Milwaukee Brewers Blog - The Junkball Blues : Manny Parra

2009 Rotation I: Yovani Gallardo and Manny Parra

radio silence — Thu, 09 Oct 2008 01:46:14 GMT

This is a continuation of my current project, which is to quantify the extent to which the Brewers' 2009 rotation core is average, below average, above average, without Sheets or Sabathia.

Preliminary links: 2008 survey of 100+ IP NL starters; Analysis of rotation levels from 1-5 and Brewers' rotation without Sheets and Sabathia.

I am more and more interested in the ways in which our thinking about starting pitchers affects our understanding of the strengthes and shortcomings of a Bush, Gallardo, Parra, Suppan McClung, Villanueva rotation. That's not to say right off the bat that the Brewers' rotation is complete as is, but the result might be to seriously consider the extent to which the Crew needs to spend a ton of $$$ on a top rotation pitcher, or whether those $$$ would be better spent on rotation depth.

***

Until any movement or signings, we can analyze the players currently under contract control. My first project is Gallardo and Parra, because they present excellent changes and endless possibilities for analysis. It's damn near impossible to project baseball production in the first place, but it's even more difficult with young players that have not fully developed their skills, pitched multiple seasons, or set of the parameters of their performance levels (i.e., what's a good year, what's an average year, what's their worst level, etc.).

So, more than anything, with Gallardo and Parra I asked two questions:

(a) what would certain types of regressions or improvements look like?

and

(b) how much of an impact can we expect IP development to be?

I believe that for young pitchers that are still developing and have yet to pitch 90-120 starts in the majors, (b) is probably more important than (a), if only because workload adjustments in earlier years, while adjusting and developing to the majors, seem more likely to affect production.

This is only an intuition and is not a fact, but it is an intuition I have nonetheless, and would like to scrutinize it.

So, with that, let's look at Gallardo:

Gallardo (23): 24 G, 21 GS, 134.3 IP, 125 H, 53 R, 121 K/45 BB; 15 quality starts; 3.55 runs average, 5.60 IP/G

Raw Average: 34 G, 30 GS, 190.3 IP, 177 H, 75 R, 171 K/64 BB; 21 quality starts; 3.55 runs average, 5.60 IP/G

10% increase: 34 G, 30 GS, 209.3 IP, 176 H, 74 R, 206 K/63 BB; 23 quality starts; 3.18 runs average, 6.16 IP/G

20% decrease: 34 G, 30 GS, 152.3 IP, 169 H, 72 R, 110 K/61 BB; 17 quality starts; 4.25 runs average, 4.48 IP/G

IP Progression:

2004: 26 IP (R, A)

2005: 121.3 IP (A)

2006: 155 IP (A+, AA) (+.278)

2007: 77.7 IP (AAA); 110.3 IP (MLB) (+.213)

2008: 15.7 IP (AAA); 24 IP (MLB) (-.789)
Ideal 2008: 218.3 IP (MLB) (+.161)
Ideal 2009: 244.3 IP (MLB) (+.119)

Gallardo's career opening probably could not have gone any better, and then a series of freak injuries derailed him for an entire year. Although Gallardo had worked up three seasons worth of strong IP totals, from 120, to 155, to 188, the sheer lack of any regular IP and any regular routine in 2008 present huge sets of question marks for his spot in the 2009 rotation.

While Gallardo's production levels are strong -- his averages rest him in the approximate range of a strong top rotation starter, even if he is short of an ace or elite producer -- his IP development dropped at least 148 IP off course, and possibly more than 175 IP off course. The 175 IP number is based around an approximate estimate of Gallardo's 2008 ideal IP total using the descending percentage of IP increases from 2006-2007.

The good news:

-Gallardo is 23 and well within the service requirements for another option. A trip to the minors is neither career-altering nor detrimental to his development, and we're not talking about cheating a guy out of a polished season during his prime. Further development is an option for Gallardo and the Brewers should it be necessary..

