good nuber of pitches without getting on base. The only below league average OBPer on our team that does not seem to have a surprising NP/PA is Braun -- it shouldn't be all that surprising that a batter that takes 3.53 NP/PA would get on base at a clip below .300....what will help to develop this point is to see if Braun's future hot streaks correspond with taking more pitches. It could be that Braun is more like Hart, who does not take a lot of pitches, but gets on base at a good clip anyway (basically due to hits).

So, while we're thinking of the significance of taking pitches, we can enhance our understanding of taking pitches by looking at the results. Here are the Brewers' BB/PA and H/PA. For the sake of keeping this at least a little compact, I did not include other productive PAs, like a HBP, SH, or SF...

1. Fielder 12.8% (19/149)

2. Weeks 12.3% (20/163)

3. Cameron 10.64% (5/47)

4. Hardy 10.61% (14/132)

5. Hall 8.9% (13/145)

6. Kendall 7.3% (9/124)

7. Hart 7.1% (10/141)

8. Braun 4.6% (7/152)

1. Hart 26.2% (37/141)

2. Braun 25% (38/152)

3. Kendall 25% (31/124)

4. Hardy 21.2% (28/132)

5. Fielder 20.8% (31/149)

6. Hall 18.6% (27/145)

7. Cameron 17% (8/47)

8. Weeks 16.6% (27/163)

Here we can get a snapshot of how different batters are balanced in creating the largest portion of their OBP (most players construct the largest part of their OBP with hits and walks). Not surprisingly, Fielder is fairly balanced, as are Cameron and Weeks, although their BB and H totals might be close to one another because of hitting slumps rather than offensive balance. A larger number of PA might help to affirm or refute this.

What seems clear is that Braun, Kendall, Hart, and Hardy have the most unbalanced distribution between walks and hits; of course, this is because each of them rely heavily upon hits to get on base. None of us will complain about this lack of balance when they get on base regularly (like Hart), and by comparison, most fans would probably have a player like Hart get on base largely through the hit than a player like Weeks get on base roughly equally between hits and walks, but fail to get on base regularly (as Weeks is currently having problems with...).

Now, I feel confident suggesting some type of aggregate list. Adding each of these together, I offer the following list (using OBP as a tiebreaker):

Fielder: 13

Kendall: 16 (.366)

Hardy: 16 (.321)

Hart: 18 (.357)

Weeks: 18 (.319)

Cameron: 19 (.277)

Hall: 20 (.278)

Braun: 24 (.296)

Presumably, then, if we wanted to put together the best line up according to plate approaches, we might end up with a batting order that looked something like this. What's interesting is that  Kendall, Fielder, Hart, and Hardy comprise the top 4 in OBP (in that order), so the list roughly mimicks OBP, although perhaps what we gain by looking at NP/PA, H/PA, and BB/PA is a certain way to distribute those top OBP players. In this case, we place the balanced Fielder first, and then the hit-heavy Kendall, Hardy, and Hart follow.

I hope that this has been a thought provoking exercise into what can be found in an analysis of the plate approach, and perhaps this will also help us figure out how to organize a batting order.

*************************************************************

One amendment to this list I would like to also suggest is utilizing the number of extra base hits as an analysis of the plate approach. Part of me wonders if it would be best to consider that a player's plate approach might best be judged by (1) the ability to get on base, (2) the ability to collect extra bases (i.e., get to second without requiring an SB or sacrifice), (3) number of pitches, (4) number of hits, and (5) number of walks.

One could argue that given two players that hit and get on base equally, the player that collects more extra base hits is more valuable because of their ability to get to second.

Here's how the Brewers look in XBH/PA, and here's how that changes our rankings of plate approaches:

Adjusted: XBH

Braun: 10.5% (16/152)

Hall: 8.9% (13/145)

Cameron: 8.5% (4/47)

Kendall: 8.1% (10/124)

Weeks: 7.4% (12/163)

Fielder: 7.4% (11/149)

Hart: 7.1% (10/141)

Hardy: 3.0% (4/132)

Fielder: 19

Kendall: 20

Hall: 22 (.278)

Cameron: 22 (.277)

Weeks: 23

Hardy: 24

Hart: 25 (.357)

Braun: 25 (.296)

What is interesting about this shift is that Fielder and Kendall remain the most valuable batters based on plate approaches, even considering their ability to hit extra base hits. Cameron and Hall jump up to the middle of the order -- even with their shortcomings to get on base, their slugging ability might make their vacations on the basepaths more meaningful. Oddly enough, Weeks remains at 5, Hardy and Hart fall to the bottom of the order, and even his ability to slug an extra base hit in 10% of his PA does not bring Braun out of the 8th spot (although now he's tied with Hart, who is arguably more valuable because of his OBP all together....)

The Brewers starting pitchers have not pitched a quality start in six games, since Gallardo's quality start no-decision at Wrigley Field. The result. along with an offense that scored 16 runs in 6 games, seems fairly obvious: no quality starts equal no wins (along with no offense, of course).

Part of me wonders if quality starts will actually be the answer, however. Because of the number of close games the bullpen has been thrown into, and the offensive woes, the Brewers have not capitalized on what few quality starts have been pitched. Of the 13 quality starts pitched thus far, 10 have gone for no decisions or a loss:

Quality Starts: 0-1, 10 GS, 66 IP, 50 H, 15 R, 38 K/20 BB; 2.05 runs average, 6.60 IP/GS

Suppan (4/8, 19, and 24): 0-0, 20.7 IP, 14 H, 4 R, 7 K/6 BB

Gallardo (4/20, 25, and 5/1): 0-0, 20 IP, 19 H, 4 R, 13 K/6 BB

Villanueva (4/21 and 26): 0-0, 13 IP, 9 H, 4 R, 6 K/4 BB

Sheets (3/31): 0-0, 6.3 IP, 2 H, 0 R, 7 K/2 BB

Bush (4/15): 0-1, 6.0 IP, 6 H, 3 R, 5 K/2 BB

Suppan's quality starts are the biggest benefactor of this bizarre trend, and this is a particularly difficult trend for Suppan because he is a pitcher that, while eating IP, only tends to pitch around 50% (perhaps more, perhaps a bit less) quality starts throughout a season. To waste his quality starts is problematic because the offense will then need to face the task of scoring enough runs to overcome his poor outings.

The same might be said for Villanueva and Bush, and even Sheets' quality starts shouldn't be wasted, although he pitches enough quality starts that it's not as big of a problem to waste one here or there.

The bottom line is, a quality start indicates that a pitcher has pitched fairly deep into the game, allowing 3 or fewer runs, a start that should certainly keep the team in the ballgame, and give the team a good chance of winning. I wholeheartedly believe that a team that pitches more quality starts more frequently than another team will have a much better chance at winning games -- so, not only do the Brewers find themselves in the difficult situation of not receiving many quality starts (only 13 thus far), they also find themselves in the position of failing to win a very large majority.