-Gallardo is closer to a 3.20 runs average than a 4.20 runs average

-Gallardo is closer to a 1.15 WHIP than a 1.50 WHIP.

-Gallardo is closer to 20 quality starts than 15 quality starts.

What this means is not exactly clear because there is no good way to project a production level for Gallardo in 2009 (what are the bets that the injury ruined his stamina to the point that he spends 2009 recovering rather than producing, and drops below league average? More bizarre things have happened to young pitchers -- like two non-consecutiive, unrelated knee injuries in the same season occurring to a 22-year old developing top rotation pitcher....). However, these are basic parameters for certain trends should Gallardo pitch the entire 2009 season, with one trend representing a noted but rather modest improvement, the other representing a rather significant regression.

Parra (26): 41 G, 31 GS, 192.3 IP, 206 H, 104 R, 173 K/87 BB; 11 quality starts; 4.87 runs average, 4.69 IP/G

Raw Average: 34 G, 26 GS, 159.7 IP, 171 H, 86 R, 144 K/72 BB; 9 quality starts; 4.87 runs average, 4.69 IP/G

20% increase: 34 G, 26 GS, 190.7 IP, 164 H, 83 R, 205 K/68 BB; 11 quality starts; 3.92 runs average, 5.61 IP/G

10% decrease: 34 G, 26 GS, 144.3 IP, 184 H, 85 R, 117 K/71 BB; 8 quality starts; 5.30 runs average, 4.25 IP/G

IP Progression:

2002: 50 IP (R)

2003: 139 IP (A)

2004: 73 IP (A+, AA) (-.475)

2005: 91 IP (AA) (+.247)

2006: 86 IP (A+, AA) (-.055)

2007: 106.7 IP (AA, AAA), 26.3 IP (MLB) (+.547)

2008: 166 IP (MLB) (+.248)

My concerns about Parra have completely turned in the opposite direction since I thought about the results of this survey. Initially, I seemed convinced of Parra's talent and production level and concerned with his IP development after a sketchy injury history. Now I am much more concerned about Parra's production than his IP development.

Shutting down Parra might have been Sveum's best and longest-lasting strategy, and I'm being dead serious. The only other result of his tenure that readily beats the potential long-term impact of shutting down a tired Parra is the potential future financial impact of making the playoffs. Given that Sveum managed to (a) make the playoffs while (b) shutting Parra down leads me to re-analyze my own position about Sveum and what he accomplished in two brief weeks.

Needless to say, after a necessarily large IP increase in 2007 after years of injurt rehab, Parra did not necessarily have the stamina to finish strong during another IP increase in 2008, but the fact that the Brewers cut him out when he was tiring shows a surprising amount of foresight in the midst of a pennant race -- thankfully that fatigue was accompanied by ineffectiveness, so even if Parra wasn't truly tired and didn't truly need to be rested, his ineffectiveness played the de facto role of forcing the Brewers to address their (previously lacking) plan for limiting Parra's workload.

Now to the performance. Parra will not realize his potential if he does not pitch aggressively, stop nibbling, and rely on that power fastball. I am not arguing that Parra has bad stuff; for anyone that has not watched Parra up close, I highly recommend buying a ticket right behind home plate for one of his starts. I did so during a mid-afternoon discount game against the Cardinals, and was blown away by the strength and movement of his stuff when he's right -- it's his control and his approach that are constantly and coming and goind, and unfortunately no matter how powerful your stuff is or how much your stuff moves, if you do not use proper or appropriate pitch sequencing or pitch aggressively, all of that is a waste. For most of the season I felt this was an issue with Kendall. I get that he wants these young pitchers to learn, but there's something to be said in favor of Parra raring back and blowing that fastball by batters, rather than focusing on nibbling around the plate with his blurry set of breaking pitches.

This might actually be a point against Parra -- he huge suitcase of off-speed pitches rivals that of Dave Bush and Jeff Suppan, and really, it's not clear that Parra needs to be more than a 3-pitch pitcher. And I mean that as a compliment. I am such a firm believer in Parra's stuff that I think he could get by with an aggressive rotation of fastballs and a trimmed down set of breaking pitches.

Thus, I flipped around the scenario for Parra from that of Gallardo, as their scenarios in general seem to be flipped: afterall, whereas Gallardo pitched entirely too few innings in 2008, there were serious questions until mid-September about how many innings would be too many for Parra. And here's the issue: if we work with a rather significant improvement, Parra jumps flat into the solid range of a top rotation pitcher. But a marked but rather modest regression lowers his production to a rather unsatisfactory level.

Which leads me to be concerned more with Parra's production and Gallardo's innings workload in 2009. But the recap need not be negative, even if we could raise 100,001 questions and concerns about our young pitching combination. Let's be positive: Gallardo's strong riding fastball and backwards-pitching set up is simply stunning, and his ability to pitch, his composure, and his overall development appear years beyond his age. Parra's power stuff supplies the Brewers with a rather rare and coveted asset -- a left-handed pitcher with a strong arm.

The upside for this duo could easily carry the Brewers to the playoffs in 2009 and beyond. The downsides and question marks need to be thoroughly analyzed because I firmly believe that it will be issues of workload, the progression of innings, and the development of pitch selection / pitching approaches that help to make two strong, complementary seasons from these two pitchers possible in 2009.

So what do we expect?

Pitching with two outs....

radio silence — Tue, 20 May 2008 16:44:27 GMT

Here is a link to a story I wrote for SportsBubbler's Brewers page about the Brewers starting pitching. Specifically, I analyzed the results of our starters' approaches with two outs recorded in an inning; I recorded the R, H, BB, E, and HBP allowed once two outs were recorded. Somewhat surprisingly, there was actually a significant trend in Brewers losses vs. Brewers wins: our starting pitchers systematically allow more R and BB during losses when two outs are recorded, versus wins. Perhaps not surprisingly, our pitchers that do not have the strongest stuff allow the most runs with two outs already recorded (Suppan, Bush, Villanueva), and our pitchers with stronger stuff allow fewer runs with two outs recorded (Parra, Sheets). Gallardo's sample of starts is really too small to conclude anything significant, although he also tended to allow fewer runs with two outs recorded than his counterpart.

Here are the stats:

Dave Bush: 16 H, 5 BB, 2 E, 15 R (39% H, 28% BB, 50% R)

April 3, 2008 (@ ChC) (L): 1 BB, 1 R

April 9, 2008 (vs. Cin) (L): 0 H, 1 E, 2 R

April 15, 2008 (@ StL) (L): 4 H, 3 R

April 23, 2008 (vs. Phi) (W): 3 H, 1 R

May 7, 2008 (@ Fla) (L): 3 H, 1 BB, 3 R

May 12, 2008 (vs. StL) (W): 3 H, 1 BB, 1 R

May 17, 2008 (@ Bos, 2) (L): 3 H, 2 BB, 1 E, 4 R

Carlos Villanueva: 18 H, 8 BB, 2 E, 12 R (28% H, 50% BB, 32% R)

April 4, 2008 (vs. SF) (W): 3 H, 2 BB, 0 R

April 10, 2008 (vs. Cin) (L): 1 BB, 0 R

April 16, 2008 (@ StL) (L): 1 H, 0 R

April 21, 2008 (vs. StL) (L): 2 H, 4 BB, 2 R

April 26, 2008 (vs. Fla) (W): 1 H, 1 E, 0 R

May 3, 2008 (@ Hou) (L): 1 H, 0 R

May 8, 2008 (@ Fla) (L): 5 H, 1 BB, 1 E, 6 R

May 13, 2008 (vs. LAD) (W): 3 H, 2 R

May 18, 2008 (@ Bos) (L): 2 H, 2 R

Jeff Suppan: 18 H, 8 BB, 1 HBP, 10 R (29% H, 38% BB, 32% R)

April 2, 2008 (@ ChC) (W): 4 H, 0 R

April 8, 2008 (vs. Cin) (W): 4 H, 1 BB, 1 R

April 13, 2008 (@ NYM) (W): 1 H, 1 R

April 19, 2008 (@ Cin) (W): 1 H, 1 BB, 0 R

April 24, 2008 (vs. Phi) (L): 1 H, 1 BB, 0 R

April 30, 2008 (@ ChC) (L): 2 H, 1 R

May 6, 2008 (@ Fla) (L): 2 H, 1 BB, 2 R

May 11, 2008 (vs. StL) (W): 1 H, 2 BB, 1 R

May 17, 2008 (@ Bos, 1) (L): 2 H, 2 BB, 1 HBP, 4 R

Ben Sheets: 13 H, 6 BB, 1 E, 3 R (31% H, 50% BB, 15% R)

March 31, 2008 (@ ChC) (W): 2 BB, 0 R

April 6, 2008 (vs. SF) (W): 3 H, 0 R

April 12, 2008 (@ NYM) (W): 2 H, 1 BB, 1 R

April 18, 2008 (@ Cin) (W): x

April 29, 2008 (@ ChC) (W): 2 BB, 0 R

May 4, 2008 (@ Hou) (L): 3 H, 1 E, 2 R

May 10, 2008 (vs. StL) (L): 4 H, 1 BB, 0 R

May 15, 2008 (vs. LAD) (L): 1 H, 0 R

Yovani Gallardo: 4 H, 2 BB, 1 R (21% H, 33% BB, 25% R)

April 20, 2008 (@ Cin) (L): 2 H, 2 BB, 0 R

April 25, 2008 (vs. Fla) (L): 1 H, 0 R

May 1, 2008 (@ ChC) (W): 1 H, 1 R

Manny Parra: 12 H, 4 BB, 2 E, 4 R (25% H, 18% BB, 16% R)

April 5, 2008 (vs. SF) (W): x

April 11, 2008 (@ NYM) (L): x

April 17, 2008 (@ StL) (W): x

April 22, 2008 (vs. StL) (W): 4 H, 1 E, 1 R

April 27, 2008 (vs. Fla) (L): 3 H, 2 BB, 0 R

May 3, 2008 (@ Hou) (L): 2 H, 1 BB, 0 R

May 9, 2008 (vs. StL) (W): 1 H, 1 R

May 14, 2008 (vs. LAD) (L): 2 H, 1 BB, 1 E, 2 R

Wins: 35 H, 12 BB, 2 E, 11 R with two outs recorded

Losses: 46 H, 20 BB, 4 E, 1 HBP, 34 R with two outs recorded

Part of me wonders if we can isolate the problems with two outs recorded to scouting approaches, pitching plans, or perhaps even composure on the mound. I suppose it's not entirely implausible that runs are likely to score with two outs -- after all, while the first two outs of an inning are recorded, teams can advance runners, or string together a walk or hit earlier in the inning, and cash that run in later. However, part of me thinks that this is one aspect of the pitching that stands out -- some of our starters are not merely allowing runners that are already on base to score with two outs; rather, they record two outs, and then allow home runs, or allow walks and hits after the outs are recorded.

Given the Brewers' recent fortunes, I believe there is a lot that we can analyze and find concern with; this is one aspect of our team's performance that is affecting the Brewers' ability to remain competitive in each and every game.

4/22/08: Observations at Miller Park

radio silence — Wed, 23 Apr 2008 05:20:56 GMT

I am in the middle of job hunting right now, and it is a very stressful time. So, I promised myself yesterday that if I found a few jobs to apply to on Tuesday, I would treat myself to Tuesday’s game. My added incentive was lower level box seats on sale for $22, so I found some job openings, completed my morning appointments, and headed to the stadium to pick up my will call ticket. 118, Row 20, Seat 12.

1. I have not yet sat this close to the action at Miller Park. While the Cleveland Indians were in town during their snow out games, my friends and I sat down the third base line off the dugout. So, those seats were technically “closer” to the field, these seats today placed my right on top of the action.

Today I really captured just how intense every at bat is. Everyone is so focused on each pitch, and after each pitch, the tension explodes, and there is an unfolding of events: the catcher sliding to smother a wild breaking ball, the batter fighting off a sinker, the umpire interacting with the batter, the pitcher following his pitch. I truly appreciate just how difficult this game is for the major leaguers, and the level at which they are playing the game.

2. Manny Parra needs to throw more strikes. And better strikes. Today he finished yet another non-quality start, although it was not an awful start. His start was plagued by nibbling around the strike zone. This disappointed me, because his stuff is clearly good, and he has a very easy time switching speeds, causing deception, and maintaining different velocity levels. Parra has the potential to be one of those quality middle of the rotation (or higher) pitchers that can get by on deception, while having the luxury of sitting on a mid-90s fastball.

Here is an example of some of his velocity sequences:

90-93 (first through second IP)

89-91 (fourth through fifth IP)

73-76 (second through fifth IP)

83-84 (first through fifth IP)

81-82 (third through fifth IP)

I basically found Parra to be working comfortably in the upper 80s and lower 90s, and by the third onward he really established his change up (which I assume to be 81-82). I believe he was also throwing a slider effectively (which I assume to be 83-85). The fact is, by the middle of his start, he was working at least two different mid-80s off speed pitches effectively.

However, his trouble started in the second, where he provided Ludwick with a lead off walk, recorded two fly outs, and then surrendered consecutive singles, including and RBI single to pitcher Kyle Lohse (who now has 3 RBI off of Parra). What could have been an efficient inning took his pitch count to 33, and the top of the order then put Parra through a long third inning, in which Parra through 30 pitches, but got a lot of defensive help from Ryan Braun (who threw out Albert Pujols).

Parra then struggled in the fourth with two outs recorded, allowing two baserunners on two suspect defensive plays (one charged an error, the other a single). He finished the inning without allowing a run, but his pitch count was further damaged.

What I like about Parra is his velocity level, and his mechanics. He has a wide variety of pitches to use, and he has the luxury of that hard fastball in his back pocket. He also seems to vary the fastball velocity at some points, notching different fastball velocity levels in most of his innings pitched. I think that if Parra was more aggressive, he would in turn limit his pitch count, and it seems to me that he needs to simply trust his ability to change speeds.

The perfect model for Parra occurred in the fifth inning, where he regularly set up his fastball with a slow curveball. I forget the particular batter, but he was unhittable when he attacked with his change up, and also when he used his slow curve to set up his blazing fastball. 93 is that much faster and harder when it follows a 74 curveball, especially when the fastball that follows the low curve is placed high in the zone.

3. Seth McClung was the perfect model of a Brewers pitcher pitching aggressively today. He was placed into a tie game in the 12^th, to face Ludwick, Glaus, and La Rue. He started the inning by testing each of his breaking pitches, which come in at two different speeds. He then turned to working his fastball around the zone, and although he can get the ball up to the upper 90s and tough triple digits, he began working the fastball at slower speeds, working up to a consistent 96 by game’s end (ironically, the GameDay guns are much more consistent in reading McClung’s fastball at very high velocities from the start of the inning)..

By moving the fastball around, and focusing on placement and throwing strikes, McClung was able to strike out Ludwick and La Rue looking; La Rue’s strike out was an especially sweet inside fastball that touched 96.

Glaus was the only batter to put a ball in play during the inning, and he tried to time McClung’s fastball. His effort did not work, and he dribbled out to McClung, who threw to first to make the out.

McClung’s outing was a model for what Brewers’ pitchers need to do: change location, vary speeds, throw strikes. Change the places the batter can look in the zone for strikes, and by being aggressive, it forces the batter to beat the pitcher, rather than allowing the pitcher to defeat himself.

4. Cardinals fans are very nice people and very knowledgeable fans. I had the pleasure of sitting next to a diehard Cards fan, and was in a little pocket of Cards fans for the game. It was an enjoyable day at Miller Park from that perspective.